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Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-157
Tuesday
14 August 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-157 *14 August 1990*

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Spokesman Gremitskikh Gives Briefing 13 Aug

Genscher To Visit USSR

LD1308150290 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zaytsev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—West German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will arrive in Moscow on Thursday, August 16, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said at a briefing here today.

On August 17, Genscher will hold talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze.

Gremitskikh recalled that President Gorbachev, President Richard von Weizsaecker of West Germany, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl exchanged congratulations on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty.

Pace of Vienna Talks Slows

LD1308163890 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zaytsev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—"The parties to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe have already reached agreement on more than one third of the future treaty, over half of the protocol on inspections, and many parts of other documents," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today that the delegations reached an important accord on tanks and armored personnel carriers.

"Recent weeks, however, have not produced equally tangible results," Gremitskikh went on. "The tempo of the talks was down. In addition, the rapidly changing situation in Europe, primarily German unification, sets new tasks for the delegations.

"Aviation remains the stumbling block at the talks," Gremitskikh said. He expressed belief that the chances for an accord on aircraft will rise if the geo-strategic interests of the USSR in attending anti-aircraft defense interceptor fighters and land-based aircraft be taken into account. [sentence as received]

Gremitskikh noted that the Soviet delegation was ready for constructive interaction with its partners to prepare a teaty on conventional armed forces in Europe for the Paris summit of the participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Further on Vienna Talks

PM1308202790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Vienna Talks Continue"]

[Text] More than one-third of the text of the future treaty has already been agreed at the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. Moreover, the participants have also agreed more than one-half of the protocol on inspections and quite a few parts of other documents.

This was stated at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 13 August by Yu.A. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

Aviation remains the stumbling block at the talks. In our opinion, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said, the chances of reaching an accord on aircraft will be enhanced if the Soviet Union's geostrategic interests were to be properly taken into account when questions of air defense fighter-interceptors and land-based Navy aircraft are examined. With the aim of finding compromise solutions on the question of arms destruction, the USSR would be ready in conjunction with the other participants in the talks to reduce its fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and artillery systems over two to three years from the moment the treaty comes into force.

As far as tanks and armored vehicles are concerned, he went on, we need more time in view of the considerable size of the cuts (a further [yesche] two to three years). At the same time the conversion of military equipment for use in the national economy forms an important component of the Soviet position.

Tank, Armored Vehicle Issue Stalls Vienna Talks

PM1308140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by correspondent S. Tosunyan: "Provided They Don't Run Out of Time. Will Vienna Talks Participants Keep to Allotted Time"]

[Text] Vienna—There are still 100 days left before the Paris summit begins. It is scheduled for 19 November, and the signing of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe by the 35 CSCE states' presidents and heads of state will be one of the main items on its agenda. NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations are now preparing the draft treaty in Vienna.

Almost 18 months of talks are behind us, only 100 days lie ahead. Will the diplomats succeed in putting a document ready for signing on the table in Paris? I put this question to members of many delegations at the Vienna forum and invariably received an affirmative answer with one reservation: Provided the negotiating process is speeded up.

A considerable amount has indeed been done. The sides' agreement on levels of tanks and armored vehicles this

June can be described as a very major breakthrough. The problem of cutting these categories of arms had long been the most difficult to overcome. From the military viewpoint they are considered the most dangerous.

According to experts, roughly one-third of the text of the actual treaty and the subtext of the protocol on inspections are now ready. That is substantial baggage which must not be disregarded.

Nonetheless diplomats do not hide the fact that the pace of the talks has slowed down of late. Why? Take the protracted dispute over naval aviation. The West claims that these aircraft must invariably be encompassed by the agreement but refuses to take into consideration our side's concern about carrier-based aviation. However, it is well known that carrier aviation can be used like land-based aviation. No way out of the deadlock has yet been found.

The resolution of problems of establishing levels for the weapons and hardware subject to limitation has also dragged on.

When defining the rule of sufficiency it must not be forgotten that a different situation has taken shape in Europe today. Hence the treaty must also take into consideration the possibility of a particular state's declaring itself neutral or even leaving one alliance and joining another. The impending unification of Germany confirms that this is possible. A whole series of problems is arising. German membership of NATO, along with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe, is creating a new situation in the region; the balance of forces and the balance of interests of many European states is changing. If this is not taken into consideration the sides will be placed in unequal positions.

The completion of the talks on schedule depends on the timely resolution of the verification question.

A position on the procedure for and monitoring of the destruction of the arms being cut back has not been fully agreed. General accord has been reached on the fact that artillery and certain other system must be destroyed within two or three years. But what about tanks and armored vehicles? To our cost we manufactured far more of them than the West. Consequently we have more to cut back. It is impossible to confine ourselves to the proposed time frame. What is more, our country could use some of this hardware for road building following its conversion as bulldozers and tractors. But our Western negotiating partners cannot bring themselves to make this compromise. In short, there are considerable problems.

The delegations will go home 13 August for a short time in order to consult with their governments and will hold the final phase of the talks on their return to Vienna.

Soviet-U.S. Military Action in Gulf Ruled Out

LD1308234690 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Excerpts] The situation in the Persian Gulf and the joint efforts by the USSR and the United States to settle the conflict open up opportunities for testing the new kind of relations taking shape between the two countries's navies. More from Radio Moscow's military observer, Captain Aleksandr Yakovlev:

[Begin Yakovlev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] Today Soviet and American naval servicemen have a unique opportunity to join ranks for the first time since the end of World War II. After the United States suggested forming a multinational naval force in the Gulf region, Soviet spokesman said this country's involvement in the project must be substantiated by an appropriate United Nations resolution. The Soviet Union rules out a joint Soviet-American military action against Iraq, but it does not view a blockade of the Persian Gulf as that particular kind of action. [passage omitted]

Today even a token involvement by Soviet naval forces in stabilizing the Gulf situation together with American seamen might be important. So far, this country's naval presence in the region has been confined to one vessel guiding Soviet civilian vessels through and protecting them in the Gulf. [passage omitted]

The Soviet Union believes that no dispute—not even the Gulf conflict—can justify the use of force. Not a single Soviet Army or naval serviceman is involved in hostilities anywhere in the world today. Hopefully this will remain this way. The Soviet seamen believe they can pool efforts with their colleagues from American and other countries to localize and eventually defuse the Gulf conflict by nonviolent means. [end recording]

UN Meeting To View Defense Industry Conversion

LD1308155190 Moscow TASS in English 1514 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Prominent scientists and public and political figures are attending a five-day international conference which opened in Moscow today to discuss switching resources from military to civilian use.

The forum, organised by the United Nations Department from Disarmament in cooperation with the Soviet Peace Fund and the Soviet Central Trade Union Council, is officially titled "Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction."

The U.N. undersecretary-general for disarmament affairs, Yasushi Akashi, read a letter from U.N. chief Javier Perez de Cuellar at the opening.

Soviet Presidential Council member Aleksandr Yakovlev read a letter to participants from President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Benefits of German Unification Examined

LD1408094190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2315 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—The Soviet Union and the countries in East Europe will benefit most from the unification of Germany and the end of the cold war. Gorbachev adviser Vyatcheslav Dashitshev said this in an interview with "DER MORGEN" newspaper (Tuesday edition). His country will be free from the heavy burden of permanent confrontation with the West as a whole, and of the arms race, which is a great strain on the Soviet economy creating an excessive domination of arms production and heavy industry while production of consumer goods and the agricultural sector is being neglected. [passage omitted]

The unification of Europe is inconceivable without the unification of Germany. This also means that the unification of Germany will help overcome the isolation of the Soviet Union from Europe, Dashitshev said. The USSR has been given the chance to once again integrate itself into European civilization.

"In the future the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union will be among the most important security factors. We, the Russians and the Germans, Russia and Germany, have many positive things from the past to show for ourselves. These experiences should be developed," the adviser to the president said. The triangle USSR-GDR-FRG had a destructive effect on Soviet-German policy. Every time we saw the need for fundamental agreements with the FRG we had to take into account the Honecker leadership. This hindrance is now disappearing." [passage omitted]

Cuban, Albanian Refugee Problems Summarized

PM1008151490 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 32, 7-13 Aug 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Aleksandr Didusenko]

[Excerpts] Upwards of 5,000 Albanians who took refuge at foreign embassies in Tirana have been allowed to emigrate from the country after an agreement with its government. Cubans who seek a permission to leave their country have taken a Czechoslovak diplomat hostage. Havana policemen (opening fire?) broke onto the grounds of the Spanish embassy to catch the refugee who had taken refuge there. Many reports of this kind have appeared in the press over the last few weeks. They make us once again ponder the reasons which prompt people to leave their own countries. [passage omitted]

An Unpatriotic Act?

According to Cuban officials, those people who seek refuge in foreign embassies are "lumpens and antisocialist elements." They are incited to do so by foreigners—Czechoslovak diplomats in particular. Thousands of miles away, in Tirana, officials explain this desire in the same way. Albanians who asked for a refuge in embassies are called "people without ideals and morals," "bandits, criminals and hoodlums." Their actions were provoked by countries in whose embassies they found refuge, and, of course, by Yugoslavia. It is clear that they are not patriots.

It is possible that there are several criminals and, surely, agents of the state security service among thousands of Albanians who left the country. Such elements can perhaps be found among Cubans, too. Of course, every country does not want to lose brains, talent and manpower. This is what most emigrants take with them. As a rule, they are not political refugees. They simply want to work and receive payment according to their labour.

Can all of them be called unpatriotic? Perhaps it would be more correct to talk about the tenacity of the distorted concept of patriotism as the readiness to put up with the lack of normal conditions for the application of one's brains, talent and labour, about "patriotism" which, to avoid the temptation fenced the people off the rest of the world by police and frontier cordons.

As the last vestiges of the cold war disappear and the image of the enemy fades away in the minds of millions of people, the sensation of freedom becomes as essential to man as clear air. It is not important where armed guards stand—near the iron-barred window or at the frontier. The difference is only in the size of the cell. The more acutely man feels nonfreedom, the more vigorously he will try to escape from it by any means, even by climbing the fence of a foreign embassy, though such a way is likely to bring him to another nonfreedom.

United States & Canada

U.S. 'Strategic Political Action' in Gulf Seen

PM1308151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Linnik under the rubric "New York on the Line": "What Does 'Desert Shield' Promise?"]

[Text] The names thought up in the Pentagon for military operations always make you feel that wizards of the pen unclaimed by great literature work there. "Desert Shield," as staff officers have designated the transfer of thousands of U.S. members of landing forces and Marines, hundreds of aircraft, and dozens of warships to the Persian Gulf region, really sounds pretty good.

"A line has been drawn in the sand," President G. Bush declared in his address to the American people on the biggest U.S. military action abroad since the Vietnam war. A further advance by Iraqi troops—this time against Saudi Arabia—will mean war against the United States, so the President said.

The scale of the U.S. military preparations clearly shows that the United States has no intention of joking. Only a few days ago the figure of 50,000 soldiers and officers was named as the upper limit for the U.S. contingent on the Arabian Peninsula. Today it is reported from the Pentagon that in the space of a few months the number of servicemen there will reach 100,000. Thus, the military presence in the region is conceived as a serious, long-term measure.

It follows from this that it is a question not so much of military measures to ensure Saudi Arabia's territorial inviolability as of a strategic political action whose outline and long-term consequences are barely beginning to become apparent. I believe that it is precisely this that marks the borderline between what accords with the interests of the whole international community and the strategic interests of the United States itself and of certain U.S. allies. These latter seem to have the intention of cardinally changing the correlation of forces in the Near East region.

...Journalists pursue the U.S. President even on vacation, which for him officially began Friday. During an impromptu news conference at Kennebunkport Saturday morning, Bush reported that he considers the economic sanctions announced by the Security Council sufficient basis for establishing a virtual blockade of Iraq.

To all appearances, the United States now intends to turn the economic sanctions announced by the United Nations into a permanent blockade of Iraq and to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and, in the long term, Saddam Husayn's removal from power.

The large-scale preparations by the United States and its allies are working toward a military solution to the situation that has taken shape. Today the first shots have only to be fired on a Kuwaiti-Saudi border crammed with combat hardware and troops and war will be practically inevitable.

However, to judge from the bellicose tone of reportage and commentaries in the U.S. mass media, such a turn of events perfectly suits the United States. Jingoistic sentiments are being fanned in the country in every possible way.

Saddam Husayn is presented to Americans as the "butcher of Baghdad." The Arabs seem to be replacing the Soviets as the United States' No. 1 enemies, an observer here remarked.

IZVESTIYA Previews Sununu's Kremlin Visit

90UN2595A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent V. Shalnev: "Bureaucrats From the President's Team; What the White House Staff Does"]

[Text] Washington-New York—John Sununu will be visiting us.

This will happen between late August and early September. In all likelihood, the dates were determined with a view to Sununu's returning home by Labor Day, which marks the end of summer vacation in the United States and the full resumption of the work of Washington's entire machinery of government officials and bureaucrats.

John Sununu is a bureaucrat at the top level of the ranking structure. He is chief of the White House staff, the person who controls the thousands of staffers supporting the full and productive activity of the President of the United States.

John Sununu will be visiting us not as a tourist, although the visit will take place during his vacation. He is coming to work; he is coming, as the White House has said, "to advise the Kremlin" on the question of how to organize the efficient operation of the presidency—the Soviet presidency.

It is said that it was entirely our idea to invite Sununu as a consultant. But this is what is said in Washington, in the White House. The Soviet side has a different viewpoint: It was not we, Moscow says, who were the sponsors.

We will not investigate who had this idea first; it is not that important. The sentiments of the parties are, however, understandable: It is one thing when a request is made of us, and we, having pondered the matter, consent; but when we have to make the request ourselves, it is quite another.

Nevertheless, the question of "primacy" is secondary. Incomparably more important is the fact that it would by no means be a sin for the White House to have something to teach the Kremlin.

It is not a question of political matters, not one of the subtleties of global strategy and local tactics—say, on a state or county scale. It is a question of matters which many of our bureaucrats might perceive as trifling and not worthy of attention.

But what trifling matters can there be, they say in the White House, if it is a question of the president and the presidency? Each trifling matter has official status here.

The White House has astonishing experts in the science of trifling matters.

They say—I myself did not witness this—that when George Bush received Mikhail Gorbachev at Camp David, where the two leaders, having thrown off their coats, removed their ties, and rolled up their sleeves, conducted long, comfortable discussions—in terms of style, although not necessarily in content—the American President showed the Soviet president his customary daily program. Two or three sheets of paper on which the White House leader's working day was scheduled by the minute. By the minute, literally. I can vouch for this: I once happened to glimpse these sheets myself.

A daily program on which figured the time of the start of any activity—be it a telephone call to the leader of another country planned in advance or a meeting with high school basketball players—and the time that it would end. Moreover, these were not approximate times, but precise times—say, 5:43 to 5:59. Apparently, this made an impression on Mikhail Gorbachev inasmuch as he asked the American President, as THE NEW YORK TIMES subsequently wrote: "Could I not familiarize myself with and study this document?" "Take it," President George Bush replied, if we believe THE NEW YORK TIMES.

So from there, Camp David, the out-of-town residence of American presidents, stretched the chain of events which ultimately led to the joint decision that John Sununu would go to Moscow on official assignment for consultations.

From the viewpoint of protocol his visit may be considered a return visit: A small delegation of ours headed by Mikhail Shkabardnya, administrator of the USSR Council of Ministers, visited Washington in June to take a closer look at the work of the White House and its staff. Our delegation was shown practically everything in the White House and taken around just about every nook and cranny; and there is an enormous number of them in the White House and the two huge neighboring buildings which house the presidential staff not accommodated in the White House itself. There was just one location it was not shown—the basement area, the area called the Situation Room where the most important meetings of the National Security Council are held and where something akin to a presidential command post is set up at the height of major foreign policy crises.

And I really do not know that there is anything so extraordinarily secret there in the Situation Room that cannot be shown to visitors from the Soviet Union but may nonetheless be shown in photographs that are often taken in this room and frequently published by the American press.... Well, that's all right. There is most likely something we also would not want to show Sununu when he comes to the Kremlin.

This trip has, I would say, a philosophical basis. It was thus expressed by American commentator Max Lerner, with whom I am prepared to agree 100 percent in this situation: "The main reason for the backwardness of the Soviet system of government is that they have attempted to function in their archaic administrative bureaucracy, as equally in their economy, by employing centralized power.... But, after all, the essence of what is happening in our age, which the Soviets are only now desperately endeavoring to enter, is the replacement of crude power by information and fluency which is coming to replace the command approach."

As far as Sununu himself is concerned, he was more straightforward in his assessments of the impending trip. Just a year ago he said in an interview with THE WALL STREET JOURNAL: I could not in my wildest dreams have imagined the degree of openness that is developing in relations between us.

It is not only he who is amazed; it is everyone who is well acquainted with Sununu, who is considered a highly conservative figure and who, as THE NEW YORK POST wrote, until most recently was extremely skeptical regarding the authenticity and reality of glasnost. Incidentally, people are beginning to talk in Washington, in all seriousness, about the Russians' attempts to "co-opt Sununu."

Political acumen and ideological harmony are not, however, the main attributes of the White House chief of staff and a man who, after Secretary of State James Baker, is considered the closest adviser, assistant, and partner of the President of the United States. Sununu, like many others in the present administration, is a pragmatist, who, it cannot be ruled out, displays his engineering education. He is a man of business, a man of entirely specific goals, and his highest goal is securing George Bush's election for a second term in 1992.

When presidents are elected, not appointed, one will not be victorious, whatever one does, in a country which is uneasy with, concerned about, and disappointed with one's actions and even words. For this reason, the concern for the President borne by John Sununu and his staff is concern, reflected or direct, for ensuring that the country is in a mood that permits it to vote for Bush without any particular moral effort. In other words, Bush as President and as presidential candidate will be assessed in two years not by the speed at which pieces of paper are set in motion in his White House but, instead,

by the extent to which this speed is converted into actions that help the American electorate say about Bush: "Now that is a president!"

The conclusion is, in fact, obvious: The state of the country as a whole—the political, economic, and moral state—depends—and most likely to an extent far greater than we could imagine at home—on how precisely and adeptly the activity of the presidency is organized.

I read somewhere that President Gorbachev familiarizes himself daily with a colossal amount of information in terms of volume—several hundred pages—which comes to him from the most diverse sources and via the most varied channels. The American President would not do this. And I am by no means referring to presidents of the type of Reagan, who was known for his exceptional laziness and for not being prepared to assimilate at one sitting material amounting to more than three or four pages.

That daily program Bush gave Gorbachev at Camp David "as a keepsake," so to speak, most likely contained mention of two activities with which the morning's work of the current President of the United States unfailingly begins at 0800 and 0815. These are briefings on key events in America itself and overseas, briefings lasting half an hour altogether, conducted verbally and providing Bush with a sufficiently complete picture of the world situation. Information obtained by way of intelligence—with the aid of electronic, satellite, or "human" espionage—is a key component of these briefings.

There is no need for the U.S. President to read in their entirety the newspapers which any ordinary politician has to read: The pertinent subdivision of the White House staff has since the early hours been preparing for him a roundup of the main newspapers, including in this roundup the most interesting extracts from the most interesting and significant articles. In the same summary are extracts from television news comment.

I am not trying to maintain that the U.S. President's "paper work" is completed by the reading of all these summaries—the verbal briefings on events in the country and the world are supplemented by several pages of written text. Of course not. Many varied papers continue to pass through his hands in the course of the day. But we can say this: The number of them will not amount to several hundred. A president's function is not to be inundated with papers but, having obtained the information, having obtained a preliminary analysis and evaluation thereof, and having obtained them from advisers and aides in whom the president has the fullest confidence as "sifters of the reports," to think and adopt decisions on what has already been pondered and considered.

All the rest is the business of the staff.

Crucial business, undoubtedly. The staff decides to whom to grant an audience with the President, and to whom, not; the staff decides which reports will make it to the President's desk, and which will be "wrapped" or dispatched to lower departments and levels; the staff determines the set of alternatives among which the President will have to opt for the sole correct version of a solution of most important questions. The President's time is too valuable for it to be taken up with questions and business which can easily be tackled at lower levels.

One of Bush's predecessors, Jimmy Carter, disregarded this rule, becoming involved in everything that came to hand. He had the energy even for compiling lists himself of the White House staff allowed to use the White House tennis courts. But the further Carter delved into the jungle of paper, the more things he lost sight of. Who can tell, many of the problems for which he failed to find a solution and which ultimately resulted in his defeat in the 1980 elections would perhaps have been settled and taken off the agenda had Carter's staff enabled him to involve himself in what a president should in fact involve himself—that which is most important.

Reagan was a president with a temperament the direct opposite of Carter's: He would have been perfectly content not to be distracted at all. He did not let anything distract him from that for which he had a particular affinity—from playing at president, from the performance in real life of screen and motion picture functions, from participation in ceremonial receptions and banquets, from meetings with celebrities, and from trips to fascinating foreign countries. Reagan was fortunate: Under his leadership a team of truly unique experts in their trade had been put together in the White House who did—and successfully, generally—what should have been done, but what was not done, by the President himself. Only closer to the end of the Reagan presidency did the White House staff, having undergone a series of reshuffles, begin to misfire, which led to the immense "Irangate" scandal.

Bush, it seems to me, has found the golden mean between these two extremes of Carter and Reagan. Even the most acerbic critic will not catch the current President being ignorant of what the head of the White House should know; but even the most assertive well-wisher will not find reason to sympathize: "You are overdoing it, Mr. President." And this comes despite the fact that the Bush timetable is unusually heavy, that a visit to several foreign countries within three or four days is squeezed into it at times, and that the severity of the workload forces Bush to rise daily at 0530, and the reporters accredited to the White House to collapse toward the end of the day from fatigue.

But there is no pointlessness in all the actions in which the President engages; there is no spontaneity in what appears spontaneous; and there is no lack of substantiation in a single one of the 15 activities which, as a rule, constitute the routine of the President's day. And one would truly not, of course, hear phrases of this type from

Bush: "There's not even enough time to take a break; I would like to be able to get away and get a good night's sleep."

You think there are no problems in America? There are many. But that is why there is a staff in the White House as well-tuned and efficient as a watch mechanism to ensure that the President's attention is focused on what is most important and that days off and holidays are, in fact, days off for him. There operates in the White House, according to my observations, a rule which is considered a law in many American corporations and which may be formulated this way: "If you are doing what should be done by your subordinates, you have not yet grasped the meaning of directive work."

I would like here to express an idea which could seem seditious under our conditions of all-out struggle against bureaucrats. The idea is simple: Bureaucrats are necessary. Thoughtful, skillful bureaucrats who know their business, who can be relied on, and who take on all preliminary work, enabling their bosses to concentrate on what is most important—decisions, thoughts, ideas.

And a second semi-seditious idea: We should have somewhat more of these bureaucrats in our key departments. I would like to see some more bureaucrats around the president. If our experts, returning from America where they are familiarizing themselves with how Congress operates, say that it would not be a bad thing for our deputies to have—if only in the very distant, "moneyed" future—the same numbers of staff as the congressmen and senators there (several dozen each), we should most likely take account of the experience of American presidents also.

Federal money in America, as with us, is somewhat tight. Economies in government resources—thanks to a reduction in inordinately inflated staffs included—are demanded in America, as with us. But one does not hear demands that the White House staff be "axed," a staff on whose upkeep immense resources are expended.

I have been in the White House quite often and I have frequently come across White House staffers "at the exits," for example, of international conferences in which the President is participating. And not once have I seen any staffer who was not busy with something or other or someone lounging around from office to office or chatting idly with his colleagues. People at work, not work for the sake of work on account of which, if it is not done, no one is put out, but real, necessary business. It is not difficult to be fired from the White House staff—one may be dismissed without two weeks' notice and no labor union will intercede. It is expected of one that he hold nothing back, forgetting about days off and holidays, forgetting about family and relatives. You work until you drop. There are also some privileges, mainly moral: Proximity, for all that, to the President, to the country's highest leader, fosters self-esteem. In addition, if there is subsequently a change of power in the White House and one has to leave, there will be no shortage of tempting offers from private corporations: Exceptional value is placed on business connections struck up during one's work in the White House.

But this is a subsequent advantage. Meanwhile one is in the maelstrom of affairs subordinated to the super task of ensuring the efficiency of the presidency and consequently the efficiency of the country.

I will not venture to judge or even guess what of his experience the top White House bureaucrat will endow our Kremlin bureaucrats with in the four days he will spend in Moscow. I assume it will not be possible to do all that much that is specific. But even if he simply helps us look at ourselves from outside and see what we ourselves have become accustomed to, but which to others seems an oddity, this in itself will be of benefit.

U.S. Attorney General Receives Justice Minister

LD1408082690 Moscow TASS in English 0818 GMT 14 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Berezhkov]

[Text] Washington August 14 TASS—"I want to welcome our Soviet friends in Washington as ardently as they welcomed us in Moscow. We meet again to carry on our historic dialogue about human rights and law-governed society," U.S. Attorney-General Richard Thornburgh said in Russian, addressing Soviet Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev and members of a delegation led by him.

The Soviet guests arrived in Washington on Monday for a weeklong stay to return the visit to Moscow by a U.S. delegation led by Thornburgh last fall when wide-ranging discussions and exchange of experience on the functioning of the legal systems of the two countries began.

Following the visit and mutual trips by delegations of lawyers, close contacts have been established between the Soviet Union and the United States, Thornburgh said. In particular, the U.S. Department of Justice's antitrust division is discussing with Soviet counterparts the problems of legal backing of economic activities. Contacts between the U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service and respective services in the Soviet Union [are] also growing stronger, Thornburgh added.

"We are convinced that such exchanges may be of immense benefit to our peoples and to the legislative systems of our two countries now that rapid and constructive changes are taking place in the world," Thornburgh emphasised.

A seat of tension again emerged in the Middle East these days, he said. "It is now particularly important that our two countries stand side by side in their opposition to the naked aggression and press for the observance of law through the mechanisms of the United Nations and other international organisations," Thornburgh said. "Not a single person or country can be above law or feel

suppressed by law. This should become the guiding idea of our discussions," he added.

"The wide-ranging dialogue on legal issues that we continue in Washington opens up a fine opportunity to strengthen cooperation between our two countries in such an important field as the ensurance of legality in a democratic state," Yakovlev said.

"We are ready for such cooperation which is yet another illustration of the present-day changing world," Yakovlev added.

China

Chinese Conservatives Obstruct Reform Progress

OW1208054390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 4 Aug 90

[Text] Listeners, as you certainly know political life in our country has undergone fundamental and colossal changes. The existence of diverse views, it may be said, is the most noticeable sign of the change that recently has emerged. Newspapers, television stations, and radios often air different, sometimes diametrically opposing views on various topics including the situation in China. Various views and comments have been made on the problems facing China. More often than not, these views run counter to the official position. Under these circumstances what should the Chinese language editorial department do? Should we turn a blind eye and keep these views away from Chinese listeners? However, one of the primary purposes of this station is to present to listeners the disparate views in existence in Soviet society. Many letters we have received from China have asked us to do exactly that. Therefore, we believe that different views and articles which entirely contain authors' personal views will interest you. The article published in MOSCOW WEEKLY by Academician Bogomolov, a noted scholar in the USSR, is one of such articles. Before we broadcast this article, we would like in particular to point out that there are differences even among us in the Chinese editorial department with regard to this article.

China started reforms ahead of the USSR and has achieved significant progress in the economic field. Later, the USSR and East European nations outran China in political reforms. On one hand Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have discarded resolutely the ideology and social practice imposed on them from the outside; on the other hand, China and Cuba have undertaken to defend the socialist system which has been rejected by the majority in the USSR and East European nations. Is what they are doing reasonable? Let us leave aside Cuba for the moment, for the case of Cuba is a rather exceptional phenomena created by post-war global rivalry. China is a far more important factor in the development of events around the world, and what it does or says carries great weight. Without a doubt, reform in China has yielded tremendous progress. Over the past decade living standards in cities and the countryside have doubled or redoubled, and the consumer goods market has swelled immensely.

At the same time, said Bogomolov, China has encountered a series of economic and social difficulties and has come to realize that economic reforms must be supplemented by political reforms. Academic circles, college students, workers with a higher level of skills, and peasants who have done relatively well gradually have become aware of the need to introduce rule of law in China, put an end to the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party, institute a multiparty system, and guarantee human rights and freedoms to meet international standards. More and more people are demanding freedom of speech and the press and demanding that different views be allowed. The social movement in support of these ideas and demands has met the determined resistance of the Chinese conservatives. Their tenets are embodied by the four cardinal principles: socialism, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the people's democratic dictatorship, and communist leadership. The fact that force was employed during the Tiananmen incident last June shows exactly that the conservatives were afraid that the Chinese Communist Party might lose its monopoly on power and privileges.

Here we would like to repeat one more time: These are the personal views of Soviet scholar Bogomolov. He continues: Where is China headed under the guidance of the four cardinal principles? It seems that there is still much to be desired in China's current system. However, what worries me is that they are refusing to look forward, face facts, discard ideological dogmas that run counter to reality, and acknowledge and accept the values of all of mankind. In today's world, it is impossible to build a society with long-lasting stability and prosperity by relying on force, one-party dictatorship, eliminating dissidents, and restricting the freedom of citizens. There never has been such a precedent in history.

Telephone Link With Harbin Operational

PM1008150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by A. Melnikov: "Harbin Speaking...."]

[Text] Vladivostok—Businessmen in Maritime Kray no longer have to waste time in order to phone Harbin. They are being served by a direct telephone link between Vladivostok and this Chinese city which has come on line under an agreement between the two countries' communications workers.

Northeast Asia

Change in North, South Korean Attitudes Noted

SK1208111290 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] As has already been reported, a pannational rally for peace in and reunification of Korea is scheduled for

15 August at Panmunjom on both sides of the demarcation line that divides the DPRK and South Korea. According to latest reports, however, the plan for this rally is expected to be deadlocked.

Station commentator Petrov writes the following:

Never have conditions for dialogue between the North and South of Korea been more favorable than they are now. In other words, the North and South have recently signed an agreement on holding talks between premiers of the two sides, the first of their kind; the two states agreed to open the demarcation line for their people to travel freely; and have begun preparing for the pannational rally.

However, the development of the situation called into question not only the convening of the rally, but also other agreements. Why?

This time, too, as has so often been the case in the past, the shopworn political thinking and a desire to turn the rally into a propaganda test seem to be stronger than anything else.

The DPRK and South Korea have not been able to reach an agreement on a number of issues. Pyongyang is strongly against the participation in the rally of the leftist [as heard] and conservative organizations that are supportive of the South Korean Government's policies, while Seoul banned the National Democratic Alliance of Korea [Chonminnyon], which represents about 200 dissident organizations, from taking part in the preparations for this rally.

When viewed from a different angle, the programs for the planned rally also seem to be of an extremely politically-oriented, progressive nature. A demonstration march from one end of the Korean peninsula to the other, from Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla on Cheju Island, is expected to be launched. Meetings and demonstrations are also expected to be held and a declaration is expected to be adopted.

In the meantime, the 61,000 people in the South have applied for permission to visit the DPRK. Pyongyang, it seems, is not ready to accommodate such a large number of visitors from the South. Pyongyang attached conditions to an exchange of lists of visitors, conditions that are believed to be unacceptable to Seoul. In other words, Pyongyang made the abolition of South Korea's National Security Law, allowing the North Korean people's visit to the South Korean dissidents in prison, and the Chonminnyon's participation in the pannational rally preconditions for the exchange of visitors' lists.

The attitudes of the South and North toward each other, which have not been freed from the cold war framework, have become commonplace. When one side puts forward a proposal, the other side puts forward a counterproposal without fail. Although such counterproposals appear to be a little more progressive, in fact they render every proposal ineffective.

In my opinion, the problem stems from the fact that the two sides understand the notion of dialogue and reunification in totally different ways. While trying to demonstrate its own ideological and political potential in dialogue, the North side fears information on the South Korea's economic success and successes in other areas. Whereas, Seoul, placing particular stress on developing people's contacts, economic cooperation, and exchanges of broad scope when it comes to relations with Pyongyang, fears the intensified activity of the domestic antigovernment organizations.

It seems to be a result of the excessively exaggerated fears and suspicions of the two sides. It will be foolish if both the South side and the North side believe that their respective systems currently in place will collapse following the visits of relatives.

If I may say so, today's situation is not developing in favor of either the opening of the demarcation line or the pannational rally.

Instead of beginning with [words indistinct] or with an adoption of a declaration that contains mutual denunciation, the two sides should begin with such small things as allowing the separated families and relatives to have family reunions at Panmunjom for the second time in 37 years, and implanting in the hearts of the Korean people a faith that reunification of the country is possible.

Navy Detachment To Visit North Korean Port

PM1308160190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Soviet Naval Ships To Visit DPRK"]

[Text] In accordance with an agreement reached, a Soviet naval detachment composed of the large antisubmarine warfare ship "Marshal Shaposhnikov" and the patrol escort "Poryvistyy" will make an official visit to Wonsan Port 14-18 August. Vice Admiral A.G. Oleynik, first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet, will head the visit.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Revival of Khmer Rouge Feared in Cambodia

BK1408100190 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Commentary by Alekseyev]

[Text] At a recent news conference on Cambodia in Jakarta, PRC Prime Minister Li Peng chiefly said that Beijing would never support the Khmer Rouge as a dominant force in Cambodia. Our observer, Comrade Alekseyev, has the following comments:

In the latter half of the 1970s, the Cambodian people endured a horrible tragedy. The gang known as the proletarian revolutionary group seized power and

plunged the country into a chaotic quagmire of bloodshed. Under the banner of struggling against a parasitic, ideology-spreading group of enemies, the gang, also known as the Khmer Rouge, slaughtered over three million of its own compatriots. The tragedy suffered by the Cambodian people is not only a historical event but also a reminder of what will happen if the Khmer Rouge returns as master of the country again: The danger will unavoidably and certainly emerge again. The Khmer Rouge whose despotic regime was toppled in 1979 is, at present, the dominant force within the Cambodian resistance. The well-equipped gang is poised with zeal to retake power for the purpose of continuing to inflame the civil war in Cambodia. In the face of such a situation, the PRC prime minister's statement, in my opinion, is of vital importance because everybody knows what China's influence is over the Cambodian resistance, including the Khmer Rouge.

The prevention of the Khmer Rouge from returning to power does not mean the group is totally discounted from joining in the settlement of the Cambodian problem based on a national reconciliation. And this affects neither Phnom Penh nor the other states which believe that they bear the responsibility for promoting a Cambodian settlement. As a real political force, the Khmer Rouge group has the same right as the other partners of the Cambodian resistance to participate in Cambodia's various political structures in the future. However, to achieve this aim, the Khmer Rouge must forever renounce its ambition to regain power in the country via military means. In particular, it is necessary that, as a beginning, they cease their military operations. By all accounts, it is regrettable that they have been opposed to the formula which truly represents the aspiration of the Cambodian people.

In the inter-Cambodian meeting held in Tokyo in early June, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan categorically refused to sign the document calling for a cease-fire. As such, what would have developed? According to observers, it greatly depends on the joint efforts by the countries concerned. As the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA recently noted, China would certainly be able to provide a great contribution to restoring peace to Cambodia. Nonetheless, it is regrettable that at a news conference in Jakarta, Premier Li Peng denied reports by Indonesian media that China had the intention of terminating military aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Near East & South Asia

Bush Favors 'Successful' Sanctions Against Iraq

LD1108144690 Moscow TASS in English 1221 GMT 11 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Orekhon]

[Text] Washington August 11 TASS—U.S. President George Bush on Friday flew to his summer retreat at Kennebunkport, Maine, where he plans to stay until September 3.

In an encounter with journalists aboard Air Force One, Bush said that in view of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, his summer holidays would be a combination of work and rest.

Asked if American troops already in Saudi Arabia would be able to withstand any sort of assault by Iraq, Bush said: "There's no evidence right now that Saddam Husayn would be foolish enough to cross that border, but we have implemented the air power out there, air forces. Saudi has strong air power. Some of the Kuwaiti Air Force is there in Saudi Arabia. Other elements will be there. We have a carrier there. So I think that our fighting men that are on the ground there will be safe.

"But I don't want to heighten concern, because they have not presented me with any evidence that the Iraqi troops that have already been moved forward are being reinforced or that they are preparing to move across the Saudi border."

Bush expressed hope that the international sanctions against Iraq would be successful. He noted that Iraq was exporting less oil than usual already now.

Bush said he could not tell journalists that Iraq was fully forced out of the market but he said he "would advise Iraqi ships not to go out with oil."

As regards Husayn's calling for a holy war, Bush said it was not unexpected. "He is so isolated in the world, so much backed into a corner by world opinion, that he has to find some mechanism to try to rally support. It won't work," Bush said.

However, Bush expressed concern over the possibility of the escalation of terrorism in conection with the situation.

Bush stressed that while in Kennebunkport, he would be permanently informed about all developments in the Persian Gulf area. "We have a highly complex and highly efficient communications," Bush said.

Soviets Expected To Condemn U.S. Intervention

JN1408072390 Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic 14 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Text] Amman, SAWT AL-SHA'B—Diplomatic sources in Amman have said that a new Soviet position on regional developments is expected to be announced within the next few days.

The sources expected that the Soviet Union will announce its condemnation of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia out of convictions that the majority of the Arabs and Muslims oppose this intervention and also for reasons of maintaining balance.

The sources added that the USSR has begun to feel the seriousness of the regional situation after its image in the world began to show it as a U.S. satellite and not as a world superpower.

Soviet-Iraqi Contacts Reported During Crisis

LD1308165790 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevsky]

[Excerpt] Moscow August 13 TASS—[passage omitted] The [Soviet Foreign Ministry] spokesman [Gremitskikh] said "The Soviet Union continues its contacts with Iraq at all levels, including at the highest, in order to convince it of the futility of its actions and the need to pull out Iraqi troops."

Asked about the alleged cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the exchange of information about the Iraqi Army's equipment and facilities in Iraq, Gremitskikh said "Our contacts with the U.S. side have not reached this level so far."

Speaking about the growing U.S. military presence in the region, Gremitskikh noted that "the United States took a responsible decision by sending one contingent or another or one batch of arms or another" and he hoped it would not "exceed the reasonable margin, sufficient for the protection of Saudi Arabia."

Soviets Reject Reports of Cooperating With Iraq

Solely Defensive Military Ties

LD1308154990 Moscow TASS in English 1530 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—The Soviet Union is now considering evacuating a small group of Soviet military specialists from Kuwait, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Moscow today, quoting the Soviet Defense Ministry.

After repeated questions from journalists about Soviet military cooperation with Iraq and Kuwait, spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh read to journalists information prepared by the Defence Ministry Information Directorate. He stressed that he "does not identify himself with this material."

In particular, the Defence Ministry pointed out that Soviet-Iraqi military cooperation "is not directed against any third countries." In the framework of military cooperation, the Soviet Union rendered Iraq assistance by delivering advanced types of weapons and military hardware, helped them to master and exploit it, and trained personnel.

"The Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that the Iraqi Armed Forces would be used only with the aim of ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country," the document points out.

The ministry also pointed out that "in recent years Iraq took delivery of military equipment intended for performing purely defensive tasks—fighter jets, anti-aircraft missile complexes, air-defence radars, and patrol boats."

The Defense Ministry announced that "a small group of Soviet military specialists—who mainly work at repair facilities, educational establishments, and on construction work—continues to stay in Iraq in order to complete the fulfilment of inter-government agreements in Iraq."

Under this document, Soviet-Kuwait military cooperation, started in the mid-1970s, was insignificant and was carried out on a spasmodic basis. Kuwait mainly received anti-aircraft facilities and some types of land forces equipment. A small group of Soviet military specialists was sent to the country.

After reading out this information, Gremitskikh added that, according to information available to him, there are no Soviet advisers now working on specific military plans in Iraq.

Refute Reports of Aiding Iraq

PM1308154990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by N. Burbyga under the rubric: "Competent Sources": "Not a Single Soviet Ship in Persian Gulf"]

[Text] Despite the Soviet Union's official statements condemning Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the Sunday edition of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES has reported that thousands of Soviet military advisers in Iraq are providing services to President Saddam Husayn and his Armed Forces.

Still earlier, in transmitting reports on the buildup of Western countries' naval forces in the region, REUTER and UPI noted that there are Soviet warships in the region and that the USSR Naval Command is considering the possibility of joint actions with foreign fleets. As your correspondent was informed at the Soviet Defense Ministry, the Soviet Government statement is being strictly carried out. The military advisers in Iraqi territory are providing services to neither the president nor the Armed Forces of the country. As far as the Soviet Navy is concerned, there is not a single Soviet ship as of today in the Persian Gulf. The question of building up naval forces and of their joint use with Western countries has not been considered by the military command.

Deny Sending Military Adviser

LD1308144390 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today denied reports in the Western mass media that Colonel-General Albert Makashov has been appointed head of the Soviet military advisers in Iraq.

General Makashov, head of the Privolzhsko-Uralksiy military district, became well known after his speech at the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party. The speech was described as a forthright attack on perestroyka by the conservative wing.

Quoting the Soviet Defence Ministry, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said the rumour was "groundless." "Colonel-General Makashov remains head of the Privolzhsko-Uralski military district and his appointment to any other post is not being disucussed," he said.

Institute Reports on Weapons Shipments to Iraq

PM1308154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Zubko: "Weapons, Weapons..."]

[Text] Stockholm—At the risk of irritating IZVESTIYA readers I still consider it necessary to return yet again to the subject of exports of Soviet weapons to Iraq.

The previous dispatch on this topic (see IZVESTIYA No. 220) was compiled on the basis of data in the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook for 1990. But the inventory, so to speak, was devoid of one important characteristic—how many weapons the said states supplied to Baghdad. Now this week, two days after the article in IZVESTIYA, SIPRI has published a special roundup of materials.

So, during 1980-1989 Iraq purchased abroad weapons to the tune of $25 billion. The Soviet Union accounted for 53 percent of that total. That is, our country is the chief supplier of weapons to Baghdad. In second place is France with 20 percent, in third place China with seven percent, then come Brazil and Egypt with four percent each, Czechoslovakia with two percent, and several other suppliers.

Government, Press Views Differ on Gulf Crisis

LD1108115390 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 10 Aug 90

[From the "Top Priority" program presented by Sergey Goryachev]

[Excerpts] [Goryachev] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to "Top Priority." I am Sergey Goryachev. This is Radio Moscow's panel discussion. We missed a couple of weeks out of this program. You know we all were on vacation here at Radio Moscow. We are now back at work—such is life—and the topic of this edition of "Top Priority" is obvious. It is, of course the situation in the Persian Gulf area. [passage omitted]

Our guests today to discuss these and other topics are, to my right, Andrey Kortunov, who is the head of a department in the Institute of the United States and Canada Studies—Welcome, Andrey—and our guest from the United States is Leon Aaron, and you're with the Heritage Foundation. [passage omitted]

Let's get over to the Soviet reaction, which I think has been very interesting. I notice that the Soviet press has been very outspoken about the invasion. I mean all the newspapers have denounced the invasion while the government was not as definite about that, was not as distinctive, especially with regard to the American buildup, military buildup, in the area. And in fact, on Thursday the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that his country did not support military means in the crisis area. There may be foreign policy considerations for that or there may be home policy considerations.

[Kortunov] Well, let me clarify this point. I don't think that when the Foreign Ministry declared that the Soviet Union didn't support this action it necessarily meant that the Soviet Union was against this action. As far as I remember, the question was whether the Soviet Union is going to participate in such an action and the spokesman said that the Soviet Union was not going to participate just because the military ships that were there in the Gulf were not suitable for such (?action).

[Goryachev] (?No), only two ships at this point of time. Andrey, do you think that this is a clear unwillingness of the Soviet Union to get involved in any military operations at this point in time? Is this because of some foreign policy consideration, or do you think it is because of home policy considerations, because a lot of people would not understand it probably? People are not willing to send their sons overseas to die there.

[Kortunov] Well, I think you know that the word Afghanistan will flash the light in heads of many people here. [passage omitted]

[Goryachev] Let's talk about the American policies for the area. It sems to me that President Bush is very eloquent nowadays, saying that it is unacceptable to get foreign territory by use of force and he has never been so outspoken in terms of Israel. Isn't that double standards, Leon?

[Aaron] Well, I don't think so. [passage omitted] Iraq is not being threatened by anybody. Iraq is also not being interested in peace treaties; he is interested in territories. So I think, in my view, there is no double standard here.

[Goryachev] (?Well), what about you, Andrey?

[Kortunov] Well, I think in terms of practical politics, this administration feels that it has the whole support of the public and of the Congress when it acts against Iraq, and of course it should be very cautious even trying to

criticize the most non-rational acts by Israeli Government, because it will create an uproar in the United States. So I think that though one can find some, you know, differences in the American and Israeli positions on many Middle East issues, and one can find even some splits between Israel and the United States, I think that no American president will try to challenge the overall Israel (?policies) in this region.

[Goryachev] All right now, let's talk about, at the end of this program, let's talk about Soviet-American cooperation in the area. I think it's very important. I think that the Gulf and the developments in the Gulf have shown us how fragile is the world, but it also shows us that Soviets and Americans for the first time, as they say, since World War II, are working together very closely, even though the Soviet Union said it does not support military buildup, which seems to me as a kind of sharpening of its position. It doesn't matter. So it seems to be that the Soviet-American effort will play a major role in settling in the Persian Gulf. What will this effort be, what it could be, Leon?

[Aaron] Well, I think for the Soviet Union it could't have come at a better time. If any proof was needed that new thinking is not just words, and, most importantly, is not just a component in the U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S.-European relations, that proof we now have. We now realize that the Soviet Union is serious. I think frankly in terms of realpolitik the Soviet Union certainly has made the choice. And what it boils down to is that it needs the support of the West, for which it's willing to pay by sacrificing its clients in the Third World. I think it's a supremely rational choice.

[Goryachev] And probably sacrificing some economic advantages that it could have by....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Or short-term economic advantages. Of course, the Soviet Union can lose (?something) because the rise in the oil prices will not be as big as it could be; but at the same time I think that the potential of Western aid to the Soviet Union (?depends on) the stability of the world economic situation and if the, you know, a great rise in oil price triggers (?recession) in the West, I think the chances of the Soviet Union to, you know, somehow engage itself into international economic system will go down, of course.

[Goryachev] Yes, and how far do you think the Soviets and Americans are ready to go together in the Gulf area now?

[Aaron] Well, here again this is, of all the areas in the world, probably the most volatile. I think when you mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union said that it did not support the military steps but at the same time did not denounce them, I think that's precisely the line that the Soviet Union has drawn and I think will adhere to in the sense that the Soviet Union will not protest but itself would not probably participate in anything, both because of the domestic situation and the situation on the ground, simply the absence of necessary tools on the ground. So I think the Soviet Union will be perfectly content cheering, as we say, from the sidelines, cheering the Westerners from the sidelines, particularly the United States, yet playing a less risky game itself.

[Kortunov] Yes, probably this is wise, because it seems to me that the Soviet Union is willing to keep channels of communication open with all sides, with Iraq as well, that by probably moving in a diplomatic manner it could bring about peace to the region.

[Aaron] And I think we should also mention, I just want to be on the record as predicting something....

[Goryachev, interrupting] Yes.

[Aaron] That is, it seems to me that some moves in terms of the Soviet recognition of Israel will follow, not only because they're overdue in general, but also because the Soviet Union has now for the first time constructively engaged in the Middle East, and the next step would be to be totally accepted in the Middle East game, which is—although it's volatile, creates its, you know, its high risk, but also high yield of game, and it creates a lot of pluses in the Soviet Union. Having said "A," we'd probably proceed to say "B" and "C"; and one of those letters will be the recognition of Israel.

[Kortunov] And I would add that it will also affect Soviet relations with all other Arab states in the region, because you cannot make business as usual with, let us say, with Libya. After everything that happened you have to reconsider some of your attitudes to the PLO, and at the same time I think the Soviet Union will find it easier to establish constructive forms of relations with some states of the Gulf.

[Goryachev] Yes; after all, the world is changing. Well, our time is running out. Thank you very much for being with us today. My guests were Andrey Kortunov from the Institute of the United States and Canada Studies in Moscow, and Leon Aaron from the United States, of the Heritage Foundation. Thank you for being with us. Until next week, goodbye.

Iraqi Embassy Attacks Soviet Press Article

90UF0444A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 32, 11-17 Aug 90 pp 4, 5

[Article by Yu. Dakhab printed under the rubric "There Are Approximately 8,000 Soviet Citizens in Iraq, 880 in Kuwait": "Iraq Without Cliches"]

[Text] *An article by Yu. Georgiyev and Yu. Dakhab, "Iraq Without Cliches" (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 21), was published this June which evoked a multitude of comments in the foreign media and a far more modest response in our country.*

In the time that has elapsed since publication, the editorial office has received two official responses. The first came from the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow.

Lines From a Letter

"On the basis of the principle of freedom of the press," a letter addressed to the chief editor of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY says, **"which we respect, we would like to acquaint you with our impression inasmuch as you have an interest in learning the truth and aspire to it."**

So what kind of truth does the esteemed embassy intend to communicate? **"Before expressing our evaluation we would like to state the facts as they are. However, we have decided that it would not be expedient to go into details. We are prepared to accord the editorial office and the two authors an opportunity to familiarize themselves personally with real life of Iraq, including the situation in the region of autonomous administration."** (that is, Kurdistan—Ed.)

First of all, thanks for the invitation, although, to be candid, it aroused no enthusiasm inasmuch as the execution of a British journalist accused of spying for Israel is still fresh in the memory. The more so in that the letter from the Iraqi Embassy adduces ideological grounds for possible practical steps: **"It is clear to us that the Zionist movement is the main engine of the circles which are disseminating the information cited in the article. We have made a careful study of the question of the coincidental timing of the article's appearance. And although we endeavored to consider the question an ordinary and perfectly customary matter, we were unable to separate it from the campaign to which Iraq has been subjected of late and which has been organized by certain international forces, primarily Israel, the United States, and Great Britain.**

"You are aware that the aim of this campaign is to deprive Iraq of the right of self-defense and to prevent it's acquiring know-how, science, and modern technology. We also took good will as the basis, but could not separate the article's appearance from the date of the commencement of the special meeting of leaders of Arab states in Baghdad on 28 May 1990, a meeting aimed at the creation of mechanisms for repulsing aggression. It is known that Israel is preparing the ground in the consciousness of international public opinion for perpetrating the said aggression against Iraq and the Arab nation. We believe that the appearance of this article is an integral part of the preparation of aggression."

Now, following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, this letter hardly requires any special comment. It is only to be stated with regret that no action of "world Zionism" could have caused greater harm to Arab unity and the solution of the Palestinian problem connected with it than one Arab country's perfidious attack on another.

As far as the publication of "Iraq Without Cliches" is concerned, its moment really was not chosen fortuitously. The authors of the article, professional orientalists, wanted thereby to call the maximum attention of the Soviet and world community (including leaders of the Arab countries) to the aggressive policy of the S. Husayn regime. It is not the struggle for the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians which is the goal of its foreign policy, but its own expansionist aspirations.

What ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Warned About

It is bad enough when foreigners misunderstand you; it is far worse when you are not understood by your own people. One further response to the article was a statement at a briefing of a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman who called the article in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY "irresponsible" and "biased."

Yet it was actually responsibility which motivated ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in the publication of this article. It posed the question of the danger of close relations with regimes like that of S. Husayn. There had also been warnings from many Western media and from other sources, too, most likely. The latest came from U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, which he gave USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze at the meeting in Irkutsk.

However, as E. Shevardnadze said, he did not, nonetheless, "expect the Iraqis to engage in unconcealed aggression in respect of a defenseless peaceable country." It would be of interest to know what reports on the situation in this region had been sent to the USSR president and members of the Presidential Council by the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad and our highly paid KGB and GRU secret services.

The USSR is now in a tricky position inasmuch as no less than half the weapons with which Iraq is waging war were purchased in the Soviet Union, and, according to some figures, there are still approximately 1,000 Soviet military specialists in Iraq.

'Armed and Very Dangerous'

One can see this for oneself if one takes a look at Iraq's foreign policy in recent decades, if only in respect of Kuwait. Iraq's rulers have since time immemorial considered this country part of Iraq. In 1961 they refused to recognize Kuwait after it had gained its independence from British colonial administration.

The Iraqi dictator at that time, Qasem, made the first attempt to take Kuwait by force, and Great Britain and subsequently the Arab countries, too, were forced to dispatch forces to prevent occupation. Claims on Kuwaiti territory were stepped up particularly when oil was discovered in the border area. There was by that time no precise demarcation of the border, and for this reason both countries lay claim to the very rich Rumaila field.

In the winter of 1973 Iraq made an attempt to seize territory adjacent to its port of Umm Qasr, which had just been built, and also two islands in the Persian Gulf, on which strategists of the Iraqi General Staff planned to create a naval base. But on this occasion also the attempted armed invasion was cut short by the efforts of the United Nations and the Arab League.

Subsequently, in fear of its big neighbor, Kuwait rendered it tremendous material assistance in the war against Iran (1980-1988). Cargo and foreign specialists crossed Kuwaiti territory into Iraq, and Kuwait accounts for $10 billion of the $60 billion S. Husayn borrowed from the Arab countries to fight the war.

Nonetheless, this did not save Kuwait from expansion. Iraq demanded that the Kuwaiti Government not only waive the debt but also lend a further $10 billion and in addition pay compensation totaling $2.4 billion for the oil allegedly stolen by Kuwait from the Rumaila border deposit. Territorial claims occupied an important place in the list of Iraqi demands.

S. Husayn declared that Iraq had a right to all the enumerated concessions inasmuch as in waging war with Iran it was defending Kuwait against the aggression of the Ayatollah Khomeyni's Shi'ite regime.

According to reports from Kuwait, Emir Al-Sabah accepted all Baghdad's demands except for one: conceding to Iraq the long-desired islands of Warba and Bubiyan. For which he paid with his throne.

FROM THE EDITORS: As this material was being prepared for the press, a report was received saying that Iraq has annexed the territory of Kuwait.

The question of the safety of foreign citizens on the territory of both countries has in recent hours become serious. Iraq has closed its borders and air space and is stopping foreigners' attempts to leave.

There was a demonstration on 8 August outside the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow of Iraqi and Kuwaiti students protesting the Iraqi Government's expansionist policy.

Debate Rages Over Sanctions Against Iraq

UN Favors 'Collective Action'

LD1408064790 Moscow TASS in English 0638 GMT 14 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov]

[Text] United Nations August 14—The United Nations Security Council on Monday held consultations in connection with the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. The Council members exchanged views on the developments in the Persian Gulf area.

An overwhelming majority of Council members favoured the continuation of the policy of collective actions of the international community. They believe that further steps can be taken only if the international community becomes convinced that economic sanctions against Iraq proved insufficiently effective.

During consultations a general understanding was reached that the earlier adopted U.N. Security Council resolutions in connection with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait did not provide for the use of force to enforce sanctions. The current purpose is now to monitor the observance of the trade embargo against Iraq and report back to an appropriate committee set up under the council's jurisdiction.

Representatives of France and Canada stated during consultations that the task of their naval forces sent to the Persian Gulf area was only to monitor the application of economic sanctions against Iraq, a U.N. spokesman told TASS.

U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar told journalists that any blockade could not be considered a U.N. action. "What we are seeing is that in agreement with the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, some decisions have been taken by the United States, France, Britain and other countries, and even Arab countries, but not in the context of United Nations resolutions. Only the United Nations through Security Council resolutions may take a decision about a blockade," he emphasised.

White House Assessment Noted

LD1408073890 Moscow TASS in English 0731 GMT 14 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy]

[Text] Washington August 14 TASS—The United States Navy, acting in line with the U.N. decision to impose economic sanctions against Iraq, had cut off shipments of goods to and from Iraq through the Persian Gulf by Monday, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater has said.

Declining to use the words "naval blockade", which implies the state of war with a country against which it is used, Fitzwater assessed the impact of the "embargo" as "excellent".

The United States continues sending troops to Saudi Arabia to protect it against Iraq's possible invasion. Major-General Don Kaufman, in charge of U.S. operations in the Gulf, said planes with troops and equipment were landing in Saudi Arabia about ever 10 minutes.

Pentagon sources say sending troops to Saudi Arabia will cost Washington $300 million a month or even more. Fitzwater declined to comment on the figure.

UK Willing To Use Force

LD1408071190 Moscow TASS in English 0651 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sisnev]

[Text] London August 14 TASS—Britain announced an intention to use military force to ensure economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations Security Council. "If there is evidence of sanctions busting, the Navy will take the necessary steps," Foreign Office Minister William Waldergrave told a news conference on Monday. British ships in the Persian Gulf are reported to

have received an order to stop and search merchant vessels suspected of carrying cargoes to Iraq.

There are four British Navy ships in the Gulf now, according to the PRESS ASSOCIATION news agency.

Explaining the British Government's stand, Waldergrave emphasised that the legitimate government of Kuwait, overthrown as a result of the Iraqi aggression, applied to Britain in a request for aid in pursuance of the U.N. sanctions. In this connection he said that the decision to use military force against sanctions busters was legitimate and did not run counter to the U.N. Charter.

At the same time, according to BBC and ITN, Britain's decision, which in point of fact means the imposition of a naval blockade on Iraq, raised objections on the part of a whole number of countries. France likened the British Government's actions to a declaration of war on Iraq, BBC said.

Anthony Wedgwood Benn, a Labour MP [Member of Parliament] in the House of Commons, urged the government to withdraw naval forces from the region. In a BBC interview he said stability in the Persian Gulf could be ensured through cooperation with the Arab world, and not through gunboat diplomacy.

Several days ago Benn sent Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher a letter, urging her to interrupt the parliament's summer recess and call parliament into session to discuss the situation in the Gulf.

It has become known that Thatcher turned down his suggestion. In a reply letter she emphasised that there was no need to discuss the matter, since the dispatch of British troops to the Middle East was supported by most members of parliament.

Reportage on Events in Gulf Region Continues

Kuwaiti Envoy Allegedly Arrested

LD1308210190 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 13 Aug 90

[BY TASS correspondent Nikolay Teterin]

[Text] Rome August 14 TASS—Journalists of the Kuwaiti News Agency KUNA said here on Monday that Ibrahim al-Bahur, the Kuwaiti ambassador to Iraq, his family and five diplomats were allegedly arrested in Baghdad on Sunday.

They reported that the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers met on Monday to reject as a "whole and in details" Saddam Husayn's proposals. The venue of the meeting was not mentioned.

Kuwait's embassy in Baghdad was sequestrated and plundered after the ambassador refused to make an official statement in support of the Iraqi invasion of his country, according to KUNA journalists. There has been no word about the fate of the Kuwaiti ambassador to Iraq just as about the fate of the rest of the arrested persons.

The same sources reported that the Council of Ministers of Kuwait issued a communique rejecting "Iraq's peaceful proposals." The ministers stressed that by its initiative, Iraq admitted that the invasion of Kuwait was tantamount to Israel's occupation of Arab territories.

OPEC To Raise Oil Prices

90UF0391A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Jul 90 p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent Vitaliy Makarchev: "More Hard Currency"]

[Text] Geneva—There is good news for us from Geneva: The price of oil has risen sharply.

At the conference on Friday of the Organization of Oil-Exporting Countries (OPEC), which controls most of the world oil market, it was decided henceforth to raise the base price per barrel (159 liters) to $21. Thus, the formal increase will be $8. However, in reality the cost of oil has increased much more.

For the first time since 1986 deals being made in the leading oil exchanges of the world for September are being concluded on base prices of $20 a barrel, even though the price was $15 a barrel at the beginning of July.

The fact is that the base price is arrived at from the production quotas spread among the OPEC member countries. However, in recent years a number of states in the organization have been exceeding their quotas and flooding the market with oil, and this has depressed prices. Thus, early this summer Abu-Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates were daily exceeding the level of oil recovery of 400,000 barrels set for them. This lack of discipline was also evident in Kuwait.

The new base price was not set just for economic reasons. The rapid decline in oil prices seen throughout this year was halted last week in the Arabian desert by motorized detachments of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

The conflict over the quota violations has been a long time coming to a head. Kuwait gave the same argument to all the accusations: If prices go up, world demand for oil will decline significantly because of the extensive use of energy-saving technologies. A similar stance was also taken by OPEC's most influential member, Saudi Arabia, which also has a negative attitude toward price increases.

In short, those OPEC members supporting low prices would not respond to any argument. Thus, whereas at the beginning of this year a 159-liter barrel of oil was being sold at about $20, by April the price had fallen to $14. And in the first weeks of this summer the price was fluctuating between $14 and $16.

In turn, Iraq, Libya, and Iran—countries whose incomes from the falling prices were significantly reduced, which has a most adverse effect on their economies in general—were advocating price increases. At some particular moment in June a united front was even formed by Iran and Iraq, which tried through their combined efforts (true, unsuccessfully) to put pressure on the undisciplined members of OPEC.

The situation started to change several days ago when Baghdad accused Kuwait of "stealing" its oil—pumping it from Iraqi territory. Events surrounding this conflict unfolded exceptionally quickly. Iraq demanded compensation of more than $2 billion and Kuwait's return of disputed territories, but Kuwait rejected all the accusations and appealed to the Arab League countries. Egyptian President H. Mubarak visited both countries on a peace mission, and the Americans started to take steps to strengthen their presence in the Persian Gulf area.

Meanwhile, oil prices on the main New York Stock Exchange quickly passed the $15 mark. And when it was reported that Iraqi armored units had appeared at Kuwait's northern borders the price increases accelerated rapidly. In seven days the increase has been about $8. It was precisely in this atmosphere that the present OPEC conference is taking place in Geneva.

It was clear right from the start that the base price for oil from the OPEC countries would be increased. However, it was not known by how much. Iraq and Libya were insisting on $25 or even $30 a barrel. During the night of Thursday-Friday the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva was probably the best-lit building in town—lights were burning in almost every window and the delegations made preparations for a compromise solution. And the more it became a reality, the more the tension grew on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.

By midday on Friday an agreement was reached whereby the price was set at $21 a barrel. Quotas were held at their previous level, but according to informed people, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates gave their word not to violate quota discipline. And this time there are solid grounds for thinking that they will exercise restraint.

Belonogov Meets Western Envoys

LD1308172890 Moscow TASS in English 1722 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today received U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock, British Charge d'Affaires Ad Interim David Logan and Chinese Charge d'Affaires ad interim Zhang Zhen.

They discussed ways to settle the conflict in the Gulf region.

Afro-Asian Group Denounces Iraqi Annexation

LD1308171690 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yefremov]

[Text] Cairo August 13 TASS—the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) has denounced the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the country.

In a press release issued by the AAPSO president today, the organisation called on Arab leaders to renew their efforts to settle the crisis.

Compliance with the United Nations Charter, the principles of the Non-Alignment Movement and international laws can help settle the conflict, ensure stability in the region and restore Arab solidarity, the document says.

Commentaries Examine, Assess Gulf Situation

Oil Dispute To Fuel Crisis

90UF0438A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by TASS political commentator Albert Balebanov: "When Oil Goes to People's Heads"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is truly dangerous to be around oil with lighted matches. How justified, in fact, were Iraq's oil claims? To judge by foreign press reports, not only has Kuwait been producing oil above its quota but also selling it on the world market at prices below those established by OPEC, and this has been hitting at the financial interests of the other partners in this organization, particularly Iraq, whose economy has been in disarray as a result of the nine-year war with Iran. Judging from a BBC report, Kuwait's consent to pay Iraq $1 billion in compensation is indirect acknowledgment of its guilt in this quarrel.

At the same time, however, one notices that Iraq acted against Kuwait on the eve of the long-planned Geneva meeting of OPEC ministers. Iraqi President S. Husayn insisted that Kuwait and the other oil-producing states abide strictly by the agreements, secretly hoping for a rise in the price of this strategic raw material on the world market. Some observers believe that the "muscle-flexing" was precisely calculated by Baghdad. The effect of the power pressure worked: Kuwait agreed to concessions, and as a result of the conflict the oil price jumped immediately from $14 to $20 a barrel.

Although there is as yet no conclusive settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, it is clear nonetheless that Kuwait, as one of the wealthiest states, is simultaneously also one of the most vulnerable. On the other hand, the OPEC members now have a perfectly serious reason for keeping strictly to the established oil-production quotas—the powerful Iraqi Army.

The reasons for Baghdad's brutal pressure in this conflict are connected both with the political crisis which continues in Iraq itself brought about by the unpropitious results of the war with Iran and the difficulties in the sphere of restoration of the economy which it ravaged. However, there is no doubt that the present conflict demonstrates once again how explosive this region is, where a spark is sufficient for a conflagration to erupt. This is particularly dangerous in the light of the intensifying Israeli-Arab confrontation. And I would like to emphasize here that it is not only oil, figuratively speaking, which is "going to the heads" of certain politicians. Thus, for example, yesterday Israeli Minister Y. Neeman declared that Tel Aviv had chemical weapons and that it would use them in the event of an attack on the part of Iraq. And although, it is observed, he launched this tirade in response to Iraqi President S. Husayn's warning that Baghdad would use missiles with chemical warheads if Israel attacked an Arab country, the spurring of such threats testifies that certain Israeli political leaders have, in the words of E. Granot, chairman of the Mapam Party, "lost their heads." This applies particularly to their policy in respect of the Palestinians.

While continuing the policy of annexation of occupied Arab territory, Tel Aviv is stepping up punitive measures in respect of the Palestinians who live there, attempting to suppress the intifadah—the popular uprising which has been under way for three years running now. As a result there is a growing conviction in the world that only an international Near East conference under UN aegis with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO, is the sole practicable way of achieving peace and stability in this long-suffering area of the planet. Such is the opinion also of representatives of the European "three"—present, future and former chairmen of the EC Council of Ministers, the foreign ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and Ireland—who visited Israel last week.

It should be noted that the EC consistently advocates the achievement of a political settlement in the region, by way of direct constructive dialogue with the PLO included. Incidentally, in this respect the EC is going considerably further than the United States in the establishment of relations with the Palestinians. As distinct from Washington, which recently broke off the American-Palestinian dialogue, many countries of the community have established diplomatic relations with the PLO, granting inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip material assistance, and are speaking in support of the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

...The peoples of the Near East are tired of conflicts and are longing for a just peace and equal security for all. This should be remembered in all the world's capitals.

Husayn's Proposals Examined

PM1308172190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 14 Aug 90 p 3

["Political Commentary" by V. Mikhaylov: "Has a Chance Appeared?"]

[Text] After the four-way talks between the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Algeria in Alexandria, Egyptian President H. Mubarak stated that, even as an optimist, he does not pin his hopes on a peaceful outcome of events in the Persian Gulf.

It seemed that they really had gone too far and would at any moment overstep the boundary dividing crisis from a large-scale, bloody carnage in the region. But then a report came from Baghdad: According to Egypt's MENA, Iraq's President Husayn had promised to withdraw his troops from Kuwait and restore that country's independence in exchange for the simultaneous and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Moreover, he proposed replacing the American subunits deployed in Saudi Arabia with pan-Arab Armed Forces.

Husayn has other conditions, but these are the key ones, I think. This is what has happened. The aggressor had not expected, in my view, that his predatory attack upon a small state and its swallowing up within a matter of hours would go so far beyond the bounds of "family business." The world community's sharp and unambiguous reaction, the economic blockade which has forced the Iraqi leader to urge the population of his country to "halve its consumption of bread, meat, and other products" and "not to buy new clothes for a year," and the threat of a major war in the region have clearly forced the regime to ponder. And the readiness of the majority of Arab countries to stop this reckless aggressor is a more than serious warning.

And Husayn decided to make, let us acknowledge, a pretty adroit tactical move—to act in the role of "defender of the whole Arab nation" in order to make people forget his own treachery, knowing full well that his proposals are unacceptable. Which Tel Aviv stated straightaway. The threats and conditions made by Iraq were also categorically rejected by the United States.

But the deed is done, and I can imagine how those who only yesterday unanimously condemned Baghdad, will now start supporting it, guided by the principle of "my enemy's enemy...." The confrontation thus sharply shifts position....

Nevertheless, under these conditions there does remain a chance to solve this mortally dangerous situation. It consists of self-control on the part of all the sides involved in the conflict. It is the duty of the Arab states to persuade the Iraqi leader to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, and 662 and end the occupation of Kuwait and any preparation for new acts of aggression. A show of restraint and the use of every

opportunity, even the smallest, to eliminate the crisis by political rather than military means provides the only opportunity to avoid new and many times more numerous victims in this long-suffering region of the world.

Summit Highlights 'Differences'

LD1108100490 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 11 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yefremov]

[Text] Cairo August 11 TASS—Right after the emergency conference of Arab heads of state ended here last night, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak conducted talks with Saudi King Fahd, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad.

They discussed the possible development of events in the Persian Gulf area in light of the decisions adopted by the Arab emergency summit.

The summit is known to have highlighted serious differences among Arab states in the approach to developments in the region, especially in connection with the build-up of foreign military presence there.

Twelve delegations out of 20, including Egypt and Syria, voted in favour of a resolution strongly denouncing Iraq, supporting Saudi Arabia's self-defence measures and proposing to send Arab troops to defend it.

Three participants in the summit—Iraq, the PLO and Libya—voted against, another three abstained and two did not take part in the vote.

Many local observers fear that this outcome of the summit against a backdrop of Iraq's tough stance sharply raises the likelihood of an armed clash in the region.

Speaking to journalists in Cairo last night, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi suggested sending a mission of the Arab heads of state of Iraq to inform Iraqi President Saddam Husayn about the results of the summit.

In his view, this mission should involve Egyptian President Mubarak as the chairman of the summit, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid as the chairman of the Arab Maghreb Council and King Husayn of Jordan as the chairman of the Arab Cooperation Council.

Ousting of Pakistan's President Bhutto Evaluated

Aftermath of Coup Assessed

PM1308110390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by N. Paklin: "Afterword to 'Presidential Coup' in Pakistan. Political Revenge"]

[Text] Delhi—Something that was only whispered about yesterday in Islamabad has today become a reality. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the head of the interim government, has announced his intention to create a special tribunal which will judge, "according to special legal norms," members of Benazir Bhutto's civil government which was dismissed by the country's president a few days ago.

The main accused will be the former prime minister herself, who only recently was being called "the star of the East."

The interim government has forbidden Benazir Bhutto and members of her family and a number of politicians and businessmen to leave the country. There are 40 names altogether on this prohibition list. It is not considered to be out of the question here that the ban on leaving the country is only an intermediate measure before arrest. The head of the interim government makes no secret of the fact that his aim is to prevent Benazir Bhutto and other leaders of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) from participating in early parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 October. I recall that this party won the elections in November 1988 and formed a government based on a parliamentary majority. The president's decision to remove Benazir Bhutto's cabinet from power is all the more opposed to democratic principles inasmuch as her government still enjoys the support of the majority of deputies in the National Assembly.

Seeking to strengthen his positions, the head of the interim government has undertaken a purge of the upper echelons of the state apparatus. Over 30 advisers and political secretaries who worked in Bhutto's secretariat have already been dismissed. They include the press secretary. There is also a purge in progress in the Pakistani special services.

G.M. Jatoi's actions "to establish order" are being backed by the army, which stands behind the "presidential coup," as political circles have designated the unexpected decision by the Pakistani president to dismiss Bhutto's lawful government. Army officers have carried out a search of the former prime minister's secretariat and have removed documents. The army has taken under its control many establishments in Karachi, where Bhutto's residence is situated.

Bhutto's Downfall Viewed

90UF0439A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

["Viewpoint" by Veniamin Shurygin: "What Lies Behind the Dismissal of Benazir Bhutto"]

[Text] "A constitutional coup d'etat" is how leaders of Pakistan's People's Party are describing the president's decision to dissolve parliament and dismiss Benazir Bhutto as prime minister.

The second democratically formed government in the country's history lasted approximately 20 months. It came to the leadership in November 1988 as a result of

general parliamentary elections following the 11-year rule of the General Ziaul Haq regime.

The military's consent to elections and the formation of a civilian government was seen as a step aimed at "releasing the steam" of popular anger at its domestic and foreign policy. While agreeing to such a compromise, however, the military top brass and the Muslim parties of the right which supported it secured for themselves powerful levers of influence on the government, with the aid of which they were able to keep it on a "short rein."

They retained strong positions in the economy and administrative machinery, a majority in the upper chamber of parliament and power in a number of provinces, including the biggest—Punjab. Finally, the country's present president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, is their protege.

Under these conditions, it transpired, the B. Bhutto government was able to do little to fulfill its election promises. Aside from a certain democratization of social life, it was able to do practically nothing for a recovery of the economy and a rise in the living standard of the poorest strata of the population. Military spending and service of the foreign debt growing as a result of this ate up the lion's share of the budget. Nor were there practically any changes in Islamabad's foreign, specifically, Afghan, policy. There has recently been an exacerbation of relations with India over Kashmir. The government was forced to resort to the assistance of the army to restore order in Sind Province, where the conflict on ethnic grounds had intensified.

It is perfectly natural that the opposition took advantage of all these and other unsolved problems to topple the government. An attempt to do this with the aid of a vote of no-confidence in parliament failed. And then another method was employed. To all appearances, B. Bhutto's opponents concluded that her government had already discredited itself sufficiently and that its removal would not bring about a strong negative reaction in the country.

The charge of corruption and violation of the constitution is, in my view, the customary method employed by contending groups in the political struggle. There may have been corruption, but there are other reasons for so decisive a step on the part of the president of Pakistan. The endeavor of the opposition Muslim parties to get through parliament at all costs a bill on the increased influence of the shariah (the code of Muslim rules of law) in the life of society, for example, is thus cited as one such. The document they submitted for approval stipulates, inter alia, that the shariah must be the highest law in the state. However, the former ruling party, which had a relative majority in the lower house, opposed the bill, whose enactment in its opinion would have a negative impact on the position of women and would deprive parliament of a number of legislative powers.

So the opposition has switched to a decisive offensive and is hoping for victory at the elections scheduled for 24 October this year. I would like to believe that the development of the situation in Pakistan will not lead, as has been the case there frequently, to the installation of a dictatorship.

Afghan President's 'Peace Initiatives' Examined

LD0908153790 Moscow TASS in English 1503 GMT 9 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Aleksandrov]

[Text] Moscow August 9 TASS—"The Afghan settlement has entered a new phase marked by a marked flurry of activity among most interested sides," Yuriy Alekseyev, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Middle East Department, said.

Speaking in a TASS interview today, he described the situation around Afghanistan in light of new peace initiatives, recently advanced by President Najibullah. It should be especially noted, Alekseyev said, that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, at a working meeting in Irkutsk in early August, pointed to a significant rapprochement in the positions of countries [as received] on the main aspects of peace settlement in Afghanistan.

According to Alekseyev, the transition period, the need for which is acknowledged now by nearly all sides involved in the Afghan conflict, is central to efforts aimed at settling the situation in Afghanistan. Various variants of a mechanism for realising the transition have been proposed. One such proposal, backed by the Afghan leadership, provides for setting up an election commission on a parity basis, which will include representatives of all warring sides.

"Under certain conditions it is quite possible to transfer to it some units of the army, the Afghan Interior Ministry, as well as some units of the armed opposition," he stressed.

Commenting on the negative reaction of opposition leaders to the Afghan president's initiatives, Alekseyev said:

"There is an impression that they reacted without even studying the proposals properly, and only because they came from President Najibullah."

"It remains to hope that reason and sober calculation will eventually prevail among the opposition, because no settlement will be possible unless there is an inter-Afghan dialogue," he continued.

Alekseyev said that international organisations, primarily the United Nations, can play an important role in promoting the Afghan settlement.

As for contacts between Soviet representatives and the Afghan armed opposition, the USSR regards them "as

working (meetings) that can help settle the situation in Afghanistan, as well as release Soviet prisoners held by mujahidins."

"Of course," he stressed, "they do not mean recognition of the so-called 'transitional government of mujahidins'."

Ryzhkov Receives Afghan Deputy Minister, Others

PM0908142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting in the Kremlin"]

[Excerpts] N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received M.S. Mangal, Afghan deputy prime minister and chairman of the Afghan section of the Permanent Soviet-Afghan Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, 8 August. [passage omitted]

I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet section of the Permanent Soviet-Afghan Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, took part in the conversation, which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere. The following were present on the Afghan side: Afghan government ministers A.S. Salah, M.A. Ghafur Rahim, Khalilullah, Zahir Shah, and S. Husayn; and Muhammad Daud Razmiar, Afghan ambassador to the USSR.

Iran Plans To Restore Relations With Britian

NC1008063090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 8 Aug 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Iran has decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with Britain. This decision was unanimously adopted by members of the Supreme Council for National Security after studying a recent statement by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. These members considered this statement a [word indistinct] reply to a previous request by Iranian Majles delegates. In early March the Majles called on the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sever diplomatic relations with Britain in response to the British Government's statements on Salman Rushdie, author of the "Satanic Verses." Some time ago, (?Hurd) expressed his respect for Islam and agreed that Rushdie's book contains attacks on Islam. Our commentator writes:

The Rushdie issue goes beyond the framework of Iranian-British relations. This issue also touches on problems pertaining to the freedom of (?creativity), the [words indistinct] of relations between governments, and moral issues. Thus, Iran's decision to restore diplomatic relations with Britain was regarded with great interest in various world (?circles), particularly in the Soviet Union. How can this decision be described? Is is a victory of logic? There are signs that indicate this. Formerly officials in London had agreed that Rushdie's books contained (?issues) that hurt the religious feelings of Muslims. Margaret Thatcher was one of those to make such remarks. Nevertheless, Tehran did not consider these statements to be sufficient grounds for normalizing relations between Iran and Britain.

But Douglas Hurd's statement had the opposite effect, which leads one to believe that Iran's new leadership has understood the strong (?impact) that ideological differences can have on relations between governments. One can deduce that the Iranian Government has accepted the fact that it is not permissible to persecute an author whose imagination produced a book which is not completely within the framework of Islam and to threaten to kill him. Ultimately, a (?civilized decision) free from violence was adopted.

Unfortunately there are circles in Iran which, like before, are trying to exploit the Rushdie issue for their own spiteful objectives. They consider the decision adopted by their country's Supreme Council for National Security a mere formality. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI points out that the death decree on the British author continues to be in force and it demands that London end its defense of Rushdie.

I think that these are extremely [words indistinct] demands. No Western government can do so, even if it wanted to. Such an action would be contrary to the principles of freedom and democracy. Clearly, the conservative religious groups in Iran are making these demands in order to halt the democratization process in their country and to prevent it from joining the international process of (?political restructuring) and economic [words indistinct]. And the reestablishment of Iranian-British relations is part of this process.

I think that both sides will benefit from this. There is no place for statements about who lost and who won in this issue. Normalization of relations means that logic wins.

Sub-Saharan Africa

South Africa's Plans for New Constitution Viewed

'Compromise' With ANC Needed

MB1008133590 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The South African information agency SAPA quotes an official representative of the South African Government who said that the full-scale talks to work out a new Constitution of South Africa can begin already at the beginning of next year.

The significance of this information can hardly be overestimated. In essense, it is on a government level recognized, and the process of determining the future of South Africa will take place with the participation of the black majority, the opponent of apartheid, and mainly the most prestigious organization, the African National Congress [ANC].

As is known, this information has been preceded by a meeting in Pretoria between the delegations of the ANC and the South African Government on 6 August. The statement of the ANC on the suspension of armed struggle against the South African regime, to accelerate a peaceful political settlement in the country by means of talks, was the focal point of that meeting.

The SAPA information notes that it was precisely that statement that strengthened the confidence in the seriousness of the ANC intentions to follow the road of talks. It is evident that if there were doubts concerning the seriousness of the plans, then it should concern not only the ANC.

It is gratifying to note that at these preliminary talks with that organization the government also has shown that it is likewise a fearless partner. In particular, an agreement has been reached on the working out of plans for a stage-by-stage release of political prisoners during the period from 1 September till the end of April of next year. The government made it incumbent to immediately study the question of the abrogation of several principles of the law on internal security limiting the freedom of the opponents of the regime, and on the lifting of the state of emergency in the Natal Province.

Of course it is yet too early to say that a full harmony of views on ways and means of the constitutional transformation in the country have been formed between the South African Government and the ANC. The right of the authorities to arrest and keep in jail people suspected of terrorism for an indefinite period of time, and without trial, is still preserved. Naturally, it also depends on the authorities who is still considered a terrorist.

At the talks in Pretoria, the representatives of the ANC expressed their sharp dissatisfaction with the government's unwillingness to condemn the actions of the police, who on the eve of the meeting arrested dozens of opponents of that organization.

The leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, at a joint news conference with President de Klerk after the talks were concluded said that the mass actions and the protest meetings against apartheid would continue. But it is important to emphasize the [word indistinct]. The agreement reached on the beginning of full-scale talks took the ground from under the seat of the opponents of the reform, and there are quite a lot of them in South Africa, especially among the conservative, (?mindless) section of the white population.

Of course, future talks are impossible without compromises. But these compromises are quite justifiable [word indistinct] take place on the one hand, on the background on the rejection of armed confrontations and the cessation of bloodshed, and on the other hand when the ultimate aim becomes more and more clear and real: That is the building in South Africa of a nonracial and democratic society. The more builders there are, the better.

Other Political Forces Involved

MB1108144790 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Commentary by Andrey Orlov—read by announcer]

[Text] Following the talks between the African National Congress and the South African Government on 6 August, an official spokesman for the government declared that early in 1991 full-scale talks might be held to discuss the preparation of a new constitution of South Africa. What turn the developments in South Africa may take in this connection? [sentence as heard] We would like you to hear the opinion on the subject of Andrey Orlov, a deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

On 6 August, Andrey Orlov writes, talks about talks ended whose aim was to create a favorable atmosphere for the continuation of contacts and for opening full-scale negotiations in the long run. If the sides are ready to honor commitments that they took upon themselves during the latest meeting, namely to renounce the armed struggle—that is, on the ANC's part—and release political prisoners and allow the exiled ANC members to return home—that is, on the part of the South African Government—then these talks on a new constitution are feasible.

But there still exists the difficulties that complicate the situation. First of all, tense relations between the ANC on the one side and the Inkatha and the Pan-African Congress [PAC] [as heard] on the other, and also sharp differences between the government on the one hand and the conservatives and the right-wingers on the other. Add to this the problem of Natal; that has overstepped the limits of the province.

If the sides had a real intention to go over to genuine negotiations, then the composition of the participants and the mechanism for holding such talks should be determined. The idea is already in the air of roundtable talks where all the political forces of South Africa could be represented. The ANC, however, favors a bilateral dialogue: the South African Government on the one side and the country's democratic forces on the other. What ANC representatives imply is probably the participation in the talks of the United Democratic Front, the Congress' ally. This variant, however, can hardly be translated into reality since the Pan-African Congress and Inkatha remain outside of the talks.

As events continue taking a favorable turn the ANC and the government, who have approached this stage of the

negotiations in August, will not be able to ignore other political forces in the country. Full-scale negotiations itself imply broad participation, so the ANC has to think now about the establishment of constructive contacts with the Pan-African Congress, Inkatha, and AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization], and the De Klerk government has to take a more decisive stand in its relations with the conservatives and the right-wingers.

Though the ANC and the South African Government seem to be interested in speeding up the rapproachement process, this should apparently be done even quicker. Any delay means for the ANC that it can be outstripped by the black community's left-wing forces, for example by the Pan-African Congress, which is weak so far. But its cadres will be trying to drag their feet in order to grow stronger and weaken the ANC and the (?free economy). As for the government, it already faces the danger that the right wingers will be gaining points. Their influence within the white community is growing. To talk about full-scale negotiations over constitutional matters and [words indistinct] rights is a feasible thing.

The question is: how to get down to these talks—to sit down at the clean table, so to speak, and start from scratch, or to come with certain practical proposals dealing with the preparation of a new constitution? In the opinion of Andrey Orlov, the second variant would be much more preferable.

'Armed Struggle' Waged Against Somali Regime

EA1108105290 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 9 Aug 90

[From the "World Events Today" program]

[Text] REUTER News Agency reports that three of the fronts waging an armed struggle against Somali President Siad Barre's regime have decided to unite their forces. Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov says the United Somali Congress, the Somali National Movement, and the Somali Patriotic Movement, which is the strongest militarily, have decided to form a united military command. A united military command means that guerrillas fighting in the northern, central, and southern regions of Somalia now get their orders from the central command. The danger of this unity for the regime, as seen by many foreigners, is aggravated by the chaos in the government army itself.

The unarmed opposition groups are also showing new vigor. The big demonstrations in support of the leaders who signed the first Mogadishu manifesto, which caused a lot of commotion, and the burial of the hero Ismail Jimale Ossoble, may God rest his soul in peace, in which half a million Somalis participated, show that the political confusion in Somalia is approaching its climax.

History teaches us that such situations lead any society to a loss of direction and anarchy and can worsen the condition of the country. For this reason, all the political forces in Somalia are trying to get through the confusion. The government has announced political and economic changes and has proposed to the armed opposition that they hold talks to reach a solution. These changes, to be implemented after a referendum, include a new constitution for Somalia that respects human rights and a multiparty system.

The signatories of the first Mogadishu manifesto proposed similar changes to these. The difference lies in how to effect the changes. The opposition politicians believe that the referendum and the elections cannot take place normally as long as the repressive forces, which are very numerous in a country of nine million people, are in the hands of the regime. Among the repressive forces are the national securty service, the military police, operatives of the ruling party, the only party, in the country, and the investigation department of the party. Any member of these forces or organizations can arrest any Somali.

Therefore, based on the fact that none of the leaders of the fronts waging an armed struggle against the Siad Barre regime can accept holding talks as long as Siad Barre heads the regime, the signatories of the first Mogadishu manifesto proposed establishing a government without the president, and having the president hold his post until new elections. These proposed negotiations have been rejected by the regime, which in turn cannot seriously harass the politicians.

Perhaps all these facts caused the guerrillas to wage an armed struggle for a democratic and peaceful Somalia to satisfy themselves that their way is the straightest and quickest way to their goal. Once they have united their forces, they plan to achieve a speedy victory over the Mogadishu regime. However, the fact that the civil war in Somalia has quickly claimed more than 50,000 lives and over 400,000 refugees is a concern. Therefore, what will it cost to defeat the regime militarily? If the guerrillas are victorious, does it mean the end of the civil war? The example of Siad Barre, who has ruled the country by force, shows that the hunger for power does not lessen after victory.

Gorbachev Congratulates Cape Verde President

LD1308134190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent a message of congratulations to President Pereira on the occasion of the 15th anniverary of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Cape Verde. It expresses satisfaction with the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cape Verde based on mutual trust, equality, and mutual advantage.

West Europe

FRG's Bundeswehr To Check for Chemical Weapons

LD1308152290 Moscow TASS in English 1437 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn August 13 TASS—Experts from the West German Bundeswehr will inspect a storage facility near the city of Hohenleipisch, belonging to the group of Soviet troops in Germany, on August 14, 1990.

The inspection aims to check if the storage facility has chemical weapons, says a statement by the West German Defence Ministry released here today.

The Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated that there are no chemical weapons on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. However, senational reports that the USSR stores huge reserves there appear now and then in the West German press.

The inspection of stores and other military facilities of the GDR National People's Army, which was conducted last July, confirmed the statements by Soviet representatives. West German specialists did not find any signs of the deployment of Soviet chemical weapons in East Germany.

FRG's Kohl Declares Polish Border 'Definitive'

PM1308144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Grigoryev under the rubric: "Details": "Hooting in Bad Cannstatt. Revanchist Sentiments of 'League of Exiles'"]

[Text] Bonn—It is a long time since the Federal chancellor, who has recently been riding high in public opinion polls, met with a welcome such as he got in Bad Cannstatt a few days ago. The intention was conceived of celebrating the 40th anniversary of the so-called "exiles' charter" in this resort town near Stuttgart.

Celebrating it because it contained a "renunciation of retribution," as some kind of act in a spirit of reconciliation, Kohl interrupted his vacation for this. However, scarcely had he declared that the border between Poland and Germany along the Oder and the Neisse is definitive in its present form than hissing and hooting broke out in the hall. For the sake of propriety it is now asserted that a minority was protesting.

A professional cohort of the "League of Exiles" and its branches—the Landsmannschaefter, to which the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union have always adhered—was present at the meeting. Its representatives serve as deputies in the federal and land parliaments, almost 100 percent of them being from these parties. It has never happened before that such a circle of people has hissed the leader of the Christian Democrats and the head of the Federal Government.

The happening in Bad Cannstatt illustrates in its own way how radically the times and the situation have changed. It is well known that Kohl was has for a long time resisted recognizing Poland's existing western border, surrounding this with various provisos. Now his position, expressed in Bad Cannstatt, does not give rise to any reservations. As the Germans say, he has poured out a "stiff drink" for his discontented listeners: Recognition of the definitive nature of the Oder-Neisse border is inevitable and necessary. This is the chief condition both for Germany's unification and for peace in Europe. In my view, the expression of this position of the Federal Government before the political stratum of "exiles" is important for trust in European countries with regard to the future united Germany.

On the other hand, Bad Cannstatt showed that the "hard nucleus" of compatriot organizations is not laying down its arms. The aged leaders of the "League of Exiles" have prepared their successors after their own image and likeness.

The problem of survival which the leaders of the "exiles" are encountering is prompting them to maneuver and to seek new covers for an old essence. In Bad Cannstatt, H. Czaja, head of the "League of Exiles," did not confine himself to stamping his feet with regard to the "total abandonment of the East German motherland." He also threw up the following jesuitical formula: "Everything cannot be as it was, but neither can it remain as it is."

Not only is a ridiculous demand for the population in western regions of Poland to be granted the right to vote in... all-German elections served up with this sauce. At the same time, the slogan of a "European" solution for these regions was advanced. Czaja proposed turning them into some kind of "independent territory" under the auspices of European institutions. Some people in the same circles are dreaming of a new colonization of Polish lands by means of "peaceful settlement" there on the basis of the "right to a motherland."

There are other constructions too. The majority of them today appear absurd and absolutely hopeless.

Agreement Signed With FRG TV, Radio Station

PM1008145990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Igor Andreyev: "'Deutsche Welle' on the Glasnost Wavelength"]

[Text] A seemingly unlikely event occurred 7 August: A cooperation agreement between the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting [Gosteleradio] and the "Deutsche Welle" radio station—which had been considered a "hostile voice" until quite recently—was signed in Moscow.

Under this document—which was signed by Gosteleradio Deputy Chairman A. Plevako and Deutsche Welle Intendant Dieter Weirich—the Soviet and West

German partners will, over the course of three years for the time being, exchange radio programs on a noncommercial basis and help each other to set up and jointly produce broadcasts. Attention will center on themes of mutual interest, common political problems, culture, and sport.

"Deutsche Welle" broadcasts from FRG territory to foreign countries, D. Weirich said, representing the radio station he heads. It is the only West German radio station controlled by social groupings that is wholly subsidized by the state—to the tune of 330 million Deutschmarks [DM].

Bound by agreements with many of the world's radio companies, we attach quite different importance to cooperation with Gosteleradio: After all, it is a question of deepening partnership between our countries. We have now established a permanent Cologne-Moscow radio link.

Currently, D. Weirich continued, we have still not settled all the issues associated with cooperation in the sphere of television. But the conclusion of an agreement on this topic is a matter for future weeks. We are planning, for instance, to beam our newscast to the USSR—or rather to Kazakhstan, where many Germans live. This broadcast is currently taken by more than 1,500 cable stations in the United States.

One last point. "Deutsche Welle" is announcing a literary competition for Soviet participants. Prizes of DM5,000 are on offer for the winners of the "radio story" and "radio play" categories.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Decree Rehabilitates Stalin Victims

LD1308185190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] In this bulletin we will acquaint you with a decree of the USSR president on restoring the rights of all the victims of the political repressions of the 1920-50's. It says that the mass repressions, arbitrary rule, and lawlessness carried out by the Stalinist leadership in the name of the revolution, the party, and the people have formed a grave legacy of the past. The outrages begun in the middle of the 1920's against the honor and the very life of their fellow countrymen continued with the harshest consistency for several decades. Thousands of people were subjected to moral and physical torments and many of them were exterminated. The lives of their families and loved ones were turned into a bleak period of degradation and suffering.

Stalin and his entourage gained practically unlimited power, depriving the Soviet people of the liberties that are considered natural and inalienable in a democratic society. The mass repressions were mainly carried out by means of punishments outside the legal process through the so-called special conferences, collegia, troykas, and dvoykas [three-men and two-men tribunals]. But even in the courts the elementary norms of legal proceedings were trampled on. The restoration of justice begun by the 20th Congress of the CPSU was conducted inconsistently and was in effect discontinued in the second half of the 1960's.

The special commission for the additional study of material connected with the repressions has rehabilitated thousands of innocently condemned people; it has rescinded the illegal acts against the peoples subjected to resettlement from their native areas; and it has deemed illegal the decisions on political cases taken by the extra-legal organs of the OGPU, NVKD, and MGB [previous names of the current KGB] during the 1930-50's period. Other acts have also been adopted to restore the rights of the victims of arbitrary rule.

But even today thousands of legal cases have not yet been raised. The stain of injustice has still not been removed from the Soviet people who innocently suffered during the forcible collectivization, who were subjected to imprisonment and exiled with their families to remote regions without the means of existence, without the right to vote, even without any term of imprisonment being announced. Representatives of the clergy and citizens persecuted on religious grounds have to be rehabilitated. The swiftest elimination of the consequences of the lawlessness and political crimes committed out of abuse of power is essential to all of us and to all of society, which has embarked upon the path of moral regeneration, democracy and lawfulness.

Expressing principled condemnation of the mass repressions and considering them incompatible with the norms of civilization and on the basis of Articles 127/7 and 114 of the USSR Constitution, I resolve:

First, to deem as illegal and contrary to fundamental civil and socioeconomic human rights the repressions carried out against the peasants in the period of collectivization and against all other citizens on political, social, ethnic, religious, and other grounds during the 1920-50's period and to fully restore the rights of these citizens. The USSR Council of Ministers and the governments of the Union republics are, in accordance with the decree in question, to submit to the legislative organs prior to 1 October 1990 proposals on the procedure for restoring the rights of citizens who suffered from the repressions.

Second, this decree does not extend to persons condemned with cause, for committing crimes against the homeland and Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, and in the prewar and postwar years. The USSR Council of Ministers is to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft legislative act defining the list of these crimes and the procedure for deeming by legal process those persons, condemned for their commission, who are ineligible for rehabilitation on the grounds provided for by this decree.

Third, taking account of the political and social significance of the full resolution of all matters connected with the restoration of the rights of citizens groundlessly repressed during the 1920-50's period, supervision of this process is vested in the USSR Presidential Council.

TASS Reports Rehabilitation Decree

LD1308180790 Moscow TASS in English 1758 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—A decree by President Mikhail Gorbachev was issued here today, restoring the rights of all victims of political repressions in the 1920s-1950s.

Although the special commission to study the repressions has already rehabilitated thousands of innocent victims, many cases have not been studied.

Expressing a general condemnation of mass repressions, Gorbachev ruled to recognise, as illegal and contradictions to basic human civil, social and economic rights, repressions against peasants in the period of collectivisation, as well as against all other citizens for political, social, ethnic, [words indistinct] restore the rights of these citizens.

The decree instructs the governments of the USSR and republics to submit, before October 1, 1990, proposals to legislatures on restoring the rights of repressed citizens.

The decree does not cover those who were convicted for crimes against the homeland and Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, in the pre-war and post-war years.

Supervision over the restoration of the rights of citizens illegally subjected to repressions in the 1920s-1950s is vested with the USSR Presidential Council.

Gorbachev Decree Extending Weapons Deadline

PM1308152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

["USSR President's Decree on Extending Deadline for Implementation of USSR President's 25 July 1990 Decree"]

[Text] In view of the requests that are coming in from Union republics concerning the need to carry out additional measures to ensure fulfillment of the demands of the USSR's President's 25 July 1990 decree "On prohibitng the creation of armed formations that are not envisaged by USSR legislation and the confiscation of illegally held weapons," I decree that:

1. The deadline for the surrender of weapons, ammunition, explosives, combat equipment, and other military hardware by illegal armed formations, set by article 1 of the USSR President's 25 July 1990 Decree, should be extended by two months .

2. The present decree comes into effect as of its adoption.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev

Bakatin Views Decree Extension

LD1308170290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Interview with Internal Affairs Minister Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin by correspondent K. Minayev from the "Vremya" newscast; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Minayev] A decree by the USSR president of 11 August this year has extended by two months the period for the voluntary surrender of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and new military supplies by illegal armed groupings.

Vadim Viktorovich, what brought about the need to extend the period for the fulfillment of the USSR president's 25 July decree?

[Bakatin] The decree was actively taken up by the overwhelming majority of the republics and republican governments. Now I can even cite some operational figures on this. If on 8 August I was saying that in the period since 25 July some 1,600 rifles had been handed over, now this is already 2,500 rifles. Various weapons have been voluntarily surrendered or removed, but from the very start of the implementation of this decree requests have been received from the republics to extend the period of this decree.

Today I have 11 such requests with me here. That is 11 which come from 11 republics. Leon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, has appealed to President Mikhail Sergeyevich saying that relying on the support and the agreement of the people, by their common efforts, and without external intervention he hopes to find ways to get out of the complex social and political situation and requests the extension of the period for the fulfillment of the decree in the sense.... [changes thought] What is in mind is the voluntary surrender of weapons.

The extension of the period in no way signifies that there should be some kind of abatement in the implementation of the decree which of course retains its force in full. I would say the opposite.

Of course it is a special situation, despite the fact that the main problems remain to be tackled in Armenia by the Armenian Government first and foremost, and other republics have a great many concerns and a great deal to do also. Of course each has its own special features, but there are many common ones. Above all this is the activation of purely professional activity, primarily of criminal investigators on urgent investigative measures. This is the first thing.

The second thing which it is necessary to do is to intensify the general audit of all enterprises that have weapons, that manufacture weapons, or that can manufacture them in order to take tough steps there which would exclude the pilfering of weapons.

And the third thing, perhaps, is the monitoring of the numerous public groupings which have been set up to assist the law protection bodies in order to ensure that weapons don't reach them.

Probably the last thing which I would like to say now, and which is also very important, is not to provide an opportunity for those forces that are still interested in whipping up tension and that place their trust only in force, that place their trust only in the militia, that place their trust only in troops in tackling any problems or any complexity, to profit from this gesture of the president which extends the period in order not to evaluate it, not to present it—this reasonable, indisputably reasonable step—as some kind of retreat, as some sign of weakness say, inasmuch as the task of disbanding the armed illegal groupings is not being cancelled. This is perfectly clear.

But here the bodies of power are striving to do this peacefully, without possibly numerous victims. And evidently this step has to be appraised appropriately and, apart from the law protection bodies it is very important that all political and social forces and public movements should join in this work alongside ourselves, alongside the State Security Committee that they should actively join in, and I hope the mass media too which have far from exhausted their capabilities here, and I am actively hoping for active cooperation.

Supreme Soviet Continues Union Treaty Discussion

LD1308192890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 13 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Consultations on preparing a new Union treaty have continued in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukraine were due to expound their proposals here today.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent N. Chernyshova] The Ukrainian delegation arrived at this meeting without yet having a final concept of the new Union. Rather, these were the first approximations and attempts to check on the partners' reactions to different theses. So some assertions of the guests provoked an ambiguous response from the Supreme Soviet representatives. And members of the working group of the Ukraine appraised every word of the Union representatives with passion. But on the main issue, the Ukrainian delegation replied unambiguously. [video shows Chernyshova interviewing V.B. Grinev, deputy chairman of Ukraine Supreme Soviet]

[Chernyshova] Will the Ukraine join the Union?

[Grinev] In my view, without fail. The question is how it will join, and on what terms, and what kind of new Union this will be. This is the question of questions.

[Chernyshova] The main topic of discussion was whether the Union will be preserved as a single state or whether it will break up into separate states united by the principle of a common market, and which rights the Ukraine delegates to the center. The treaty should be the result of the agreed proposals of all the republics, but each of them is trying in the first instance to consolidate their own fundamental interests in it.

[Grinev] You understand, this question about how our vision of the Union treaty will correspond with other Union republics is a question for direct talks with the republics. Of course there are different readings there. [video shows Chernyshova speaking to R.N. Nishanov]

[Chernyshova] Rafik Nishanovich, the discussion was intense today.

[Nishanov] We would be unwise if we began by destroying or denying what we achieved. But at the same time, we of course cannot fail to take account of those ugly phenomena which existed as a result of centralization, and in fact, of the creation of a unitary state. So there are certain elements of suspicion and distrust here. And our consultations are reducing this distrust and suspicion.

[Chernyshova] The new Union treaty—for how many states will it be intended?

[Nishanov] Naturally, all 15 republics should be parties to the Union treaty, including the Baltic republics. If, with 12 republics, we succeed in working out some kind of general approaches taking account of their interests to the maximum, and create the foundations for a good Union treaty, then who can deny that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will want to take part in this Union. For this reason we are also inviting our Baltic friends to the consultation table, and we will take maximum account of their views.

[Chernyshova] And what if some ethnic group or formation or an autonomous republic wants to sit at the negotiating table?

[Nishanov] It goes without saying here that we also have to take account of the view of the Union republic of which the autonomous republic forms a part. This is a most important factor, but at the same time, the fact that every autonomous region and their representatives are entitled to these consultations is an axiom. [end recording]

Commentary on Union Treaty Ideas

90UN2540A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 30, 30 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Professor Grigoriy Atamanchuk, doctor of legal sciences: "A New Treaty—Is It Only a Matter of Powers?"]

[Text] [Following paragraph is published in a three-column box in the middle of the item] Questions on the preparation of a new treaty on the Union, and on cooperation and mutual assistance among the peoples of our country, have left the plane of abstract reflection and entered the plane of practical activity. The first exchanges of views have taken place on the concepts of new allied relations, on ways of reforming our Union and transforming it into a Union of sovereign states.

In analyzing the ideas, positions, and approaches that have been expressed, we can already conclude that several courses have been charted along which creative search is now being conducted. The first course, the most widespread, is most often reflected in the pages of our press and can be seen to some extent in the USSR Law "On the Demarcation of Powers Between the USSR and Federation Entities." Its essence lies in the premise that we must logically expand on what we have already gained, improve and perfect the mechanisms of allied relations we now have, and in this manner reach a new stage in the historical development of the USSR.

The authors and advocates of this position see the main problem in a new distribution of powers between the republics and the USSR in general. The entirety of the task amounts to determining which powers to reserve for the Union, and of these—which to designate as exclusive and which to relegate to the sphere of joint competence. At first glance this point of view seems quite productive; at the same time, it is easily decided, insofar as practically all USSR constitutions, beginning in 1922, contain the concept of demarcating powers between Union and republic organs of state power and government. At the same time we cannot help but feel that this position

contains only one side of the problem of Union relations—the so-called jurisdictional aspect.

Another approach, initiated no doubt in the draft constitution drawn up by A.D. Sakharov and reproduced now in many variations of draft Union treaties, consists of generally repudiating today's principles of the organization of social life and moving to structure it on the basis of the needs and interests of ethnicity. It involves the necessity of establishing national soviets for each of our peoples, through which they can somehow effect self-determination. These national soviets would then lay down the structure of new allied relations.

At first glance we see much that is democratic and humane here. The problem, however, is that society, the peoples, have long since discarded the tribal-clan, purely ethnic organization of their lives. The state has existed quite a bit longer than one millennium structured primarily on the principle of unification of certain territories and the inclusion in social life, naturally, of representatives of all peoples inhabiting the given territory. And it is felt that the extraction of each nation out of this multiethnic community would hardly be able to facilitate the normalization of interethnic relations or the resolution of the social problems people face.

Nor is it possible to fail to note the nationalistic and separatist positions, according to which any need for perfecting, improving, or maintaining allied relations is altogether negated. Spokesmen for these views defend autarchy and isolationism, believing that everyone must close himself up in his ethnic compartment, be the master of his house there, and in this way resolve the great or little issues which confront each nation, each people. We can understand this position as a reaction to those authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations which accompanied our lives for so many years and which, of course, had their effect on the implementation of those principles which were recorded in the treaties on the formation of the USSR in 1922.

But one cannot move forward if his head is facing backward. This is not only dangerous, but it will not bring about, as a rule, the goal we would all like to reach together. I call this position nationalistic, because national in the true sense of the word always presupposes the existence of other peoples, equal relations with other peoples, and cooperation with them—thus, national is by virtue of its nature always international.

It is no accident that in many countries where national self-consciousness has been realized, and to a great extent embodied in actuality, the processes of integration have undergone development. For the experience of mankind shows clearly that it is difficult not only for the individual person, not only for the individual collective, but for the individual people as well to resolve problems without mutual support, mutual assistance, cooperation, exchange of knowledge, skills, experience, culture, etc. The internationalization of social life is an objective process—and of course we are pursuing it and will continue to pursue it, even through its present rejection.

If we analyze the scope of powers of Union organs, beginning with 1922, it is not difficult to see that it has not changed very significantly. Formally the republics were sovereign states and could control processes on their territory in accordance with their constitutions. The whole secret lay in the mechanisms for implementation of these powers. It is precisely these mechanisms—and not the powers—that became authoritarian-bureaucratic and distorted our federation. To a great extent they nullified the concepts on which it was established.

It was conceived that the Union would unite republics with equal rights, enable them to resolve their vital issues more efficiently, and provide for the direct participation of each republic in conducting common matters. But gradually, as a result of deformation of the democratic essence of socialist society, the notorious center sprang up which increasingly alienated the Union and autonomous republics—not only from conducting affairs overall, but matters on their territory as well. Under such conditions, not only did the powers relegated to the jurisdiction of the USSR cease to play any kind of role, but the sovereign rights of the republics did so as well. Ministries and departments resolved issues as they wished and assumed a leading role accordingly. The absence of democracy and disregard for the legitimate interests of peoples is what deformed the federation. This—and not the powers—is what destroyed normal relations among peoples.

Therefore, in discussing new forms of allied relationships, the scope of powers should not be shifted to the foreground as much as the question of how, that is, in what manner these powers are to be implemented. Evidently, the most important thing consists of giving the Union republics the opportunity to be sovereign states to the fullest extent, not just in their territory, but with regard to common matters as well. For if we delve into the essence of the situation, we must acknowledge that the Union is to a certain degree an abstraction, because there is not a single Union issue which does not to one degree or another affect all the Union republics or a certain one of them. The Union is in fact the republics, just as the interrelationship among republics comprises the Union.

It is sad to admit that this seemingly simple truth cannot to this day be in any way assimilated. Attempts still continue to be made to find some special issues or problems which supposedly concern the center, and which are different from the problems and interests of the republics. But, as we have become convinced, little of constructive value emerges from this calculation. The fact of the matter is that life is integral—it cannot be developed separately on a level of Union, republic, oblast, rayon, or any other entity. It is necessary to approach life in integrated fashion.

It is felt that, under contemporary conditions, it is high time to shift the emphasis. Of course, it is necessary to designate by mutual agreement those issues which are to be resolved jointly. Let me repeat once again—it is not simply questions related to some jurisdiction, apart from Union republic, but precisely those questions which these republics will resolve jointly. By virtue of this, republic sovereignty will be exercised as if in two directions. The first of these is the sovereign activity of republics on their territory. Here, naturally, the republics are sole masters and must resolve everything in the manner they consider most advisable. Another block of questions is determined objectively by the fact that the republics are simply unable to handle them independently, or it is too disadvantageous for them to do so—these are questions requiring their joint efforts, an integration of their capabilities. Such questions include ensuring freedom and independence, state security, inviolability of borders, communications, information, scientific-technological progress, and generally a great deal more which may arise when integration processes constitute the law of social development. The important thing is to understand and convince everyone that these will be questions which are not separated, or detached from the Union republics. They are retained within their jurisdiction and serve as an extension and expression of their sovereignty. But these are questions which the republics resolve jointly, on an equal basis.

I see great constructive potential in this point of view, embodied in the concept of a Union of sovereign states. The study of this concept should lead us into a new field of reflection. More than anything else we must escape the bounds of argument as to which is better—federation or confederation; what to move towards and what to move away from; what to destroy and what to create again.

As we know, the fact of emergence of our state was constituted in the Declaration on Formation of the USSR adopted 30 December 1922. This declaration is related to the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America signed in 1776 by representatives of 13 states. And although they have become 50 states in the centuries that have passed, the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural situations in the United States of America have changed radically. State-legal structures are built differently in many aspects, but no one has ever raised any doubt about this great act of establishing a new state on the American Continent. I think no one will raise any doubt about our similarly historic moment either, but the subject of discussion basically is the restructuring of the internal organization of our multiethnic state.

Incidentally, the Treaty on Formation of the USSR, that which today we usually call the Union Treaty, consisted—figuratively speaking—of two parts. The first part dealt with what the Union republics ascribe to joint competence and what they transfer somehow to Union organs. The second part revealed the mechanism for participation of these republics in the conduct of all-Union matters and inter-republic cooperation. Just looking at this second part easily convinces us that it was completely democratic, that it provided for republic participation in practically all the state-legal structures created by this treaty. It is the distortion of this, the second part, which led practically to a cessation of the functioning of the first part. At the center, in the republics, and in the localities, the authoritarian-bureaucratic system of organizing social life and the management exercised by it trampled everything underfoot.

Thus, if we really want to bring national processes into the stream of rationality and constructiveness, if we want to radically restructure interethnic relations, we must first get rid of a number of stereotypes that have accompanied us in the course of recent decades. We must depart from use of the concept "center," since there is no center in a union. This is just a geographical concept which denotes the place where federal structures are situated. We must understand that there are no special, specific, all-Union interests that would not affect the republics. Even defense and security are not functions that can be exercised apart from the republics. We must get away from the concept that if a republic decides something jointly, by doing so it limits or restricts its sovereignty. Sovereignty is always absolute, but its realization presupposes intelligent concessions and compromises, entry into various alliances, treaties, agreements, and understandings, which naturally impose certain obligations upon the entering party. And the undertaking of such obligations is not a restriction of sovereignty, but rather a form of exercising it. Finally, we must concur with the fact that the exercise of national sovereignty is not always automatically related to one form or another of the state organization of social life, that all peoples possess equal national sovereignty regardless of the specific form of their organizational consolidation. We should also delve into many other obsolete concepts reflecting phenomena which have different content today, phenomena operating under fundamentally new conditions—all the more so since today it is the interpretations which elicit numerous discussions and arguments. Instead of analyzing phenomena, attention is focused on definitions.

It seems three principles must be embedded in the foundation of forming new allied relations, principles which today have resounded universally and relate to common human values.

The first consists of the fact that all people, regardless of their nationality or other specific features, possess equal rights in all spheres of life and should enjoy the same rights and freedoms everywhere, regardless of where they reside. This human and humanitarian measurement today constitutes the scale apart from which it is impossible to comprehend or evaluate a single social phenomenon, a single technical or technological process.

The second principle consists of the fact that all peoples are equal regardless of their numerical strength or level of development. The importance of this principle should be especially stressed, insofar as the indigenous peoples of certain republics, in fighting for their rights within the

framework of the USSR, place a very great emphasis on equal rights. But when the topic of discussion turns to treatment of other peoples residing in their territory, somehow this very same equal-rights concept is forgotten. No principle can be selective—either it is valid, or it is not.

The third principle is the interrelationship between rights and freedoms of the individual and rights and freedoms of peoples. We know that a people cannot be free if the rights of the individual there are suppressed, just as a person cannot feel free if his people's rights are trampled upon. There is an absolute correlation here!

It is entirely natural that realization of these principles will bring us directly to the issues of democracy. Only in a democratic society, where the relationships to the individual and to peoples are valued equally, are peaceful cohabitation, well-being, and social progress possible. In forming allied relations, therefore, we must focus our primary attention on the development of democracy—its forms, methods, and procedures which will ensure complete, guaranteed implementation of these principles. The most pressing thing today is not simply to determine the scope of powers that the republics will exercise jointly or direct to appropriate Union organs. The most important thing is that all republics, all peoples, be full-fledged, authoritative participants in allied relationships, that they be entities in these relationships so that not a single weighty issue in the life of the country is resolved without their consideration.

A union of sovereign states is not a federation in the traditional understanding of the word, nor is it a confederation, about which a great deal is currently being said. More than anything else it should be a new formation, built on genuinely democratic principles and functioning in a democratic mode. I will not get into details, since Union republic representatives will be working out the specifics and collective judgment will enable us to find the most suitable forms, but for me it is already clear that we should concentrate our attention on perfecting the design of appropriate allied organs. We do not need a system of organs detached from the Union republics—and we certainly do not need such a system standing over them—but rather a system in which all entities of allied relations would be represented equally and be able to participate on a permanent basis in the resolution of all allied issues. Naturally they would inevitably bear responsibility for the practical implementation of what was decided with their specific participation. Logically this would assume a reorganization of those state structures which we created so superficially in recent years, but which, alas, have not demonstrated their effectiveness. We can already establish that we have a structural crisis in state authority. Several sub-systems of organs have been created which operate in parallel, duplicate one another, correlate with each other, and as a result they are very weak, exceedingly weak, in directing social processes. What do we see in this regard?

Primarily, the establishment of an organ in which the heads of republics would decide important issues of the state life of the country on a consensus basis. We also need a new parliament—a parliament in which the entities of allied relations are represented by authoritative delegations which express the interests and will of their respective peoples. Here too, apparently, we must examine the consensus principle, for in mutual relations among sovereign states there should never, under any circumstances, be instances of foisting one's will upon others. Taking into account the changes underway, the governmental level is also subject to a thorough reorganization, and should obtain all the legal, personnel, information, and other resources needed to successfully implement decisions of the heads of the republics and the laws of the Union parliament. It will also be necessary to significantly reinforce the judicial-prosecutorial authority, for otherwise it will be difficult to guarantee exercise of the rights and freedoms of people throughout the territory of our country. But this subsystem too must envisage the full-blooded participation of the entities of allied relations. In short, the entities of allied relations must be suitably represented in all structures.

Consequently, the Union treaty is conceived as consisting of several sections, each of which will reflect the forms, methods, and procedures for resolving certain problems. The treaty will have to reflect the aims and principles of allied relations, the rights and obligations of the entities of such relations, the listing of issues subject to joint competence, democratic mechanisms for resolving these issues, the responsibility of entities of allied relations for execution of decisions made, guarantee of individual rights and freedoms, conditions for withdrawing from the allied relations, and possible sanctions in the event of intentional harm or damage inflicted on the participants, the members of the Union.

One more thing I would like to comment on. As the experience of many countries shows, in particular that of the development of the European Community, there is no cause for establishing a rigid, dogmatic model of allied relations. It will be better if this model is flexible, progressive, and capable from the very beginning of taking into account and reflecting the specific interests of diverse entities of the allied relations—and their readiness to tighten up such relations. If today someone looks warily at the new forms of allied relations being proposed, this does not mean his attitude towards the matter will not change over the course of time. When things are organized properly, the advantages of allied mutual ties will of course become apparent, and many people will gradually come to desire the expansion and strengthening of appropriate inter-republic and all-ally ties. As always, the most significant argument in proving one or another position, opinion, or point of view, is the social effectiveness of the selected form. Everything depends on how constructive and creative the new Union will be.

Democratic Platform Draft on CPSU Property

90UN2539A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 31, 4-10 Aug 90 pp 2-3

[Draft decree "On CPSU Property" submitted to the 28th CPSU Congress on behalf of the Democratic Platform and interview on its content with Yu. Boldyrev, USSR people's deputy and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by correspondent Ye. Leontyeva]

[Text] **On 10 July 1990 on behalf of the "Democratic Platform of the CPSU," a group registered with 105 members, the draft decree "On CPSU Property" was officially submitted to the secretariat of the 28th CPSU Congress for the delegates' consideration and voting. Below follows a text of the document and comments on it given at the request of our correspondent Ye. Leontyeva by Yu. Boldyrev, USSR people's deputy and a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.**

DECREE (draft) of the 28th CPSU Congress "On CPSU Property"

During the more than 70 years it has been in power the CPSU has proclaimed the good of the people and service to their interests as its highest goal. During this time the CPSU has concentrated immense property and financial wealth in its hands.

The handout presented to the congress delegates "On the USSR Budget" gives the volume of fixed capital in the hands of the local party organs as of 1 January 1990: R2.3 billion. The handout does not give the overall sum of the value of CPSU fixed capital. The reserve financial fund is R4.9 billion.

It is admitted in the handout that the material and technical base of the CPSU was created only "mainly" from party funds. In order to refute assertions to the effect that this base was created and is being created from membership dues from Communists it is sufficient to compare the sums given in the aforementioned handout:

The calculated sum of revenue from CPSU party membership dues as of 1 January 1990, taking into account the increase in wages in the national economy, is R1,612,860,000.

Expenditures on maintaining local party organs and party institutions—R1,587,600,000.

Expenditures on maintaining central party institutions and also the staff of the CPSU Central Committee—R51,000,000.

The handout that has been given to us reveals the true source of augmenting the wealth of the CPSU today—revenues from monopolized publishing activity. In 1990 alone deductions from the profit of party publishing houses into the CPSU budget will amount to R1.76 billion.

Because of the preferential provision of funds and quotas for the CPSU, the real buying power of the ruble is greater for the CPSU than it is for the citizens of the country and their associations. Thus in 1989 the CPSU exchanged R44 million for hard currency and the plan for 1990 calls for exchanging R29 million for hard currency.

During 1990 alone the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs was allotted by the USSR Council of Ministers 1,300 passenger vehicles whose market (auction) value is four to five times greater than the retail price.

For many decades the CPSU has used state land, buildings, and other property without paying any rent for them. CPSU income, including from production and publishing activity, has not been taxed.

There is considerable value, and particularly historical and cultural value, to buildings and other property which the party, during its period in power, has transferred without charge from state ownership to party ownership on behalf of the state organs it has created.

During past years the sums taken from the people this way have reached many billions of rubles.

And the fact that this was partially "legitimized" by the corresponding legal norms does not essentially change anything.

The congress thinks that the time has come for Communists to move on from declarations of CPSU responsibility to a recognition of their immense guilt before the country and the people for their present condition and for repentance and responsibility in practice; including responsibility for the funds taken from the people.

The congress considers it necessary to return these funds to the people by voluntarily turning CPSU property over to the soviets of people's deputies, whose current impoverishment is also the result of our rule. We should let go of this property in order to compensate at least partially for the historical guilt of the CPSU before the country and place ourselves in equal conditions with other political parties.

In keeping with what is presented above, the congress decrees:

1. To transfer all CPSU property, including buildings, structures, enterprises, publishing houses, and financial funds (with the exception of funds corresponding to income from membership dues during the past three months) to state and municipal property with a transfer of the right to dispose of this property to the corresponding soviets of people's deputies.

2. To recommend to soviets of people's deputies of all levels that they create joint financial commissions that would include deputies and representatives of the corresponding party organs for inventorying and transferring

the property of party organizations (property controlled by party organizations) to the soviets of people's deputies.

3. The CPSU Central Committee during the period before 1 November 1990 is to do the necessary organizational work for transferring party property to the soviets and is to solve problems of reducing the CPSU apparatus.

4. To request that the soviets of people's deputies at all levels, the leaders of enterprises and organizations, and the labor collectives render any possible assistance in finding work of the released workers.[draft decree ends]

[Leontyeva] Yuriy Yuryevich, how was this draft received by the congress?

[Boldyrev] In spite of my explanation that it was submitted by a registered group and, consequently, according to the regulations, should be put to a vote, only 473 delegates voted in favor of its consideration. There were 3,385 delegates voting against it which, in general, is not surprising. The draft could not have been adopted by these delegates for only 1,022 people at this congress voted to include on the agenda the question of CPSU responsibility to the people for the entire period of its rule. For the other more than 3,000 delegates, such a question does not exist. In any case it is not worthy of discussion.

[Leontyeva] In your view, how will society react to the statement of the problem of CPSU responsibility?

[Boldyrev] There is reason to assume that outside the walls of the Kremlin the attitude toward this will be somewhat different. Including among the CPSU members themselves. In any case I have a feeling of support. There is the widespread delusion that party property was created with Communists' membership dues. In the document that was read this is refuted even on the basis of financial data. I say "even" because there is absolutely no sufficient basis for trusting them: From the statements of the chairman of the CPSU Central Audit Commission and the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs we learned that control over the residual funds, their expenditure, and hard currency funds is provided by the ... Politburo!

I hope that every honest member of the CPSU who has learned of the draft decree we proposed to the congress will find sufficient justification to vote for the unconditional transfer of all party property to the soviets. Or at least that which is controlled by a specific rayon, city, or other party organization (such a decision could quite possibly be adopted through a referendum initiated by members of the organization).

[Leontyeva] Would that not be similar to expropriation?

[Boldyrev] This is not expropriation because we are suggesting not that it be confiscated but that it be returned voluntarily, for which, you understand, the justification is not so much legal as moral. And there is plenty of the latter. Is it possible to "fight for influence in society on a level with other political forces" in the customary, to put it mildly, not altogether honest, way? In this case can you even ask people to trust you, not to mention your claims to some special leading role?

CPSU Budget Detailed

90UN2376A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 28, Jul 90 p 1

[Figures from the brochure "Information for 28th CPSU Congress Delegates": "Openly and Candidly About the CPSU Budget"]

[Text] Income: The annual sum total of proceeds from party membership dues is put at R1.6 billion. Income from publishing activity, at little more than R1 billion.

Expenditure: Some R2.1 billion annually are spent on the maintenance of the party committees and party establishments, the financing of their organizing and political work, and maintenance and repairs. The bulk of this money—R1.913 billion or 90 percent—goes on the upkeep of the local party authorities and the development of their physical plant. Expenditure on the maintenance of the central party establishments constituted R28.7 million—1.4 percent—and expenditure on the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, R22.305 million—1.1 percent.

Planned expenditure on the 28th CPSU Congress is a total of R5.6 million—0.3 percent.

The wages of senior officials of the party committees constitute R460.95 million; of full-time party organization officials, R282.5 million.

The bonus fund (based on two months' salary) is R90.92 million.

The Communist assistance fund is R6 million.

The following party organizations secure their own income as follows: Tuva, 20 percent; the Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Buryat, Chita, Pskov, and Yakutsk, 50-60 percent; and the Kazakh, Altay, Vologda, Kirovskaya, Lipetsk, Penza, and Sakhalin, 60-70 percent.

Political education centers and study rooms cost R63 million a year, and R8.1 million worth of literature and visual aids is acquired for them.

Some R54.5 million is spent on the higher party schools.

R23 million is anticipated in expenditures on the acquisition of minor equipment, office equipment, and propaganda and teaching hardware for the party committees.

CPSU Property

As of 1 January 1990 the local party authorities had day-to-day control of R2.3 billion of fixed capital.

Some 5,254 buildings valued at R1.9 billion are used for the activity of the republic Communist Party Central Committees, the kray, okrug, city, and rayon party committees and party establishments. Of these, 3,766 are individual buildings built wholly on party money.

Some 935 buildings were built in conjunction with other organizations with participation from CPSU resources.

Some 216 buildings have been handed over to party authorities for the accommodation of their apparatus. Some 337 buildings belong to other organizations and are leased by the party authorities.

There are in the system of party authorities 114 publishing houses, 111 of which belong to the Union republic Communist Party Central Committees and the kray and obkom party committees.

The property of the CPSU includes 23 sanatoria and recreation centers for 7,100 persons with fixed capital valued at R418.2 million. The physical plant of these facilities has been created mainly from party resources.

Some R15.9 million was allocated for the upkeep of hotels and facilities and organizations under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Affairs.

The CPSU budget for 1990 provides for a reserve to cover unforeseen expenditure of the local and central party authorities on the order of R25 million.

Prokofyev Comments on CPSU Congress

90UN2511A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 17 Jul 90 p 1

[R. Zaretskiy report on 16 July briefing at Moscow Gorkom Press Center given by Yu.A. Prokofyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow Party Gorkom and interview with Prokofyev by unidentified VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondents: "The Main Thing Is Not Polemics; the Main Thing Is Decisions"]

[Text] "The 28th CPSU Congress was fairly dramatic," said Yu.A. Prokofyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow Party Gorkom [City Committee], in his statement at a meeting with journalists yesterday. His discussion of his personal impressions of the party forum, which is not altogether typical and has emotional overtones, probably revealed the political struggle better than many figures and computations.

"I personally experienced three dramatic moments in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, and I have experienced strong feelings. The congress shifted first to the left and then to the right. To a large extent I explain this by the inadequate political preparation of a number of the delegates. It seemed to many that the congress was comprised of conservatives. I would not say that. Although, of course, there were plenty of conservatives there, the problem with the lack of understanding of the processes taking place in our society existed in a number of deputies. Nonetheless the congress came to the correct conclusions.

"Speaking about the first dramatic point of the congress, for me it was the adoption of the decision to evaluate the activity of the Central Committee. On the one hand, there was the dissatisfaction of the masses and the delegates. Remember that the congress began with a statement by the delegate from Magadan, who demanded that the Politburo retire and admit that its work has been unsatisfactory. Then there were also other harsh evaluations of the results of the work during the five years of perestroyka. All this pushed us to the point of declaring the work of the Central Committee to be unsatisfactory. But this meant casting doubt on the entire course of perestroyka. And although the heat of passions was so great that it would have been possible to adopt an unsatisfactory evaluation, still the congress delegates reached a decision to give a political evaluation and not one reached through carefully weighing the pros and cons."

Yuriy Anatolyevich went on to discuss other critical situations in the congress. These included the elections of the deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and when 14 people—representatives of the intellectual forces of society—were left out of the Central Committee. But the congress heard the voice of reason. The candidacy proposed by M.S. Gorbachev was accepted and the congress also made adjustments and expanded the list.

Yu.A. Prokofyev said that during the course of the congress the delegates went through a school of politics. As a result they adopted fairly progressive documents. "And the main thing," emphasized Yuriy Anatolyevich, "is that this is not polemics, the main thing is decisions."

One could say that journalism on all continents was represented in the hall where the press conference took place. This included the American WALL STREET JOURNAL, the Chinese XINHUA, the British press agency REUTER, the Turkish ANATOLIA agency, Italian television, GDR radio, and many other mass media. The questions from their correspondents show the serious attention foreign readers, viewers, and listeners are giving to the problems that were resolved by the 28th CPSU Congress.

VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondents also asked Yu.A. Prokofyev several questions:

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Toward the end the congress shifted considerably to the left. Were the delegates really persuaded or did they give in so as to consolidate and attack the right with new force?

[Prokofyev] As I have already said, the congress was not conservative; it was simply not adequately prepared politically. And the delegates gained experience while they were working.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Could you tell us about the possibilities of joint-stock publishing companies? In particular, would it be possible to change VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA over to this form?

[Prokofyev] As concerns VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, we have already discussed this. There will be no objections. If you accept the Moscow CPSU Gorkom as a stock holder there will certainly be no objections.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] Since you have been elected a member of the Politburo will you be less accessible to journalists?

[Prokofyev] There will be no difficulties. I think the best quality for a person is to remain himself in any situation and in any position. Perhaps I shall have to weigh my assessments more carefully if we are speaking about the state of affairs in the country. My attitude toward the press will not change. I have a great deal of respect for the mass media and I understand that you are the ones who form public opinion.

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] We are expecting changes. Many people are interested in the problem of replacing cadres. On what principle will this work be based? After all, it is possible to rejuvenate cadres by replacing former apparatchiks with people just like them. But there is another path—to look for new and interesting people with nonstandard approaches.

[Prokofyev] This work is being done, and a delegate club has been created. There has been a large amount of work for preparing documents for the city party conference and the congress. This work will continue, and we will find people with initiative from among its participants.

Smirnov-Ostashvili Trial Resumes in Moscow

LD1108010390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2213 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Video report from the Moscow trial of Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili by correspondent I. Usachev, including recorded interviews with Smirnov-Ostashvili and Public Prosecutor Makarov; from the "Television News Service Program]

[Text] [Announcer Dmitriy Kiselev] The hearing resumed in Moscow today of the case of Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili, a participant in the disturbances in the Central Writers' Club in January of this year. He is accused of inciting interethnic dissension.

[Usachev] As at the previous court sessions, Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili, an adjuster at the Sapfir Scientific Research Institute, tried in every possible way to delay the bringing of the indictment. He demanded a check on the ethnic status of the prosecutors, insisted that representatives of the left-wing press be removed from the courtroom, and announced the withdrawal of another lawyer. The presiding lawyer rejected the petition of the defendant and read out the bill of indictment.

[Begin Smirnov-Ostashvili recording] You may congratulate me. Regardless of the verdict, the trial has been won! What my opponents thought up, that is to crush and bring the Russian people to its knees again here in the dock, is not happening. There have been a mass of telephone calls. Just look what's going on in the courtroom. I'm being swamped with flowers, I can't go into the metro for people presing round me to shake my hand, there's not a soul who could would condemn me! [end recording]

[Usachev] And he does indeed have a lot of supporters to judge by the crowd and the placards at the entrance to the court building. According to prosecutor Andrey Makarov, the Pamyat society sacrified Smirnov-Ostashvili in order to save other members from justice.

[Begin Makarov recording] There are, I think, far more serious people at the back of this organization. They are trying to hide their faces, imagining it to be possible for Ostashvili alone to be convicted. [end recording]

[Usachev] [video shows people reading posters saying "Down with Zionism", "Jewish racism is worse than any fascism"] Article 74 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code, under which Smirnov-Ostashvili is accused, provides for punishment of deprivation of freedom for from six months to three years. We may have to wait several months for the verdict.

Conference To View Problems of Soviet Germans

LD1308201690 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Akseonov and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—The third conference of the all-Union society of Soviet Germans "Rebirth" is opening in Moscow on Tuesday, August 14.

The serious problems of this country's German population of more than two million are discussed amid the unprecedented aggravation of inter-ethnic relations.

Although the quests for solutions to the problems of Soviet Germans do not outgrow into sharp confrontation, their urgency is increasing virtually every day. They demand that the German autonomous republic, which was abolished under the Stalin rule be restored.

Union authorities are taking efforts in this direction, including in the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, the very idea of restoring the German republic in the Volga region meets with resistance from the local population. Alternative variants are proposed, but they, too, have not yet produced any practical results.

In this situation, many Soviet Germans are deciding to leave the homeland to resettle in West Germany. A total

of 105,000 Soviet Germans moved to West Germany in 1989. This year's place of resettlement outstrips that of last year.

Among the new variants for solving the problems of this part of the country's population the idea of creating an (?ex)-territorial association of Soviet Germans to be vested with the rights of an autonomous republic in what concerns its representation in supreme bodies of authority and the formation of government structures along the line of culture, personnel training, etc.

Gugo Vormsbekher, who is the co-chairman of the "Rebirth" Society, told TASS that the all-important task before the Soviet Germans was to be preserved as a people. But for this purpose, they should get together and gain conditions for rebirth.

Vladimir Isakov, a member of the Russian parliament Presidium, favoured unconditional solution to the problems of the Soviet Germans. "This should be done seriously, with full respect for the people who suffered unjustly," Isakov said.

Isakov sees the way towards solving the problem in setting up national settlements, cities in the Volga region at the initial stage. "The existence of the areas of the compact settlement of Germans will in itself be the best evidence that the German autonomous republic does not threaten in any way the Russian-speaking population but, conversely, contributes to the economic and cultural prosperity of the region," Isakov believes.

Protection of State Secrets Pondered

90UF0398A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 30, Jul 90 p 15

[Article by V. Ugarov, leader of the USSR KGB subunit concerned with problems of the protection of state secrets, published under the rubric "Secrets—Wholesale and Retail": "The 'Secret' Classification: Spy Paranoia or Necessity?"]

[Text] Hardly anyone doubts the need to provide secure protection for secrets that are important to state interests. It is only a question of making the system of state security which has developed accord with the changes taking place in the country and of determining in which direction it should develop.

Measures to defend state secrets which have been adopted in past years by the higher organs of power and administration, particularly with regard to the creation of nuclear weapons, strategic missiles, and modernization of strategic weaponry, permitted hundreds and hundreds of billions of rubles to be saved and helped guarantee conditions for a peaceful life....

Now it seems that the times of the "cold war" are fading into oblivion. But even today the need exists to defend state and military secrets. According to W. Webster, director of the CIA, the processes taking place in the USSR during perestroyka are of even greater interest to the government of the United States than previously.

Appropriations allotted for the needs of U.S. special services have reached unprecedented sums—30 billion dollars per year. We mention this not to intensify paranoia about spies but simply to reflect the reality existing in the world. It is enough to recall the sad story of Tolkachev, an agent of Western special services and an associate at one of the defense-related scientific research institutes, who collected and transmitted important information on a number of long-term projects to U.S. intelligence services. Damage worth hundreds of millions of rubles was inflicted upon our state. The newspaper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, quoting information received from highly-placed people in U.S. intelligence, wrote that Tolkachev was one of their most profitable sources of information. The Americans saved billions of dollars by receiving data from him about trends in the development of Soviet aviation. Another agent of the CIA inflicted significant damage upon our country—Potashev, a former scientific associate with the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, decided to trade in secrets of a military and political nature.

A number of causes, as analysis shows, contribute to the leakage of secrets. State secrets reach much too large a circle of persons and organizations that do not need them to carry out their official duties. Secret information is often published in official documents and articles intended for the press and in speeches at scientific conferences and symposiums. Work with secret documents is sometimes conducted under conditions which do not guarantee reliable security. Measures to protect the technical equipment used for processing, transmitting, and preserving classified information are insufficient. Little attention is being paid by certain officials and executives to the question of the protection of secrets, and sometimes there are instances of neglecting the security of entrusted secrets.

The developed capitalist countries, on the other hand, take strict measures to protect their secrets. Previously documents of the governmental departments of the United States were reviewed with the goal of reducing their security classification and, after 20 years, declassifying them altogether. Now information is classified for as long as national security reasons demand. In several instances governmental departments have been granted the right to reclassify and forbid the publication of information that was previously declassified. Rules have been introduced obligating all employees of state institutions having access to secret materials to sign a commitment regarding the nonpublication of secrets and legal accountability. This system is even being applied to the attorney general, the director of the FBI, and other highly-placed people.

A strict system of security requirements both in the sphere of the state apparatus and in nongovernmental institutions exists in the United Kingdom as well. A law

on state secrets adopted in 1988 introduced strict limits on the mass media. Citing this law as well as a civil law on the confidentiality of materials, the government can use the courts to forbid publication without a public hearing via the private ruling of a judge.

The system of security existing in our country today is in need of a fundamental restructuring. Firm guarantees of the security of secrets should be harmoniously included in those progressive processes that are taking place in every sphere, without exception, of the life and activity of our state and society. Measures are created under the guise of security in order to hide from foreign eyes or make inaccessible significant labor deficiencies and omissions and sometimes even activities which qualify as crimes in accordance with USSR legislation. Such measures are unnecessary and at times far-fetched and unjustified from the state's point of view and arise only because of a wish not to "air one's dirty laundry."

Under no condition should we allow security measures to serve as a cloak for advocates of upward distortion of results, and especially for official abuses and violations of socialist law and of the rights and interests of Soviet citizens.

Which problems have taken on a fundamentally important and definitive significance? First and foremost they are the development of scientifically based criteria for security of information and optimal procedures for classifying and declassifying it. We must exclude the narrow departmental approach to distributing such information. The increase in the number of papers of all types with the strict classification of "secret" leads to significant economic costs. It is time to declassify many materials concerning the history of our country as well. Very unfortunately, they are still not accessible to a wide circle of specialists because of the presence of restrictive classifications established by ministries and departments. The inflated volume of secrets does not contribute to the security of information, which is genuinely in need of protection.

At the urging of the USSR KGB, the ministries and departments are presently carrying out a great effort to examine and declassify information which has lost its timeliness. The initial results are already on hand. A significant quantity of cartographical, air survey, and space materials have been handed over for use in the national economy. Limitations have been removed from the open publication of results of sociological research on questions of domestic and foreign policy and of data on the activities of nuclear power plants and enterprises using a nuclear fuel cycle and their influence on the environment and the health of people. The formulas and technology for several types of goods and materials formerly used only in defense applications have been declassified. On the whole, the volume of secret information in a number of sectors has decreased by 30 to 40 percent, which reflects the process of glasnost in the country, of course. And that is not the end of it. The work continues.

The transition from command and administrative methods of management to economic methods raises the question of using economic methods in security activities as well. We will have to resolve problems of the professional training of workers of the security services. The system of paying for their labor and achieving full staffing of highly qualified workers needs to be improved.

On the basis of an analysis of the experience of Russia to 1917, of modern foreign practice, and of the opinions of Soviet specialists, the first step has been taken toward a standardized application of the concept of a "commercial secret," as it is represented in the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR." Capitalist firms, banks, and employers have long desired to penetrate the secrets of their partners, a wish that proceeds logically from competition. These are new conditions for Soviet enterprises, which are only now entering international exchanges and a world where "industrial espionage" flourishes. But even now the exercise of rights to defend information which is the property of organizations and their labor collectives may be implemented by existing security services as well as new specially created subunits.

In the United States large firms usually have their own security services which guard the territory and buildings of the firm, verify the personnel's reliability, maintain security of industrial secrets, and ensure that workers take the necessary precautions with the appropriate documents and equipment. If a firm fills orders from federal departments, (a state committee for ordering), these services also carry out measures to guarantee the security of state secrets.

Recently in the press many articles have appeared on the problem of preserving state and commercial secrets. However, many of them are of a rather subjective nature. The authors of such articles as, for example, "Security Which We Do Not Need" (NOVOYE VREMYA No. 10, 1990) and "Secrets of the Firms and the Country's Economic Security" (PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK No. 15, 1990) apparently do not have the necessary experience of practical work in this realm. They have insufficient knowledge of current procedures and therefore make unsubstantiated statements that the existing system for the protection of state secrets is incredibly inflated and is developing without a considered strategy—impulsively and chaotically. This, of course, is untrue. The system for protection of state secrets at each historical stage in the development of our state and society was formed on a standardized basis which was defined by the highest organs of power and administration. At the present time its development is progressing according to the processes of perestroyka. As a specialist I dare to state that even the staffs of the subunits directly fulfilling the functions of maintaining the security of secrets are woefully undermanned. And after reorganization of the structures of administration they are usually cut even further. Incidentally these subunits are regarded as auxiliary services, and the wages of their workers in the majority of cases are lower than

the pay for associates of other administrative organs. It has been stated that annual damages worth 30-40 billion rubles take place because of unjustified security. But how are such figures arrived at? I would like to learn how the appropriate calculations were made.

It is possible to argue about individual aspects of the problem of protecting secret information, of course. But it is senseless to argue whether or not secrets should be preserved at all. In this case there is only one answer: Information about strategic, military, scientific, and commercial secrets must be protected in the interests of national and economic security. Such protection is not a caprice or a tribute to paranoia about spies, but a necessity. A draft USSR Law "On the Protection of Secret Information," which, we hope, will be presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet at the next session, will create the legal basis for such efforts and, it is believed, put an end to speculation and gossip on this score.

Nina Andreyeva Comments on Party Leaders

90UN2376B Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 25, Jun 90 p 6

[Interview with Nina Andreyeva, chairman of "Unity: for Leninism and Communist Ideals" society, by Robert Bayrashev; place and date not given: "Socialism or Death"]

[Text] **In the debate that has developed on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress it is important to hear all opinions in order to be able to compare one's own and complete idea of the situation in the CPSU and surrounding it and in order to confirm the credit of confidence in the historically promising wing of the now ruling party and to reject the historically bankrupt forces. Even if you together with SOBESEDNIK do not share the opinion which is expressed and even if the exponent of this opinion is the person who is called the author of the "manifesto of anti-perestroyka forces" and "Gorbachev's furious critic." So, Nina Andreyeva, lecturer at the Leningrad Technology Institute, chairman of the "Unity: For Communism and Leninist Ideals" all-Union society and member of the CPSU since 1966.**

[Bayrashev] Nina Andreyeva, the CPSU is not currently experiencing the best of times, and in the East European countries the Communist Parties have suffered a knockout altogether. What does this mean, in your view; a temporary setback or the decline of communist ideology?

[Andreyeva] Communist ideology will exist as long as its exponent—the international working class and its allies in the struggle against monopoly capital—exists and as long as they oppose wage labor and capital.

Anticommunism, which has so many times before shouted about the "collapse of communist ideology," that is, Marxism-Leninism, is now on the upsurge. But a crisis does not mean collapse. It is first and foremost the precursor of renewal and new upsurge. Such has been the case repeatedly since the times of Marx and Engels and will be such repeatedly in the future, evidently. It is the opportunists and renegades who are the first to lay claim to the role of renovators, as a rule, which is recognized sooner or later in the Communist Parties. What is the reason for the success of the "gentle," "velvet" revolutions, which upon verification turn out to be counterrevolutions expressed, according to Herbert Mies, a leader of the FRG Communist Party, in "a heart attack of socialism"? The lack of responsibility, weakness and, in some places, petty bourgeois degeneration of the leadership in the socialist community countries and the increase in the ruling parties of revisionist and right-opportunist strata, I believe. Advantage was taken of the incapacity of the party and state leadership of the East European countries to cope opportunely with the economic difficulties which had emerged by reactionary forces, which knew how to turn the legitimate discontent of the peoples in the direction of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

Further, these pseudo-revolutions in socialist countries had been soundly prepared and coordinated in time, which is now being acknowledged by American analysts. The strict coordination of the actions of foreign policy forces, emigres, and the churches, descendants of the ousted classes which had disguised themselves ahead of time, nationalists, Zionists, and national communists was observed in each country.

I believe that we are witnessing merely the start of the counterrevolutionary drama. But historical experience teaches that there has not been an instance of a new system which has conquered in a revolution disappearing without trace. Thus the bourgeois revolutions in the Netherlands, Britain, France and other countries proved irreversible, although the political structures serving the bourgeoisie have changed many times over. Reactionaries have repeatedly fulminated against the socialist revolutions themselves, but up to our day no socialist state has become bourgeois. We would recall that the United States brought crashing down on socialist Vietnam the most dreadful blow, poured into the battle hundreds of thousands of soldiers and the latest equipment and drenched the long-suffering land with Agent Orange, but the courageous people did not give up their socialist gains. Now imperialism is trying to corrupt socialism from within without a single shot being fired.... And succeeding in some respects.

[Bayrashev] Most Communists recognize the seriousness of the current situation in the party and are seeking ways out of the crisis. A discussion of the draft "CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress" and the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" is underway in the primary organizations at this time. What is your evaluation of these documents?

[Andreyeva] Leading opportunists and their ideological retainers have self-righteously declared them to be alternatives to one another, which absolutely does not correspond to reality. The differences between them are

purely outward and inessential and connected with the degree of disguise of capitulation. Both platforms adhere to positions of a multistructural, restoration economy and deny the class functions of a state based on the rule of law, making it the political mechanism of realization simultaneously with the interests of the working people and the kings of the shadow economy. They proceed from the permissibility of private ownership of the implements and means of production. However, asserting the need for the reanimation of private ownership in the political platform of communists and the ruling party in a socialist country is the equivalent of the pope of Rome or the Iranian ayatollah making it incumbent upon the clergy and mullahs under their jurisdiction to engage in atheistic propaganda.

The community of fundamental features of the two pseudo-alternative programs testifies that they both have a common ideological and political base—social democratism. That same social democratism which since the times of the Bernsteins and Kautskys has trodden a long path of betrayal of the working class and its dislodgement from the revolutionary liberation path. Social democratism, which at the start of the 20th century in the concepts of the Martovs, Gurevichs, Abramovichs, Dans, and other pseudo-revolutionaries grew in Russia as Menshevism, ingloriously concluded its political fate in self-disbandment within the country and total collapse in the overseas exile community. Social democratism has come to power repeatedly in a number of Western countries, but has not advanced its states by one millimeter toward liberation of the working people from exploitation. Some people call the social system of Sweden and Denmark socialism, failing to take account of the fact that social democracy there is merely harvesting the fruit of the propitious world socioeconomic conditions, a change in which could at any moment push the Swedes and Danes into a maelstrom of unemployment, inflation....

At the same time it should be noted that the authors of the "Democratic Platform" have gone much farther on the blind-alley road in the direction of bourgeois liberalism. They have abandoned Marxism-Leninism entirely, not only the communist perspective, as their colleagues who authored the "CPSU Central Committee Platform" did. Although formally recognizing the theoretical base of Marxism-Leninism, the latter have emasculated it of class, proletarian content.

It is important to mention also the fact that the "Democratic Platform" rejects democratic centralism as the basic principle of the party's composition. But without it the party would become something amorphous, a conventional liberal-bourgeois party. This would no longer be a party of the Leninist type or, as they say, a "Comintern" party but a liberal-bourgeois blip of social democratism. Would it be capable of solving socialism's problems under the conditions of an exacerbation of the crisis? I doubt it. The deeper the crisis, the more discipline and active unity is required of a workers' party. The true alternative to both platforms is Bolshevism as the scientific-proletarian and ideological-political current of social thought and action.

[Bayrashev] Today even the Communists are increasingly talking about the need for a multiparty system in our country....

[Andreyeva] There is nothing reprehensible in this. It is the kind of multiparty system: socialist or extra-socialist, that is important. A socialist multiparty system could perfect the political system or superstructure of socialism. An extra-socialist system could be turned toward the restoration of capitalist investments and the bourgeois way of life. I believe that such an extra-socialist multiparty system is the way to civil war.

[Bayrashev] In a number of regions of the country the first secretaries of oblast party committees have tendered their resignations. How do you evaluate these instances of capitulation? Do you consider the criticism of the party apparatus which has become prevalent justified?

[Andreyeva] The party apparatus should be criticized, but not indiscriminately, rather, specifically. Otherwise we will find ourselves following the lead of Trotskiyism. After all, it was Trotskiy who initiated in the party the "crusade" against the apparatus created by Lenin, who saw it as a tremendous conquest of the working class.

As far as the forced retirements of a number of party leaders of city and oblast party committees are concerned, I see at the base a Soviet reprint of the Chinese cultural revolution, which opened "fire on headquarters." The "headquarters" whose leaders have not been all that fervent in restructuring socialism into capitalism. I believe that this is an entirely controlled "anarchy." Initially criticism in the mass media, the yellow press included, filtered through, then mass-meeting passions began.

You were correct in calling such resignations capitulation. The fate of leadership may be decided by party conferences and plenums, not by the crowd, which did not elect them. Fortunately, there are also other examples, where the Communists have, in spite of all the misfortunes from above and below, shown confidence in their leaders, having them continue in their positions. Thus, for example, Polozkov and Kondratenko, leaders of Krasnodar Kray, are, in spite of the stream of party and other punishments and the press persecution, successfully guiding their region, evoking the anger of opportunists and renegades. The forces of genuine perestroyka, as the socioeconomic development of the socialist society, are rallying around such personalities.

[Bayrashev] Nina Aleksandrovna, what can you say about the activity of today's leaders of the CPSU?

[Andreyeva] I believe that the entire present leadership of the Central Committee and Politburo is to blame for the crisis in society and the party, but to a varying extent. Some as the creators and proponents of right-opportunist policy, others, for their incapacity to resist

it. For this reason, in my opinion, it is right to call to account not the entire Central Committee and Politburo but to call for the resignation of the Gorbachev-Yakovlev- Shevardnadze group, as the architects of the restoration of capitalism dexterously concealed by demagogy and myths concerning the lack of alternative to it.

[Bayrashev] Could you clarify your position: What do you not accept in the activity of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Andreyeva] I welcomed Gorbachev's promotion sincerely and warmly. The renewal of socialism was on the agenda, and with Leningrad comrades I even wrote a letter to the Politburo requesting that the new leader not be overburdened with work and that he be more reliably protected. I now stand amazed at my naivete. The departure of the present general secretary from what he had proclaimed became noticeable as of 1987. A valve for spitting on the past was opened. The selection of the Korotichs, Belyayevs, Yakovlevs and Baklanovs for the positions of editors was within his field of competence. Initially such a selection seemed a mistake. Now it can be seen that it was premeditated and that a think tank was being cobbled together. But at the Moscow party conference prior to the 19th CPSU Conference he provided a roll call of the personal composition of this tank as people who had prepared perestroyka in good time. Few people noticed this at that time. Yet this was the answer concerning those to whom we are obliged for the present crisis.

In 1987 it was ascertained that Gorbachev was inclined to sit "between two stools." This can be seen clearly from the six volumes of his "Selected Speeches and Articles." But my letter to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, with which I "surfaced" on 13 March 1988, had been evoked by his speech at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, in which the general secretary had demanded "no retreat on principles."

It would seem to me that in 1989 Gorbachev switched to right-opportunist, renegade positions, heading the movement toward a market economy, a multiparty system, the presidency, and social democratism in policy and ideology.

The danger of Gorbachev's apostasy, in my opinion, is that he knows how to adroitly disguise his deeds by words. Word and deed with us now not only differ but are diametrically opposed. This is confusing many people meanwhile. For instance, how much the general secretary has had to say about the need for an alternative approach to the promotion of leaders! He himself, however, became general secretary, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and president, on a nonchoice basis. The Deputy Obolenskiy joke at the First Congress of People's Deputies, at which he set off Gorbachev's "no-alternativeness," cannot be taken seriously. And note, nowhere has Mikhail Sergeyevich rendered account of the work he had done before taking up each position. He now holds four of the most crucial offices in the party and the state, rivaling here Comrade Stalin, who during the war combined five key positions.

[Bayrashev] And what is your attitude toward the position of such political leaders as Yeltsin and Ligachev?

[Andreyeva] As far as Yeltsin is concerned, his authoritarian politicking was typically manifested on his overseas trips, during which he felt himself to be and comported himself not as a member of the CPSU Central Committee but as a provincial Soviet tourist, delighting in the good things of the transatlantic paradise and displaying no interest in the problems of whose there who create these good things. I share fully the criticism of him by America's communists, for whom Yeltsin was the best showcase of the collapse of the Brezhnev-Gorbachev "selection of leading cadres." Not to mention the personal immodesty in his behavior both in the United States and in the Moscow business, in which he elevated a petty affair of a personal nature to the category of "political persecution." Shocking amoralism. I simply feel sorry for those who voted for him at the elections.

Ligachev is less well known to the public at large. According to many people who have worked with him, he is a leader of a different order than Yeltsin. To me his position seems more proven and consistent than that of the other present members of the Politburo. I agree with his basic thoughts concerning the situation in the party and the country.

[Bayrashev] The initiating-constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party was held in Leningrad. Your impressions of the congress?

[Andreyeva] Its convening was a manifestation of the wishes of the party masses and the broad community of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The main reports and the majority of speeches at the congress were of an anti-Gorbachev nature and made a high-minded appraisal of the perestroyka which is underway as the capitalization of socialism. The comrades, assembled from all regions of the RSFSR, discussed urgent issues and prepared documents. Unfortunately, the decisions adopted at the congress did not include so important an aspect as the cleansing of the incipient Russian Communist Party of opportunists, revisionists, the corrupt, bribe-takers.... Those who have plunged the CPSU into the most profound crisis. The anti-Stalin hysteria was not rebuffed. Inasmuch as "Unity's" position on these issues is well known, the initiating committee attempted to prevent my admittance to the congress, although I had been invited. A majority of delegates to the initiating congress voted in favor of my attendance at the congress, but did not accord me an opportunity to speak.

[Bayrashev] Nina Aleksandrovna, let us forecast: What will be the main result of the 28th CPSU Congress? What

do you intend to do if the strategy and tactics of the CPSU in perestroyka do not change even after the congress?

[Andreyeva] I shall not venture to forecast the decisions of the 28th party congress. It is perfectly probable that the current split could be made official there. Granted all its tragic aspect, it could represent a recuperative beginning. Calling now for unification without demarcation is, in my opinion, utopian. In fact, the division in the party reflects the social division in society.

It would seem to me that if the 28th CPSU Congress buries in a Menshevik embrace the party and revolutionary Marxism and the Central Committee occupies social democratic positions, our "Unity: for Leninism and Communist Ideals" society, of which I am chairman, will participate in the formation, more precisely, the revival of an all-Union Communist Party of Leninist Bolsheviks designed to crush restoration and right-opportunism. Without this we will not emerge from the crisis or save the socialist society.

[Bayrashev] What slogan is for you today the most pertinent?

[Andreyeva] Socialism or death!

KGB Breaks Up Currency, Jewelry Smuggling Ring

LD1108162290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] The USSR KGB's Public Relations Center has just reported that the committee's staff members have just uncovered and cut short the activities of a large criminal group of Soviet and Polish citizens which carried out illegal operations with [foreign] currency and other valuables.

In Brest, over 20 kg of gold and jewelry worth some 2 million rubles [R] were discovered and confiscated during an attempt to export it abroad. The participants in the group have been arrested. Weapons and valuables worth another R1.5 million were confiscated from their place of residence. An investigation is under way.

Further on Gold, Jewelry Seizures

LD1308162190 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Customs officials in the city of Brest on the Soviet western border seized over a million rubles worth of gold, jewelry, and money last week.

On August 8, 20 kilos of gold items and scrap gold worth about 1.1 million rubles were discovered hidden under a window in a compartment of a train en route from Moscow to Warsaw, Soviet customs officials told TASS.

Two days later, officers netted more than 300,000 rubles stashed in the ceiling of a carriage. It is still unclear who they belonged to.

On August 9, a large amount of rubles and a batch of watches were seized in a Moscow-Berlin train.

On August 11, more money and 1,000 electronic watches were found in a cache in the diesel compartment of a locomotive en route from Berlin to Kiev.

Yakovlev Meets Sasakawa Peace Foundation Group

LD0908221890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russia 1800 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Text] A meeting of the delegation of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council, took place today. Outstanding medical experts and doctors specializing in radiation immunology are members of the delegation. The foundation has given aid worth five billion yen, that is, $34 million for clearing up the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Construction of a hospital financed by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation will begin soon in the USSR. It will be equipped with the most up-to-date medical technology.

Gorbachev, Others Sign Academician's Obituary

PM1008145190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 90 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of Academician Nikolay Mikhaylovich Zhavoronkov]

[Excerpts] Soviet science has suffered a grave loss. Hero of Socialist Labor Academician Nikolay Mikhaylovich Zhavoronkov, outstanding scientist in the spheres of chemical technology and inorganic chemistry and winner of USSR State Prizes, died 5 August 1990 in his 83d year. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, Yu.A. Buslayev, N.A. Vatolin, G.G. Devyatykh, A.S. Dzasokhov, V.A. Ivashko, A.S. Kapto, V.V. Kafarov, V.A. Kirillin, S.T. Kishkin, V.A. Koptyug, V.N. Kudryavtsev, N.P. Laverov, N.P. Lyakishev, I.M. Makarov, G.I. Marchuk, V.A. Medvedev, O.M. Nefedov, Yu.A. Osipyan, B.Ye. Paton, R.V. Petrov, I.K. Polozkov, Ye.M. Primakov, Yu.A. Prokofyev, I.V. Tananayev, I.T. Frolov, K.V. Frolov, S.S. Shatalin, M.M. Shults, G.A. Yagodin, A.N. Yakovlev.

Gorbachev, Others Sign Writer's Obituary

PM1008145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 90 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of Revaz Shalvovich Tabukashvili]

[Excerpts] Our multinational culture has suffered a grave loss. Revaz Shalvovich Tabukashvili, prominent Soviet writer, movie director, public figure, and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has died in his 63d year. [passage omitted]

For many years R.Sh. Tabukashvili was secretary of the boards of the Georgian Writers Union and Cinematographers Union, and he was an active propagandist for Soviet multinational culture. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, G.G. Abashidze, I.V. Abashidze, T.Ye. Abuladze, Ch.T. Aytmatov, G.G. Gumbaridze, N.N. Gubenko, V.G. Gurgenidze, A.Ya. Degtyarev, A.S. Dzasokhov, V.A. Ivashko, A.S. Kapto, V.V. Karpov, E.G. Klimov, V.G. Lordkipanidze, G.D. Lordkipanidze, A.I. Lukyanov, M.I. Machavariani, R.N. Nishanov, V.G. Rasputin, N.I. Ryzhkov, D.N. Khudonazarov, N.A. Chitanava, R.D. Chkheidze, E.A. Shevardnadze, E.N. Shengelaya.

Black Sea Resorts Overcrowded, Polluted

PM0908121990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 6 Aug 90

[Report by V. Plotnikov, G. Bulanov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A report from the Crimea shows how our leisure is organized.

[Reporter] July was very warm and sunny. Water temperatures on the shores of the Black Sea have risen to 22-23 degrees Centigrade, and of the Azov Sea to 25 degrees. Hundreds of thousands of people are flocking to the beaches from early morning in order to find not a good place but any place at all. Those who come late have to sunbathe standing up.

Meanwhile one in four beaches at the local resorts is closed because of high bacterial pollution of the water, especially in Feodosiya and on the southern shores of the Crimea between Alupka and Simeiz. The oblast hygiene testing station warns that the number of cases of acute dysentery has increased, and in Yalta, Yevpatoriya, Alushta, Sudak, and Planerskoye the quality of drinking water has deteriorated. Water is supplied in accordance with a rigid timetable.

Since the resorts are overloaded and recreational zones, rest homes, and sanatoria are closed to those who have no travel vouchers, people try to get to the sea wherever they can. We have observed these scenes at Nikolayevka village, Simferopolskiy Rayon. A narrow strip of shore where there are no sewage or water supply facilities is crowded with people from Simferopol, tourists, and transit travelers. Temporary holiday accommodation put up by various enterprises is mushrooming here. Sanitary conditions are better not mentioned. In August other problems also always get worse. It is more difficult to rent private accommodation or to buy a ticket for the return journey. So if you are going to the Crimea for your vacations, be prepared for a certain amount of hassle. [video shows sign reading "No access for nonresidents of Nikolayevka" followed by scene of cars being stopped by officials]

'Echo of Moscow' Radio To Broadcast Late August

LD1208095190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Text] The new radio station Ekho Moskvy [Echo of Moscow] will start broadcasting at the end of the month between 20 and 30 August. The radio station will operate on medium wave on the Mayak band.

Economic

Ryzhkov Attends Military Conversion Exhibitions

PM1408093190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by V. Romanyuk: "Conversion on Command"]

[Text] On Tuesday, 7 August 1990, N.I. Ryzhkov was familiarized with two exhibitions of nonmilitary output that has been developed by defense sectors—the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry and the USSR Ministry of Communications. Winding up his fleeting inspection of samples of the peaceful output produced by the "defense sector," the premier confirmed the correctness of the course of conversion. But there are also questions, so to speak.

I toured the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry exhibition twice—first with O. Gryaznov, chief of the "Inform TEI [Technical and Economic Information]" Science-and-Production Association Consumer Goods Department, and then with a group of visitors; this time Minister B. Belousov himself gave explanations. The assessments did not totally coincide, one might say. The minister said that 2.3 million square meters of production area have been released as a result of conversion, 680,000 square meters of which are to be used for consumer goods production.

Supplementing the minister, as it were, the department chief said that over the last year there has been a considerably greater decrease in defense output than the increase in nonmilitary output. Yet an hour's work on nonmilitary output is six times cheaper. Do you have to explain which is more beneficial?

The minister tactfully did not tackle this subject, but the department chief who is directly responsible for consumer goods production said the following outright: The sector is not ready—economically or organizationally—for a painless transition to conversion. A minimum of two years is needed to ensure the qualified preparation of production units. The appropriate concept and model of conversion are needed. At any rate, generous tax concessions are needed and it is necessary to establish an order of priority in retooling enterprises. It is foolish to dissipate resources on all plants; we should choose five or six and really reorganize them to produce peaceful output. At present this is being done willfully, which sometimes even results in plants' closing down. Is all this compatible with a market economy?

This seemed a fundamental question to me. During the premier's brief conversation with journalists I asked him to say how far he thought our conversion regime has been perfected.

"This is a painful process," Ryzhkov replied. "Don't believe those people who claim that it can proceed painlessly. Mechanism? We've got one! Last Friday a sitting of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium considered the question of social protection for defense industry personnel. A resolution is being drafted on this subject. The conversion of defense sectors involves freeing vast resources, some of which will be spent on satisfying the population's social needs and some of which should be plowed back into the 'defense industry,' notably in order to retool production. Let me remind you how things stand with the conversion of defense sectors: Whereas two years ago defense output and nonmilitary output made up 65 and 35 percent respectively, this ratio should be reversed in 1995...."

Both exhibitions provided a considerable amount of instructive information. The Ministry of the Defense Industry submitted 700 exhibits, while the sector as a whole is manufacturing 3,000 named goods. There is a consumer market for a number of them—domestic sewing machines, photographic equipment, refrigerators, and washing machines. The exhibition offered various conversion options. For instance, the use of obsolete powder charges in seismic prospecting, or the conversion of the T-55 tank...into a fire-fighting vehicle.

The development of the production of household machinery and appliances was held up for a long time owing to the shortage of electric motors. Today the defense industry produces 1.5 million of these motors each year which has made it possible to expand production of multipurpose kitchen gadgets and electronic games. Both sectors have developed high-technology domestic electrical goods and a range of medical diagnostic equipment. Admittedly, it is more often a case of future models. Thus original material such as polymer-concrete and goods made from it will at best appear on the shelves in two years' time, while we are talking about four years for information-diagnostic microcomputers for automobiles.

One innovation—the "IZh-2126" automobile, dubbed "Orion"—was to N.I. Ryzhkov's liking. The premier took the wheel and spoke highly of the sedan's merits. What of the market? The automobile has been undergoing tests for five years, and only 5,000 will be manufactured this year.

One can give quite a long list of examples of series-produced goods and original innovations—that is not the point. The point is that the current state of production does not guarantee that the market will be saturated with goods. Four plants producing domestic sewing machines have been shut down in the past, yet now the Podolsk Shveymash, despite enjoying the advantages of a monopoly position on the market, is unable to meet the population's requirements. The efforts being made to set up new production units have not as yet produced tangible results. The overall shortage is not providing any great incentive to enhance the technical standard of the goods: Refrigerators produced by defense sectors are inferior to their foreign counterparts in terms of size and electricity consumption, while bicycles are inferior in terms of functional, ergonomic, and aesthetic factors.

The question of prices was presented differently. Defense industry personnel have developed two small-size washing machines—the "Gnomik" and "Oka"—whose price has been set at 65-80 rubles [R]. Despite an additional feature—reverse—these are nonetheless rather costly. The premier recalled that he had bought a "Malyutka" machine at "Uralmash" for just R37. V. Velichko, minister of heavy machine building, who was present during the discussion, confirmed that "Malyutka" is still that price.

Conversion cannot be implemented at high prices, although this is an alluring option. Proposals to set up a conversion fund and retain budgetary funding of the "defense sector" during its "change of profession" seem sensible. New managerial structures—associations and joint-stock companies which have also been developed in defense sectors—are also very promising. Combining the economic interests of many sectors—defense and nonmilitary—and developing commercial principles also represent a backup for conversion which must be actively exploited during the transition to the market.

Ryzhkov Meets With Mining Representatives

LD1408061790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] Ryzhkov, chairman of the country's Council of Ministers, has had a meeting with the heads of mining enterprises and of the institutions of the country's Ministry of the Coal Industry which represent most of the Soviet Union's coal regions. It was stressed that the retention of the unity of the fuel and energy complex is in the interests of the miners' labor collectives in the conditions of the transition to the market.

Shatalin Views Market Mechanisms in USSR

AU1308181590 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Law Supplement) in Polish 8 Aug 90 p II

[Interview "specially for RZECZPOSPOLITA" with Stanislav Shatalin, member of the USSR Presidential Council and economic advisor to Gorbachev, by NOVOSTI commentator Feliks Alekseyev; place and date not given: "How To Convert to a Market Economy"]

[Text] Academician Stanislav Shatalin is often called the USSR president's chief economic advisor. He shares his views about the pro-market orientation of the Soviet economy with a NOVOSTI correspondent.

[Shatalin] Of course one can act the way Napoleon did—enter the battle first and see what happens later. That sounds wonderful, and there is no doubt Napoleon was a wonderful leader. But he "got himself involved" with Russia and lost.

I firmly disagree with an immediate and universal introduction of market relations and the sale of all commodities at free market prices. That would be worse than the great crisis at the end of the 1920's. What is needed most of all is to prepare and plan a market infrastructure, in other words a new financial-credits policy, monetary policy, foreign currency policy, prices policy, and fiscal policy, plus a banking system and certain social security guarantees.

But that does not mean that we will succeed in eliminating social tension within one or two years and convince people that the right path has been chosen. For this purpose it is necessary to set an anti-inflation mechanism in motion on the basis of a genuine pluralism of all forms of ownership, including private ownership in all its variants. It is necessary to encourage free enterprise and provide the economy with an energetic stimulus. If we achieve normal enterprise, I am sure shareholding will be the best variant for us. By the way, according to our present thinking there is a certain "underwater trap" here. For example, by purchasing shares in a metallurgical combine one automatically becomes a private owner and exploits the work of someone else. And one should not deceive oneself; after all, no one wants to give up the interest earned by money that has been earned honestly and invested in a bank. And yet interest is the same form of private ownership.

In my view, ministries in charge of industrial branches should be abolished. They are one of the key elements in the monopolistic and inefficient development of the Soviet national economy.

[Alekseyev] How do you view the role of Western economic aid to the USSR, including credits?

[Shatalin] Let us be honest. Without help in the form of credits, or any other firm, we will find it quite difficult to switch to a market economy. I understand the anxiety of potential lenders who fear that their aid will be wasted. For example, they know that not even we ourselves are able to tell what has happened to the billions of our own petrodollars. That is why it is necessary to carefully consider the entire mechanism of using Western credits.

Even from a purely humanitarian point of view, I understand people in the West when they say that they want to be sure that children in the USSR will live better lives, that the aid given to the state will also be supplied to invalids, etc. But I will never agree with those who, talking about eventual credits, try to dictate their terms to the Soviet Union with the warning: If you do not satisfy preliminary conditions you will get no credits. I consider such a view to be unwise. It is naive to think that restructuring is only favorable for one side, the Soviet Union. During the restructuring, new prospects of cooperation with other countries are also being created.

[Alekseyev] Does President Mikhail Gorbachev support your ideas?

[Shatalin] All I can say is that Gorbachev is a wise man, open to all ideas.

Decree on USSR State Property Fund

PM1408094390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

["Decree of the President of the USSR 'On the Formation of a USSR State Property Fund'"]

[Text] In the course of perestroyka the conditions have been created for shaping new economic relations between the USSR and Union and autonomous republics, and the transition has begun to a market economy and diverse forms of ownership. Enterprises are being leased, joint-stock companies are being set up, and real prerequisites are being created for shaping a market in stocks and other securities. The process of transforming state ownership into other forms of ownership will increase. In accordance with the demands of the market economy, administrative structures fulfilling the functions of organs of state control over national economic sectors are being transformed.

Under these conditions, the question of the state's functions in handling and administering property in the state ownership of the USSR is being raised anew. The state should ensure the conditions for the rational utilization and safekeeping of property owned by enterprises and find modern forms of including this property in economic turnover.

On the basis of this requirement and in fulfillment of the 6 March 1990 USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On the Enactment of the USSR Law 'On Ownership in the USSR,'" and with a view to immediately shaping state organs designed to accelerate the creation of a number of necessary conditions for the transition to a regulated market economy, I **resolve**

1. To set up a USSR State Property Fund, the powers of which shall be determined by the USSR president on submission from the USSR Council of Ministers bearing in mind the tasks of developing a single all-Union market;

To establish that one of the fund's priority tasks shall be to elaborate and implement a program to transform state enterprises into joint-stock companies and enterprises based on different forms of ownership while simultaneously carrying out the demonopolization of production.

2. To task the USSR State Property Fund with:

protecting the state's property rights and interests;

monitoring the efficient utilization and safekeeping of state property;

implementing the functions of holder of the state shareholding in joint-stock companies;

implementing measures to denationalize USSR property;

assessing the value of state property when leasing, selling, or transforming it into other forms of ownership along with other functions stemming from the fund's basic activity.

To permit the fund, if necessary, to temporarily delegate the right to administer property held in all-Union ownership to other state administrative organs as well as to set up sectorial and territorial property funds on a joint-stock basis.

3. The USSR Council of Ministers shall elaborate a provision on the USSR State Property Fund.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, USSR president
[Dated] Moscow, Kremlin. 9 August 1990

Luxury Tourist Train Soon To Enter Service

OW1408083490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Video report by A. Kozhukhova from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] If you recall, the sensation of last year was the trip of the most exotic European retro-train, Nostalgia, from Paris to Hong Kong. Currently our own retro-train, Rus, is being prepared for tests.

[Begin recording] [Kozhukhova] In our country the Europe-Asia tourist express, in the retro style with the poetic name Rus, is just being created. Looking at such unprecedented splendor it is simply difficult to imagine that all these are simply typical train cars built at the end of the fifties which until recently were running along our railroads and were soon to be written off. And how the artistic hands of the craftsmen, artists, and restorers from Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, Leningrad, and many other cities were able to transform them. Note the stylization. In the design of some of the interiors motifs from old Russian patriarchal times predominate, and in others the restrained colors of the Riga seacoast and the workshops of the north. Still another lounge car would be appropriate for a museum exhibit of folk artisans from the Transcaucasus. [video shows Ye.K. Durdin, chief of the Director's Office for International Tourist Transportation, Kozhukhova, and unidentified official]

[Durdin] These wagons were built in 1957. They were repaired, restored, and equipped with air conditioning. It was necessary to completely replace the power supply systems as well as reupholster the interior, the sofas, and the tables while all the rest—the layout, the lights, and the doors—are all as they were.

[Kozhukhova] And when will the express finally go into service?

[Unidentified official] We are now thinking that the train will be ready to go into service toward the end of this year as has been said. And we have plans to use it not only for foreign tourists but we will probably use it for our Soviet people using Russian rubles as well. We have already been visited by representatives of various foreign firms from Italy, France, and the United States, and of course they are prepared to sign up for touring trips around our golden ring.

[Kozhukhova] And what other routes are being planned?

[Unidentified official] Well, first of all a route to the Baltic area is being planned, a route to Siberia, the Far East and Lake Baikal, a route to Central Asia, and to the Black Sea. And if things go well we will come up with some others.

[Kozhukhova] In the near future, the train will undergo testing on our railways. [end recording]

Forest Fire Protection Service To Be Set Up

LD1208122990 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 12 TASS—Forest fires cost the Soviet Union one billion rubles in annual damages according to the government commission on emergencies which met in Moscow under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Doguzhiev.

Forest fire fighting brigades lack hardware, transport, and means of communications. The work on a fire-fighting airplane is proceeding slowly, the commission said.

It decided to set up a service to protect forests from fire within the state emergency relief system in 1990-1991.

The commission also discussed Soviet participation in the Iranian earthquake relief effort.

The Soviet Union sent several teams of relief workers to Iran from June 23 to July 3.

Professional relief workers did well in stricken areas, but amateur volunteers were not as effective, according to the commission.

The body said it is necessary to upgrade training programs in order to make teams dispatched to emergencies more efficient.

Ulyanovsk Complex Produces Tu-204 Airliners

LD1208122790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Text] The Ulyanovsk aircraft industry complex, well known for its powerful An-124 Russian transport aircraft, has produced its first Tu-204 passenger airliner. It is at present being tested at the test flight complex. The Tupolev airliners will appear on Aeroflot routes next year.

Agricultural

6 Aug Statistics for Grain Harvesting Reported

PM1308123190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 90 p 1

[Report of USSR State Committee for Statistics under general headline "We Only Dream of Respite": "USSR State Committee for Statistics Reports"]

[Text] By 6 August 31.5 million hectares of grain crops had been cut and 28 million threshed. By this time last year the figures were 48 and 44.5 million respectively.

The grain crop yield is averaging 32.6 quintals per hectare. This is not only higher than last year's level but is quite unparalleled in recent years. The yield in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan has totaled 32.6, 37.5, and 13.9 quintals per hectare respectively.

But according to specialists' estimates cited at a recent enlarged sitting of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium, approximately 2 million tonnes of grain will perish daily throughout the country owing to the biochemical processes that occur if the ripened grain is not harvested on time.

Grain sales to the state are slower than last year. So far 28.3 million tonnes have reached grain reception points, although more than 90 million tonnes have been cut. Approximately 60 million tonnes of grain whose undamaged state cannot be vouched for given the unfavorable weather conditions are lying on farm threshing floors. Farms in the Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] have fulfilled the state order by only 34 percent while this figure is 25, 38, and 37 percent in the Tajik SSR and Odessa and Cherkassy Oblasts respectively.

There are still shortages of fuel, harvesting equipment, motorized transport, and spare parts. For instance, there is a shortage of 5,000 tires for KAZ trucks. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] have failed to receive 110,000 batteries.

Scientific

More Coverage of Cosmonauts' Return to Earth

Touchdown Reported

PM1308111790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Report by P. Orlov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Today Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin returned to earth. The Soyuz TM-9 undocked from the Mir station, and at 1134 hours Moscow time landed in the preset area of the USSR. Here is a report by our correspondent from the flight control center.

[Reporter] Here is a chronicle of the final hours of the work of the sixth main space expedition.

At about 0500 hours Moscow time, Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin transferred into the descent module of the Soyuz TM-9 spacecraft the four birds which had traveled into space with their replacement crew, bid farewell to Gennadiy Strekalov and Gennadiy Manakov, and moved into the spacecraft and closed the hatch behind them.

At 0800 hours, just after 0800 hours to be precise, the spacecraft undocked and headed toward the earth. All who watched the landing today said that they had no criticism to make either of the crew or the functioning of the systems. At 1134 hours 23 seconds Moscow time, the soft-landing engines were fired which means that the descent module has landed by now, and this has just been confirmed. Constant contact is being maintained with the descent module, with Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin. We can see the landing site here on the chart. Naturally, this is hypothetical. The two small lakes next to the red star which usually denotes the landing site are not real lakes. Vladimir Shatalov, who spoke to the crew before the landing, has confirmed that there are no lakes where the cosmonauts will land. Therefore what is in store for them is dry land and a temperature of 21 degrees centigrade. The weather is the best that can be expected from the steppe to welcome the cosmonauts back to earth.

Their 180-day flight has ended. It ended at about 1133 hours. They did everything strictly according to schedule. In a few minutes' time helicopters carrying newsmen will arrive at the landing site and a happy if noisy confusion will begin. Then, when the cosmonauts have been evacuated into the medical tent, specialists will form a line to the landing craft, each eager to pick up his cargo.

Reporters Question Cosmonauts

PM1308113790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Report by S. Slipchenko, V. Pankratov, and Yu. Gavrilov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Today Cosmonauts Solovyev and Balandin landed 65 km from Arkalyk City. Our special correspondents have just returned from the scene of the event. Here is our report.

[Reporter] [video shows cosmonauts still in their space suits, surrounded by crowds of journalists] There is a large number of foreign journalists here. They have come because there was a wave of rumors about snags in orbit, claiming that the landing might be difficult. How did it all go?

[Solovyev] During the undocking and the descent the spacecraft functioned impeccably. The unscheduled incident in space in no away affected orientation, the emission of impulses, or the undocking. There were misgivings in particular about the latter because the explosive charges had been laid bare under impact of heat and the question was how they would behave. That was crucial. But the undocking went normally.

[Balandin] If there was shade here everything would be perfect. We are not used to the sun any more. To the sun, to such crowds of people, there is a strong smell here. All this all at once.

[Reporter] And his blood pressure?

[Nurse] 130 over 60.

[Reporter] And Solovyev's?

[Nurse] His is 140.

[Reporter] What condition is he in?

[Doctor] Normal, in line with the stress undergone.

[Reporter] There were reports in the Soviet press, which were subsequently picked up by the Western press, that the spacecraft had been punctured in orbit, that its thermal insulation had been torn off, and that landing would be practically impossible. This is what is known as hard thermal insulation. It covers the spacecraft and comes into operation only during the descent when the spacecraft enters the dense layers of the atmosphere when the spacecraft passes through a plasma state. The vacuum shield thermal insulation which the cosmonauts removed during their spacewalk when they tried to repair it had absolutely no effect on the descent, as Flight Commander Anatoliy Solovyev has just said.

Here is produce from the Krater unit. It looks like food grown in orbit. [video shows leafy plant] And dozens of rolls of films, thousands of cine-frames. Priceless material.

[Reporter] [video shows Solovyev undergoing medical tests] If they said to you tomorrow, "Comrade Solovyev, it is necessary to get ready for another long-term flight," would you go?

[Solovyev] Let me tell you. A day or two ago I realized that the moment was inexorably approaching to leave the station, and I felt nostalgia. Right now I have no doubt at all that should I be called upon to go again, I will do so with the greatest of pleasure.

[Reporter, addressing Balandin, undergoing medical tests] Sasha, which is better, here or up there?

[Balandin] At the moment up there.

[Reporter] Do you want to go back?

[Balandin] Yes, very much.

[Reporter] The cosmonauts were flying home. And in the second helicopter scientists were feeding the quails. Everyone is aware of the spectacular side of space exploration but few are aware of the work that goes on behind the scenes.

Cosmonauts Readapting

LD1308140990 Moscow TASS in English 1221 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Preliminary medical checks on Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin, the crew of the sixth main space mission, showed that the cosmonauts were well prepared for their return to earth after a six-month space flight.

Medics note that during the mission the crew fulfilled all medical recommendations to resist the negative effects of weightlessness on the human organism. Regular training enabled them to preserve their fitness under extreme conditions.

According to tradition, the first stage of re-adaptation is taking place at a health building establishment in the cosmonauts' training center near Moscow.

The problem of human adaptation to conditions of weightlessness and after-flight re-adaptation assumes special importance. This problem has emerged as a result of lengthy space missions.

Experience shows that the creation of the Mir space complex and its manning by replaceable crews has justified itself.

Measures developed by specialists in space biology and medicine help cosmonauts successfully overcome the negative influence of weightlessness on people.

Cosmonauts note that hard training helps them preserve their fitness during flights and prepare for the return to earth.

The cosmonauts' conditon is now being closely monitored by medics.

New 'Mir' Crew Details Tasks of Mission

PM1308130790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0545 GMT on 11 August carries the August edition of the "Man, Earth, Universe" show introduced by Pilot Cosmonaut Sevastyanov. The one-hour program is divided into four parts, the first two of which deal with the Mir space station. Part one of the program covers a press conference on the seventh expedition to the Mir space station. V.A. Shatalov introduces the two crews. Crew Commander Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Manakov then details the tasks of the mission. It will last 132 days and conduct around 300 technological experiments to produce semiconductor materials and other alloys,

continuing the work of the sixth expedition. There will also be biotechnology and medical experiments. Two EVA's [extra vehicular activities] are planned. Cosmonaut Strekalov states that the sixth expedition's experimental program was not completed and the seventh expedition will have to increase its pace accordingly. Part one lasts 10 minutes.

Part two of the show, which runs a total of 15 minutes, opens with a short interview with mission director V.A. Solovyev followed by an interview with Pilot Cosmonaut of the USSR A.P. Aleksandrov on the repair of the vacuum sheet insulation on the descent capsule. Aleksandrov states that had the crew been unable to return to earth a rescue ship would have been sent out. A video was sent up to demonstrate the repair procedure along with repair tools. These are demonstrated by O.S. Tsygankov, department chief at the Energiya Science and Production Association. Aleksandrov shows the thermal insulation material; an engineer demonstrates the repair operation. Aleksandrov indicates the hatch repair operation on a wall diagram of the space station.

Laser Radar To Monitor Changs in Ozone Layer

LD1308183290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] A unique instrument facility developed by Soviet scientists has started operating at the Tayfun Mountain experimental base under the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology. The base is situated on the banks of Issyk-Kul Lake, Kirghizia. An optical laser radar, so far the only one in the world, will monitor changes in ozone concentrations in the atmosphere. This will enable the forecasting of climatic changes in the world. The information obtained will be fed to an international data bank and will help to introduce timely corrections in economic developments, not only in our country but also in other states in the Northern Hemisphere.

Military

Akhromeyev, Other Officers Respond to Reformers

90UM0812A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 90 p 2

[Statement signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev and other military officers, followed by editorial commentary: "Do Not Rub Salt Into the Wound"]

[Text] [Begin item set in box] **"The Army Needs Protection. Against Whom?"**

Some 280,000 families associated with the Armed Forces are in acute need of better living conditions.

Total protectionism is depriving most officers of advancement in the service.

In 1990 only 12 percent of enlisted men and sergeants showed any interest in military service.

Military spending cannot be accurately counted or sensibly regulated by the state.

In the past four years of peacetime alone 15,000 people have died.

An average of 210,000 rubles [R] is being spent on the construction of 18 private residences, each with a living area of 400 to 1,500 square meters, for high-ranking army commanders.

Military chiefs Yazov, Moiseyev, Kochetov, Arkhipov, and others responded with silence to a request to give up their own dachas for children.

The person who developed a draft for military reform is being victimized.

These matters were the subject of a letter "The Army Needs Protection. Against Whom?" signed by 47 public figures and published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 4 July this year. "We see the solution to the existing situation," the authors wrote, "in immediate military reform within the framework of the creation of a new system of national security."

And in response to that letter... another letter.... [end box]

On 4 July 1990 your newspaper published a letter entitled "The Army Needs Protection. Against Whom?" It was addressed to the country's leadership. But we suggest that we also have the right to express our opinion on the particular problems raised by the authors.

The letter, published at the beginning of the 28th CPSU Congress, was obviously calculated to influence the decisions reached by the delegates, mainly those on military matters.

Today it is clear that the authors have been unable to realize their plans. Common sense prevailed at the 28th CPSU Congress and a comprehensive and sound resolution was adopted, "On the Main Directions in Party Military Policy at the Present Stage." But obviously readers' minds will for a long time be disturbed by the scathing and incompetent words of the article.

The article raised questions pertaining to the draft concept for military reform, drawn up by a group of USSR people's deputies led by Major V. Lopatin, without consultation with the Ministry of Defense. It goes without saying that there is nothing to stop them doing this. But surely the authors of the letter did not seriously believe and hope to convince anyone that there is any real possibility of working out a concept for military reform while in conflict with the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff; without making use of the experience gained during the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar development of the Army and Navy; without in-depth consideration of the dynamic processes taking place in the Warsaw Pact and NATO; or without any review by

the government, the Defense Council, and the USSR president before it would be submitted for debate in the USSR Supreme Soviet?

Think about the meaning of the fundamental problems in the proposed draft for "in-depth military reform." In our opinion the main problem considered was renewal of the Ministry of Defense leadership and of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Matters of Defense and National Security in order to recruit for those organs of power "persons who are really interested in effecting military reform in the USSR," that is the authors of this "reform" draft and certain other people. This is the essential nature of the issue; the rest is just a setting.

But of what are the Ministry of Defense and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Matters of Defense and National Security guilty? And to whom? Is it that they are not interested in military reform? On the contrary, it is common knowledge that they are working actively in this field. Military reform has in fact been underway since 1988. Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, reported to the 28th CPSU Congress on what has been done during this time.

Now a few words about the problem of switching to a numerically small professional volunteer army.

There is no argument here: Present-day military practice requires highly professional training for the main specialists in the use of modern combat equipment and weapons. But does that mean that armed forces built on a mixed system of staffing, including a universal military draft, are unprofessional? In Soviet military development the course toward a nonprofessional army was taken way back in the late 1930's and it was successfully pursued. The number of professional servicemen—officers, warrant officers, and personnel on extended military service—is growing steadily year by year in the Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces. The Soviet Armed Forces have repeatedly demonstrated in fact that our sergeants and enlisted men and our officers and warrant officers are true professionals.

Nor is it possible to ignore convincing historical experience. It is common knowledge that in contrast to many states, by dint of its geographical position, the USSR has repeatedly been forced to repulse aggression with maximum mobilization of all its forces and resources. For since the start of the 20th century wars have been waged not only and not so much with armies that function during peacetime; they are waged by peoples. Accordingly in peacetime an army is needed above all to provide a base to prepare the people to repulse possible aggression and defend the country. If on the eve of the Great Patriotic War we had had nothing but a volunteer army to oppose a multimillion-strong Wehrmacht supported by the resources and potential of the whole of Europe, the situation might have turned out otherwise. Victory would have been achieved with even greater losses. So we should not forget either the history or the geographical position or the size of our territory, or the many other special features of our homeland.

And there is yet another factor we would like to emphasize, namely that calls for a professional volunteer army at this time are nothing but unsupported hare-brained schemes and imitation of the principles used abroad to staff the armed forces. In the FRG, France, Spain, and other countries in Europe the army is staffed on the basis of a military draft. Only the United States, Great Britain, and Japan employ all-volunteer armies, and that because of their geographical position. Moreover, proposals about a volunteer army are engendering in the consciousness of young people and their parents an attitude that is far removed from promoting any enhancement of the country's defense capabilities.

The problems set forth in the article, such as "excluding the activity of any political parties (the target here is principally the CPSU—authors' note) in the Army and other structures of state power that insure the security and stability of society," are aimed primarily at seriously weakening the moral-political potential and ultimately the might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The authors of the letter are perfectly well aware that all the problems of military reform are being worked on seriously and thoroughly at the state level. The proof of that is the detailed elucidation of the main directions of this activity in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by the USSR Ministry of Defense on 3 June 1990. Authors of the "concept of in-depth military reform" have also appeared on its pages and on the pages of other periodicals.

If we look carefully into the essence and content of the article, it becomes clear that it is not just a question of military reform. The article strikes a blow at the officer corps, in particular the generals, the backbone of the Armed Forces. To put it graphically, a "blow is being struck at the headquarters." The authors are somewhat confused or are in disagreement about the question of the "generals permitting unjustified and gross attacks against scholars who are demonstrating the reality of reducing the threat of war." We are ready at all times to engage in discussion with the authors of letter about the degree of the military threat against our country.

The generals and officers, in concert with the representatives of other departments, are helping the country's leadership not in words but in deeds to reduce military tension and reduce the threat of war. They are in total agreement with and support the policy pursued by the state aimed at strengthening peace, and they see everything that is being done in this field. They also take note of everything positive emanating from the United States and its allies in Europe. But we cannot avoid the contradictory nature and duplicity of U.S. and NATO policy. Is the United States not refusing to negotiate with us about cutbacks in naval forces where it has great superiority and is continuing its buildup?

Nor can we forget that the United States supports Japan's claims against our Kurile Islands and says that the entry of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 was unlawful, with all the consequences stemming from that. The statement made by General B. Scowcroft, national security adviser to the U.S. President, on 3 July clarifies the situation: "NATO must exist primarily because without the United States the Soviet Union will be the prevailing military force in Europe, and that will give it great weight in matters of European security." But surely they have abandoned the "from a position of strength" policy? No. This is confirmed also by the statement made by the U.S. President at the launching of a new aircraft carrier on 21 July this year. Taking all this into account, we are convinced that the military danger from the United States still exists today. And in this connection the Soviet generals are advocating the realization and consistent development of a Soviet defensive doctrine, solving defensive tasks by having the resources necessary for this, preserving the inviolability of the USSR's borders, cutting short any encroachment on the sovereignty of the socialist homeland, and in the event of outside aggression guaranteeing that an aggressor will be repulsed and the territorial integrity of the state safeguarded.

What was the purpose of the following question raised in the article: "With whom will the Army be in the event that a complex situation arises in society? Where will it be led by generals who hold dear a power unlimited by law?" There is but one answer: To set the generals against our society. We state with a proper sense of responsibility that no matter what the conditions, the Army has been and will be with the people and will steadfastly carry out the instructions and orders issued by the legally elected highest organs of power and its own supreme commander in chief—the USSR president—and the USSR Supreme Soviet to which the people have given that right.

The authors of the article write that "the myth of so-called anti-Army sentiments is being strongly foisted on society." Who is doing this? Unfortunately, the anti-Army hysteria is still to be seen on the pages of many press organs and heard on the radio, television programs, movies, and theatrical productions as well as in all the "Novostis," "Ogoneks," "Kolesos," "Vzglyady," and "Sekundy."

Who is affected by the claim made by the authors of the article that within the Army "the ideas of some special exclusivity of the officer corps in society and of the need to create some kind of special military party" are being nurtured? This is the fruit of the authors' overactive imaginations.

We see and we know that there are serious defects in the Armed Forces, shortcomings in discipline and disciplinary practice, and in the work of the officer corps to indoctrinate their subordinates. The Army remains the most stable institution in our society.

In fact, a serious situation has arisen with respect to providing officers with apartments, but surely people know why this is so, do they not? And the authors are also aware of the enforced retirement of officers in connection with 500,000 cutbacks in the Army; the steady redeployment of the Armed Forces; the withdrawal of troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia; and the chronic failure by local authorities to comply with the well-known government resolutions on allocating housing for servicemen. Surely they are not interested in rubbing salt into the wound rather than helping to improve matters here.

After reading the article it becomes clear against whom the Army needs protecting. The authors of the article make too many unsubstantiated accusations against officers, particularly generals and admirals.

We, war veterans and veterans of the Armed Forces, rightly ask this question: When will this anti-Army psychosis be stopped?

The Armed Forces need help in solving many problems—particularly the housing problem and preparing young men for service in the Army—and not malignity. We favor criticism, but constructive criticism. We favor every possible stabilization of the situation in the country on a legal basis.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev; Army General I.N. Shkadov; Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov; Army General G.I. Obaturov; Army General S.P. Vasyagin; Army General I.K. Yakovlev; Army General I.M. Voloshin; Marshal of Aviation G.P. Skorikov; Army General P.N. Lashchenko; Marshal of Armored Troops O.A. Losik; Fleet Admiral A.I. Sorokin; Marshal of Artillery Ye.V. Voychuk; Army General I.I. Gusakovskiy; S.A. Afanasyev, member of the CPSU since 1943; Army General A.F. Shcheglov; Marshal of Engineer Troops S.Kh. Aganov; Marshal of Aviation G.V. Zimin; Army General P.I. Ivashutin; Army General N.G. Lyashchenko; Army General I.Ye. Shavrov; Army General A.I. Gribkov; Army General G.I. Salmanov; Marshal of Aviation I.I. Pstygo; Marshal of Artillery P.N. Kuleshov; Marshal of Signal Troops A.I. Belov; Army General V.V. Fedorchuk; Army General M.M. Kozlov.

FROM THE EDITOR

The lines that we recalled from the letter of the 47 were not taken at random. Now all we have to do is compare the arguments of the opponents to see that there has been no debate, that is an intelligent and competent disputation in which argument is beaten by argument and fact refuted by fact. Instead of that, we see the slogans we have heard a thousand times and the ingenuous method of "switching to personalities": the opponents of the marshals and generals turn out to be banal careerists who for some reason are concerned only about military reform and indulge in intrigue against today's military chiefs.

Nevertheless, the essential issue is military reform in the USSR. And as USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 3 July, its general direction was determined way back in the spring of 1985. At the 28th CPSU Congress it was clarified: Military reform had started in 1987. In their letter the marshals and generals give yet another date: The reform has been under way since 1988. It is moving ahead full steam! And so, we ask, what did the USSR people's deputies want when on 14 February of this year they raised the question of the concept of military reform for debate at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet? What was not understood here?

A great deal was not understood. If a reform of the Armed Forces really is under way then what are its legal foundations, on what decision of the highest organ of state power in the USSR is it based? The Supreme Soviet has still not examined any concept for such a reform nor the structure of the military budget. Accordingly there can be no question of the USSR Supreme Soviet monitoring the course of such a reform even though the matter is not one just for the Army but rather a matter of the Union's national security.

Notwithstanding, a reform is under way, but not the reform to which the Ministry of Defense refers. In their declarations of sovereignty, some of the republic parliaments have stated that they have the right to their own army. The Armenian Supreme Soviet recently suspended the ukase of the USSR president on its territory, thus insisting on possession of its own armed formations. That is, the "reform" is taking place at random without a general plan or design. The "reform" is also leading to the disintegration of the Army.

And finally the military leaders are insisting that they hold the monopoly on military reform, referring unambiguously to the incompetence of USSR people's deputies. They say that we ourselves have brought the Army to this state and we will extricate it from that state. But as far as we know, in the history of mankind only one officer ever succeeded in pulling himself out of a swamp with his own hair, and that was Baron Muenchhausen, the well-known fantasist and fibber. The present-day military chiefs are evidently reluctant to follow his example by calling on their opponents for reform not in words but in deeds. So there you have it....

The USSR president and the Ministry of Defense and the republic parliaments have had since April of this year a draft for military reform drawn up by a group of USSR people's deputies. A document. Was it bad? What are your conclusions? Fine. It is time to submit it for discussion at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Only the parliament can decide what kind of Army the country needs. Only the parliament, not journalists or generals.

And now our proposal: The marshals and generals who signed the letter that we have published "are ready at all times to engage in discussion." A fine sentiment. We therefore invite the disputing parties to the Goluboy Hall of the Komsomolka on 15 August at 1200 to have a "direct line" to our readers. There are now many questions, and not only from military people.

Baltic Republics

Lithuania's Ozolas Views Talks With USSR

LD1308204190 Moscow TASS in English 2033 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Vilnius August 13 TASS—The Lithuanian deputy prime minister described talks with the USSR as the all-important task today. He reviewed last week's events on Lithuanian television.

Ozolas was a member of the group of the commission on the political, legal and diplomatic preparations for the talks, which met in Moscow on August 10 with Yuriy Maslyukov, a member of the Presidential Council and first deputy prime minister of the USSR, and Grigoriy Revenko, a member of the USSR Presidential Council.

Speaking about the importance of this meeting, Ozolas noted that the "chronometers of the long-distance marathon of the talks remained unswitched but some of its participants came to see the starting line." The comparatively modest results of the meeting are quite logical, in his view.

"Those who will conduct the talks can agree on the terms for the talks. The more so that Moscow formed, without a delay, a delegation a month ago whereas our side was represented only by delegates from the special group."

Ozolas evaluated rather critically the Lithuanian side's actions to prepare for the talks with the USSR, which, in his view, "should become the only way out of the stalemate and help solve problems, the number of which is increasing."

He called upon Lithuanian politicians "to stop subtilizing for even a second and look if they strayed from the pivotal matters too far." [sentence as received]

"In other case, it will appear on some fine day that Moscow went farther on the issue of our secession than ourselves," Ozolas said.

He called to form an official Lithuanian delegation for talks with the USSR before long.

Silayev Talks in Lithuania Previewed

LD1408111690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Report by Jurate Valanciute]

[Text] The official information today is without important reports. The Supreme Council, according to Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, is peaceful. Apart from discussions and meetings with prominent guests, this day is devoted to everyday work in preparation for the second sitting of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council. It is expected Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, will return from Switzerland on Wednesday evening.

In the Council of Ministers preparations are continuing for the negotiations with the Russian Federation. The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers is to come to Lithuania tomorrow.

More information about this in a telephone conversation with the representative of the Lithuanian government in Moscow, Egidijus Bickauskas:

[Bickauskas] As you know, the week before last the Russian prime minister met our prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene. It was a certain introduction into the negotiations, if one may say so. It was necessary to put everything in the documents, to coordinate a protocol. I visited him last Saturday and Prime Minister Silayev signed this protocol. At the same time the visit by Silayev to Lithuania was agreed. It is expected that an agreement will be signed, an agreement of a general nature, an agreement concerning the nearest future. The year 1991 is approaching and our economic life must go on. It seems that this agreement will concern 1991. At present it is hardly possible to sign a wider agreement until political documents are not signed.

[Valanciute] And from the diplomatic point of view, what is the premier's mood?

[Bickauskas] Positive. As always, he is in a very good mood, very busy, but his mood is positive, and he wishes to come to Lithuania. Partly it has been here initiative to go there. On the other hand, negotiations which will take place in Vilnius should be regarded by us very carefully bearing in mind that the final aims of Russia and Lithuania are sufficiently different, that Russia has firmly decided to take part in the union treaty, and we must during the negotiations consider very carefully each word signed by us, if I may say so. As far as I know, the government realizes this and it will be careful.

[Valanciute] Maybe, you will be [word indistinct]

[Bickauskas] I regret it very much, but I have an invitation from the Presidium of the Yakutian Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to visit Yakutiya and today in the evening I will leave for Yakutiya by air. Therefore I will not come to Vilnius. And it is important to go there because so far we do not have full and official information about what is happening in Russia's autonomous parts, apart from the newspaper reports and from television.

[Valanciute] Such is the introduction into the negotiations. The premier of the Russian Federation is coming to Vilnius tomorrow about 1600 hours.

Lithuanian Negotiations Commission Meets

90UN2472B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 19 Jul 90 p 1

[ELTA report: "Meeting of the Commission"]

[Text] The first meeting of the commission on political, legal, and diplomatic preparations for negotiations with

the USSR took place in the Supreme Council and was led by B. Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council. The members of the commission discussed a draft protocol for negotiations proposed by the government as well as government proposals on the creation of a group of experts. On the basis of these proposals it was decided to create and present for confirmation by the Supreme Council Presidium a group to work out conditions for negotiations on political, legal, and economic ties and questions of communications, transportation, the rights of citizens, the status of the USSR Armed Forces, state defense, and political and diplomatic ties. The possibility of creating a similar group for cultural affairs was discussed. Other meetings of the commission were designated for 19, 23, 25, and 26 July, and the commission's conclusions are to be presented for the examination of the Supreme Council.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet To Convene 21 Aug

LD1308201990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] The internal and external political situation of the Lithuanian Republic on the eve of talks with the USSR. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet presidium today proposed regarding this question as of paramount importance on the agenda of the second sitting of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet, which is planned for 21 August. The question will evidently be discussed at a closed sitting of the session. Apart from that, questions on introducing changes to the law on cooperatives and on registering nationality upon the issue of a certificate of citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic will be put forward for consideration by the republic's parliament. It is also planned at the session to hear the answer of the Lithuanian Republic's government to a deputy's question.

Lithuanian KGB Head Reviews Responsibilities

LD1108104190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Text] The work of the branch of the Soviet Union's State Security Committee in Lithuania is by no means infringing upon the republic's constituiton. This is stated today in the daily RESPUBLIKA by the head of that office, Major General Romualdas Marcinkus. The State Security Committee is subordinated to Moscow but—according to the general—until Lithuania's institutions are not finally formed, and until there is more clarity about protection of the borders and the work of the customs, the security committee must carry on with its functions. Gen. Marcinkus explained that his institution is dealing in Lithuania with intelligence and counterintelligence, protecting the secrets of government communications, an taking care of cases concerning the rehabilitation of people. The instutition has the status of a military unit, and its existence or nonexistence, according to Gen. Marcinkus, will be decided by way of negotiations. The head of the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Security Committee insisted that he has no disputes with the new State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, although some people from his office have left to work in that department.

Gen. Romualdas Marcinkus was born in Zemaitija. He has higher education in teaching, and before his appointment in Vilnius used to work as an intelligence office in West Europe.

Paratroopers Fail To Find Lithuanian Deserters

LD1308123290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Department for State Protection section chief Alfonsas Bajoras has reported two incidents—in Jurbarkas and Vilnius. In Jurbarkas, paratroopers surrounded a house and attempted to locate a young man in hiding. However, neighbors were watchful and prevented the uninvited guests from carrying out their plans.

On Debesys Street in Vilnius, they also searched for a young escapee from the Army. However, the youth's parents received a timely warning, and with the help of the militia, the paratroopers failed again.

The Department for State Protection warns that caution needs to be exercised today and in the next 24-hour period by young men, their parents, and those who wish to help them.

Lithuania Radio Airs Draft Evader Issues

LD1208144290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Excerpts] [First announcer] Soviet Army officials have once again resorted to force in dealing with Lithuanian youths who refuse to do their military service within the ranks of the Soviet Army. The rounding up of evaders was initiated on a mass scale last March soon after Lithuania declared independence. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian procurator's office has recently been tipped that a further rounding up of Army dodgers is imminent. According to data released by the Lithuanian State Defense Department, there are 720 young men who have deserted the Army and are now in hiding in Lithuania. The officers of the occupational army not only intend to round them up but also to find those who refuse to sign up for conscription this year. Soviet officials seem to ignore the fact that citizens of the Republic of Lithuania have a constitutional right to decide whether or not they want to serve in the army of a foreign state.

[Second announcer] What is being done for Soviet Army evaders in Lithuania? Is the state vitally concerned about their future? I suppose that the greatest help rendered to them from the state comes from a special parliamentary commission set up to investigate the situation of Lithuanian youths in the Soviet Army. As we were informed by

its chairman, Mrs. Belia Parailina, the commission is approached by 30 to 40 people daily.

Now, how can the commission help the applicants? First of all, they try to find out under what circumstances the applicants deserted the Army. Non-statutory relations, poor health, and political motives seem to be among the three reasons most often mentioned. Mrs. Parailina said that if any Army evader mentioned political motives, the parliament commission could render moral aid only. Other than this, it was practically impossible to help these youths. If, however, the servicemen deserted the Army due to poor health, the commission could provide more effective help. Thus the young men in this particular case can be hospitalized and an agreement reached with the Soviet Army officers to drop their charges of desertion against him. And if non-statutory relation is the reason why a certain serviceman abandoned his military service, and expert panel is set up to meticulously investigate all the details involved. In this latter case the most frequent solution is to have the person in question be transferred to a new military base.

The parliamentary commission has recently reached an agreement with the Soviet military officials that Army deserters who left their base on the basis that they were unable to cope with (?teasing) can now be transferred to Lithuania for the remaining period of service. In the words of the commission's chairwomen, Mrs. Bella Parailina, this was obviously a compromise solution. Thus the whole issue now boils down to the following question: What was better—a seven years' jail term for deserting the Army, or military service under easier conditions? From the information released by the commission, not a single Army deserter who had approached the commission for assistance in being transferred to another military base had suffered.

[First announcer] In short, those who deserted the Army for non-statutory relations or health reasons had every chance to escape being rounded up. Yet those young servicemen who left their bases for political reasons have comparatively fewer chances in receiving much needed support. In an interview to Radio Vilnius, (Algis Butkavicius), director general of the State Defense Department, said that his department acted as a mediator for Army deserters to get new personal identification documents. They also help such individuals to find employment or enter college or university. In the opinion of the director general of the State Defense Department, these steps made it a much more difficult task for Soviet Army officials to round up Army deserters. Yet in each concrete case of abduction, the Lithuanian State Defense Department can actually do very little. As Mr. (Butkavicius) said, if a group of soldiers has arrived at the Army deserter's home with the intention to take him away by force, the victim should immediately notify the state department by phone. Yet in reality this plan of action has materialized much too late and, to be honest, one can hardly imagine how a young man could start making urgent telephone calls when a large group of armed soldiers are breaking through his door.

Arturas Paulauskas, the Lithuanian procurator general, also thinks that it is impossible to render any assistance in a concrete case of abduction. For this reason he thinks that the only solution is for the Lithuanian procurator's office to start legal proceedings. But do the abducted benefit in any way? Mr. Paulauskas, the Lithuanian procurator general, suggests that ech Army deserter should take great precautionary measures. We can only hope that this ambiguous situation will soon be in control, especially after the extraordinary parliamentary session made an appeal to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov earlier this week demanding that the Soviet Government should take concrete steps to put an end to all violence taken against Lithuanian youths refusing to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army.

Pro-Moscow Party Wants Vilnius Given Away

LD1008225690 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Text] The pro-Moscow Communist Party in Lithuania continues to be restless. Several years ago its supporters demanded Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, to be torn away from Lithuania and given to Poland. Now they wish to make Vilnius a provincial city of Belorussia. It would be funny if these were merely words. This week's newspaper (?VORUTA) has published an appeal to the Soviet citizens residing in the Vilnius region calling on them to unite against Lithuania. Special underground groups are going to be set up with members ranging from teenagers to elderly people, and they should all wait for a signal. What kind of signal? The (?VORUTA) editorial says that this signal will most probably mean a pogrom of the Lithuanian people in eastern Lithuania, where they constitute an ethnical minority. The Lithuanian Procurator's office should start legal proceedings against the instigators until [as heard] it is too late.

Lithuanian Economy Seen as Deteriorating

LD1308174490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] News from Lithuania. Elyana Kurkletite is at the microphone.

[Kurkletite] As our listeners have already been informed, a meeting between members of the Lithuanian republic commission on political, legal, and diplomatic preparations for talks and members of the USSR delegation on the USSR-Lithuania talks took place in Moscow on 10 August. Romualdas Ozolas, Lithuanian deputy prime minister, told an ELTA correspondent that a draft protocol of the talks has been handed over [as heard]. This document was unofficially accepted for examination. It was decided that for the document to be officially discussed, it must be presented by an official delegation from the Lithuanian Republic to a delegation formed by the USSR president. We think that this is a step toward bringing nearer the possibility of an official meeting,

Ozolas said, and described that meeting in Moscow as an inspection of the launching pad.

As regards the Lithuanian economy, the blockade has caused a Lithuanian budget loss estimated at 124.4 million rubles [R]. Everything is becoming more expensive. Purchase prices for grain have gone up, and in the near future prices for milk and meat will go up, too. Tobacco and beer prices have doubled. The Lithuanian government has decided to normalize finances by cutting funds for culture, education, science, art, health care, and certain other social programs. The budget for the system of education—including higher educational establishments, cultural and educational organizations, radio and television—will have a shortfall of R38 million. Allocations for science will be cut by over R1 million. Health care spending has been cut by R12 million.

Not long ago, members of the federation of art workers trade unions sent an open letter to the Supreme Soviet commission for social issues, in which they said that of late in many towns and rayons of the republic, illegal dismissals of personnel have started, following cuts in culture spending. They hope that draft laws on employment, social and economic guarantees and status of the unemployed will be submitted for discussion by the parliament and the public.

All in all, Lithuania's everyday life is varied. Some people are getting rich through speculation, while others hardly manage to make ends meet.

Lithuanian Agrarian Policy Prompts Disagreement

LD1108161890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Excerpts] At the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee [on the platform of the CPSU], a conference has taken place of the rural party aktiv. Its participants arrived at the following conclusion:

A considerable number of inhabitants of the Lithuanian countryside do not approve of the agrarian policy aimed at speeding up the privatization of agricultural production. [passage omitted]

Given that a considerable proportion of the Lithuanian people in the countryside do not approve of this agrarian policy aimed at speeding up the privatization of agricultural production, measures have therefore been outlined to assist collective and state farms.

Press Distribution Organization To Be Formed

LD1208015690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] More than 100 Lithuanian newspaper and journal administrators have decided to establish a new, independent organization for press distribution in Lithuania. As is known, the firm Lithuania Press currently maintains a press distribution monopoly in Lithuania. Lately, its services have failed to satisfy the readers and also the printers. The press is delivered to individual homes, as well as to newsstands, very belatedly. Moreover the cost of press distribution will increase markedly beginning next year, and state taxes will be increased.

With these factors in mind, press editors and printers have appealed to (?active) individuals who could prepare an alternative press distribution program and would implement it in a practical fashion. Lithuanian newspapers and journals will finance this undertaking.

Latvia, Russia Reach Agreement During Talks

LD1308150690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] In Riga two-day talks have been held between the delegations of Latvia and Russia. It has been learned that the text of the future treaty between the two republics contains 22 points. According to Grandberg, head of the Russian delegation, agreement was successfully reached on the main humanitarian and economic problems. The sides are also having a committed discussion of the concept of entry into the European Common Market. During August the text of the treaty will be examined in the Supreme Soviets of Latvia and Russia.

Parliament Passes 'Discriminatory' Resolution

PM1008123790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh under the "Direct Line" rubric: "At the Close of the Session"]

[Text] Literally just before they dispersed for the summer recess, deputies of the Latvian parliament unexpectedly had to discuss a draft resolution suspending the effect on the Latvian republic's territory of a USSR Council of Ministers order on the registration of servicemen carrying out extended active military service in the place where their military unit is deployed.

The draft is essentially discriminatory toward servicemen and members of their families, particularly in view the fact that there are all kinds of restrictions on the acquisition of essential foodstuffs and manufactured goods in the republic today. Much of what we need for living simply cannot be acquired without being registered.

During the discussion of the draft, deputies from the "Equal Rights" faction submitted these and several other convincing arguments against the adoption of such a resolution. However, their votes were insufficient to put a stop to the adoption of the discriminatory resolution in this case. Representatives of the other faction, which, as is well known, stands on the Latvian People's Front platform, unanimously voted "for." Henceforth it is believed that the aforementioned USSR Council of Ministers order was suspended on the republic's territory "on the basis of Article 97 of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution."

It is difficult to foresee the consequences of such a decision made by parliamentarians who left to go on their summer vacation with a clear conscience.

Estonian Council Leader Hails Gorbachev Statement

LD1308205390 Moscow TASS in English 2040 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Tallin August 13 TASS—"President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement apropos of the Estonian parliament's resolution on relations between the Estonian Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics justly notes that the latter violates the foundations of the Soviet constitution and the recognised international laws, including the U.N. charter and the final act of the all-European conference, which reject arbitrariness in the issues of territorial integrity of states and nonviolability of borders," Chairman of the Council of Elders of the Interregional Council of People's Deputies and Working People of Estonia Sergey Petinov told TASS.

He said Gorbachev accurately noted that ignoring the will of Estonian people, the republic's parliament again made an attempt to declare the Soviet constitution, Soviet laws and the constitution of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic invalid and announced of its refusal to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on the basis of these basic legal documents.

Those who believed that the resolution of August 7 will move the republic towards independence, were wrong. The resolution was needed to meed the Republic's indigenous population agitated, Petinov said.

Asked by TASS of their attitude to the president's statement, many residents of Tallinn refused to comment on it. Instead, they spoke of the decline in their living standards and price hikes. They seem to be worried about these things more than about Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union.

Yazov Ends Baltic University Military Training

LD1308112690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Interview with Tallinn Technical University rector Academician Boris Tamm by an unidentified correspondent; place and date of interviewed not specified—recorded]

[Text] [Tamm] A letter has reached me, signed by [Yazov], the head of staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, head of the Main Political Directorate, and another marshal. It says the following:

In connection with the policy being implemented by Baltic Supreme Soviets, one is to regard military training in a number of Baltic higher educational establishments as inopportune, and to stop training officers for the Soviet Army, and to liquidate chairs of military training.

A whole string of points follow as to what one should do in respect of lecturers of present chairs, to whom to hand over equipment, and so on. This was done by the lofty military leaders. The letter was then presented to [Defense] Minister Yazov; in Russian it says: report/note [dokladnaya zapiska], you know. And Minister Yazov has then written across in his own hand: Agreed—in Russian there is but one word: soglasitsya—and the date. Well, this is the kind of letter we received. We had indeed taken steps previously in this direction; our institute's council adopted a resolution—to my mind already next April [as heard]—in respect of halting military training in the next study year, that is from 1 September. And in May we set a commission on liquidating the military chair. The commission is already working successfully. So, we have already started the process and will also lead it to its conclusion.

[Correspondent] In a word, the letter confirms that there is no longer any counteractivity Union-wide to liquidating the military chair?

[Tamm] That is so.

[Correspondent] Has Tartu University also been named among those universities?

[Tamm] Yes. Yes. The list begins with Tartu University and Tallinn Technical University, and then Vilnius University and Kaunas Polytechnic and Riga Polytechnic, and a number of others follow. The list begins with our two universities, Tartu and Tallinn universities.

[Correspondent] And your comment?

[Tamm] I would say that at last the form has been brought in line with the content.

Estonia To Open Russian Border Customs Offices

LD1108155390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] The Soviet Union Government has agreed that Estonia can set up its customs offices on the border with the Russian Federation. Two days ago the Estonian premier explained Estonia's plan to Ryzhkov, chairman of the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers. According to the plan, Estonian customs officials will check all goods carried through its border, including goods of the enterprises subordinated to the Soviet Union. Negotiations are taking place with Leningrad oblast on the establishment of Estonia's economic border. It is expected that Estonia's customs plan will come into force next month.

Estonian Poll Results on Ethnic Relations

90UN2417A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Artur Kuznetsov, minister of the Republic of Estonia, conducted by Vyacheslav Ivanov; place and date of interview not given: "What Do the People Think?"]

[Text] **Many politicians and leaders of various movements are today citing public opinion and saying a good deal on behalf of the people. What, in fact, do ordinary citizens of the republic think, what is their attitude toward current events, and how do they evaluate the "sore points" which characterize the economic, social and political life of society?**

Objective answers to these questions are provided by the results of sociological studies. The results of just such a recent public opinion poll were the subject of our correspondent's interview with Artur Kuznetsov, minister of the Republic of Estonia.

[Ivanov] Artur Ivanovich, first of all, what kind of studies are these? By whom and how are they being conducted and what is their purpose?

[Kuznetsov] The republic government intends conducting such studies regularly, mainly on problems of interethnic relations, but also on all questions connected with this subject in one way or another.

Such a poll, a telephone poll it is true, was conducted for the first time, as commissioned by the present government, on 15 and 16 May. This information was published at that time. Partially, of course, since a complete analysis of the results of the study takes time and cannot on account of its volume be published in the periodical press.

The poll about which I would like to speak in more detail was conducted from 30 June through 4 July—by the questionnaire method. This study was fuller insofar as more time was allowed for thinking about the questions, and, in addition, the group of persons polled was larger (although not by much) than that of last time: in May 1,314 persons, now, 1,565. One further particular feature of the last poll—people were polled in rural areas in addition to the five cities (Tartu, Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, Parnu and Tallinn). There was somewhat of a change on this occasion in the subject matter of the questions also. Specifically, we inserted questions concerning the attitude toward the problem of citizenship, and quite a detailed picture was obtained as a result, what is more.

The research was entrusted to the Press Information Center. We are thinking of having this organization conduct a further two and, if possible, three "rounds" of such research before the end of the year.

Its purpose is multilevel. But the main aim is to use the results (both in the form of express information and of a detailed analysis) in practice. For politicians the results of such research are a kind of "thermometer" showing the state of society and its "temperature."

Even from the two polls which we have conducted it is possible to determine what remains invariable and what is changing and in what direction.

[Ivanov] Were attempts made (although there is insufficient material for collation as yet) to forecast the development of the situation on the basis of the studies and to what extent were such attempts successful?

[Kuznetsov] There were, of course, such attempts. But, as the great Goethe said, life is always more interesting than any theory. And we are now seeing how a surprising shift of sociodemographic emphases, particularly among the non-Estonian population, is ripening. I will talk about this in more detail when we touch directly on the results of the poll. The same may be said also about the attitude toward citizenship—the facts which were ascertained were a surprise to me, in any event....

[Ivanov] And one further minor question in passing: Why was the Press Information Center entrusted to conduct this research when the republic has a generally recognized leader of sociological research—"Maynor"—which has become a monopolist in this field virtually?

[Kuznetsov] Well, first, any monopolism is bad, in sociology included. And the Press Information Center is a respectable enough firm with extensive connections both in the Union and in the West. So the level of competence of its specialists is perfectly deserving of trust. We are using here also "Maynor" information at our disposal—our thanks to them, they never refuse to make such information available to us. And only a fuller and more objective picture is obtained from a comparison of the different results.

[Ivanov] What does the information obtained show?

[Kuznetsov] It is interesting that the results of the research do not confirm the soundness of the statements of certain politicians to the effect that interethnic relations in the republic are deteriorating. Such assertions have been heard repeatedly at mass meetings recently. Thus 20 percent of those polled—among Estonians—believe that these relations have improved even. Only 12 percent of Estonians thought thus in May. Among non-Estonians this opinion is shared by a steady 10 percent of those polled in both May and June-July. Today 55 percent of Estonians and 51 percent of non- Estonians are of the viewpoint that relations between the two national groups remain unchanged, that is, are not improving, but are not deteriorating either (in May 32 and 34 percent respectively). And 13 Estonian respondents and 27 Russians out of each 100 polled now speak about a deterioration. In May the figures were 44 and 42 percent respectively.

To what do these figures testify? Clearly, to a perfectly definite stabilization in relations between the main

ethnic groups of the population, despite the quite complex general political situation.

It is significant that in both audiences the majority believes that the main cause of the overall tension are economic disorders (57 percent of Estonians and 55 percent of the representatives of other nationalities).

So there are no grounds, as you can see, for thinking about a catastrophic slide toward interethnic conflict, despite the gloomy predictions of some politicians.

We inserted additionally the following evaluation in the overall scale: I do not consider interethnic relations in the republic either bad or good. This opinion was supported by 49 percent of Estonians and 47 percent of Russian-speaking inhabitants.

[Ivanov] That is, we have finally come to recognize that for a normal life it is not necessary to hurl ourselves at one another with embraces and protestations of love?

[Kuznetsov] No, kissing is not mandatory, we need to become accustomed to conventional human relations.

What is creating the tension? Mainly—we have already mentioned this—economic backwardness. Both audiences are unanimous here.

A big difference is observed on another question: Do you consider that the policy of the Union government and the central ministries and departments is a destabilizing factor in interethnic relations? Some 80 percent of Estonians and only 43 percent of non-Estonians agree with this evaluation.

The following question was put also: How is Estonians' aspiration to independence influencing interethnic relations? "Strongly" was the answer of 55 percent of Estonians and 52 percent of the others polled. This seems to me a positive phenomenon: The aspiration to state independence, consequently, is seen by non-Estonians also as an objective circumstance, not the intrigues of a handful of extremists. But like the majority of objective, natural phenomena, this need not necessarily be "agreeable in all respects."

[Ivanov] And what is the attitude in the different audiences to the very idea of state independence?

[Kuznetsov] The poll sheets contain the following question: How do you envisage the future of Estonia? And offer the following alternatives: Nothing needs changing (let everything remain as it has been); within the Union, given economic independence; an independent state within a confederation; an independent state with an orientation toward the Union (the Eastern market); an independent state with an orientation toward the West; an independent neutral state. Thus in the non-Estonian audience the replies were distributed as follows (in the order in which the alternatives were listed, and we indicate in parentheses the replies obtained at the time of the telephone poll in May): for the first version, 3.5 percent (7 percent); within the USSR, but an economically independent Estonia, 22 percent (25), and subsequently, 37 (32), 14 (13), 8 (3) and 11 (13.5). That is, albeit slight, there is a clear movement toward recognition of the need for greater independence.

Among Estonians this question is perceived unequivocally, with certain variations. Thus in May eight percent of those polled supported an orientation toward the West, in July, 17 percent. For a neutral Estonia, 77 and 69 percent respectively.

It is interesting to see how people evaluate the influence of various political forces on the preservation of tension in interethnic relations. For example, exactly one-half of Estonians believes that the actions of the government and Supreme Soviet of the republic exert little influence here. At the same time, however, 55 percent of non-Estonians, on the other hand, believe that this influence is great. The evaluations of the effect of the Estonia Committee are distributed approximately the same (47.5 percent of Estonians, "little," 47 percent of non-Estonians, "great"). Of the Estonian People's Front, 51 and 54 percent. That is, the figures almost coincide, but with diametrically opposite signals.

But both agree in one area—the evaluation of the destabilizing role of the Intermovement and the United Council of Labor Collectives. Although the "absolute values" differ here also. Some 86 percent of Estonians and 46 percent of non-Estonians have a sharply negative attitude toward the activity of the Intermovement and the United Council of Labor Collectives. In May (only the Intermovement was a part of the question at that time, it is true) only 29 percent of non-Estonians were negative in their evaluation of the activity of this group.

[Ivanov] And what is the attitude toward citizenship?

[Kuznetsov] This was for me the source of the biggest surprise. Let us examine the replies of the non-Estonian part of the respondents—inasmuch as it is they who are affected by this most. Only 29 percent of them believe that the absence of a law on citizenship is creating a strain in relations to a considerable extent. Approximately as many (27 percent), that it is doing so to a lesser extent. And 21 percent of those who took part in the questionnaire believe that this factor is not influencing the situation at all.

For comparison we will present the figures for the Estonian audience—in the same order: 41 percent and 34 and 11 percent.

In both groups, what is more, the number of those who answered "don't know" was relatively great. Thirteen and 17 percent respectively. Not a very heartening picture for the state based on the rule of law that we wish to build, you will agree.

The picture obtained upon the evaluation of Estonia's social future is disturbing. To the question: Are you afraid of losing your job in an independent Estonia, 54

percent of non-Estonians answered in the affirmative. Nor are the rest entirely confident that they will keep their jobs—such constitute 25 percent. At the same time, however, 69 percent of Estonians unconditionally believe that they would not be without work.

[Ivanov] Is what is meant here loss of work altogether or the current job or position? Specialty?

[Kuznetsov] The question on the poll sheet was not put in such detail.

It is interesting that if we go back briefly to the previous topic, a spread of opinions is obtained for those on whom primarily Estonian citizenship should be conferred. Of course, an absolute majority of Estonians polled (85 percent) are for former citizens of the Republic of Estonia (prior to 1940) and their direct descendants and heirs enjoying priority. But there is quite a number of people in favor of this option among the republic's Russian-speaking inhabitants also—33 percent. At the same time, however, a further 33 percent of representatives of this audience simply do not answer this question the way it is put....

The fact of having been born in Estonia is placed second among the priorities upon the acquisition of citizenship in both audiences (60.5 percent of Estonians and 34 percent of non-Estonians). And this is followed by residence qualifications alternatives—in descending order. But it is interesting that the "zero option" of citizenship (that is, for all who at the given moment have a permanent place of abode on the territory of the republic) is in one of the last places in terms of popularity among both Estonians and non-Estonians.

Although considerable variations are distinguished here also. And whereas 29 percent of non-Estonians "vote" for such an approach to citizenship in the republic as a whole, 56 percent do so in Narva. So the overall figure rises considerably thanks precisely to Narva.

[Ivanov] Artur Ivanovich, all these figures will most likely be published separately so we will not now cite any more—the reader has something to think about as it is. But what are the practical conclusions from what has been said (other than those drawn in the form of comments in the course of the conversation)?

[Kuznetsov] One of the first is confirmation of the particular position of Narva and the adjoining region. This was clear even before, but the poll data persuade us once again that a nonstandard approach to Narva is needed—up to and including the creation for this region of special status. There is nothing bad for the republic in this, the contrary even—if we wish to have a dependable factor of stability and prosperity (and not only in this region but in the republic generally), the government must take account of this particular feature. Which, incidentally, is being done—we have drawn up a special "Narva concept," it may be said, which contains an understanding of the differences of this city and its particular significance for Estonia.

[Ivanov] Yes, it really is more sensible, evidently, to determine a special status for Narva within the framework of a single national state than apply unifying pressure and thereby create a center of destabilization in both policy and the economy....

[Kuznetsov] Of course, during the recent visit of Edgar Savisaar, head of the government, to Narva (I also was part of the delegation) one participant in the meeting with deputies of the city soviet (I do not remember her name) declared with feminine emotion, but sincerely: "If you are saying to us Narva people: Let us act together for the good of the republic! we are for this. And all that is good that can be done for the republic and for all its inhabitants, we will do!"

...The second area in which the results of the study should find practical application is the legislative activity of the republic Supreme Soviet. Particularly in preparation of the draft citizenship act. After all, aside from the particular features about which we have already spoken, very many more were revealed in the course of the poll, and I intend in the next day or so to convey these results to Marju Lauristin, chairman of the commission preparing the bill.

...And, finally, I would like to mention one further point ascertained during the poll. This aspect is a cause for serious concern, and we cannot overlook the demographic moves which are being observed, in Tartu particularly. An aspiration to emigrate—among the non-Estonian population—may be clearly traced here. To the West, what is more. And it is people who are most loyal in respect of the Republic of Estonia, skilled specialists, as a rule, who intend leaving. A brain drain is hardly in our interests....

[Ivanov] Thank you for the interesting and substantive information. Let us work together on the solution of common problems.

[Kuznetsov] I subscribe to this wish.

RSFSR

Reportage Continues on Yeltsin's RSFSR Tour

Tours Tatarian Capital

PM1408094090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent M. Zapirov: "An Open Dialogue—B.N. Yeltsin's Working Tour of Russia Continues"]

[Text] Kazan—The itinerary for the tour by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, of the cities and villages of Tartaria was put together in such a way as to enable him to visit the autonomous republic's "hottest" sites in the economic, social, and cultural sphere, sites which require not only examination, but also

serious solutions. At meetings with the working people an open, principled, and keen dialogue about the future paths of economic reform, the democratization of society, and the solution of interethnic problems was held. In Almetyevsk City, the center of the oil region, B.N. Yeltsin visited teams of drillers and oil workers on the "Druzhba" pipeline, along which "black gold" from the Soviet fields has been pumped to the countries of West Europe for three decades now. The most critical question which oil workers and the head of the Russian parliament discussed together was why the prices for oil are lower than the cost of its extraction, why the owners of "black gold" live on humiliating state subsidies.

Another "hot spot" is Kamskiye Polyany settlement. Irreconcilable squabbles have been going on there for a long time now between the supporters of the construction of a nuclear power station and activists of the antinuclear society. The autonomous republic's government has adopted a decision to stop construction, but the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry is insisting on its continuation. It is essential to put a stop to this protracted conflict, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman was told.

Just as many problems were touched on by participants in the dialogue at the Kama Truck Plant in Naberezhnyye Chelny and at the building site of the Yelabuga Automobile Plant, both of which are awaited at home and abroad with impatience. Whereas the main thing in Naberezhnyye Chelny is the further growth in capacity and increase in output of trucks and the development of the city, whose infrastructure lags behind the inhabitants' spiritual needs, in Yelabuga it is necessary to move more quickly to develop construction work and erect industrial buildings and housing. After all, the first phase of the new automobile production line is due to produce output next year.

B.N. Yeltsin devoted the last day of his tour of Tartaria to the capital of the republic. He visited the shop floors of the Kazan Aviation Production Association, met the creative intelligentsia, and in the evening addressed citizens in the spacious hall of the sports and culture complex of Kazan State University.

The arrival of the head of the Russian parliament coincided with preparations for a session of the autonomous republic Supreme Soviet. The example of Russia, which has proclaimed its state sovereignty, has galvanized the autonomous republics. A plenum of the oblast party committee adopted a resolution approving the idea of political sovereignty. Alternative declarations of the republic's state sovereignty and a draft treaty between the USSR and Tartaria have been published in the local press. For this reason, at every meeting B.N. Yeltsin was asked questions about interethnic relations.

The next stops on B.N., Yeltsin's itinerary through Russia are Bashkiria, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East.

Visits Nuclear Power Station

PM1408092490 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent M. Merzabekov: "Meetings With Workers—B.N. Yeltsin's Visit to Bashkiria"]

[Text] Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]—The city of Neftekamsk, one of the youngest and most promising in Bashkiria, was the first in the republic to greet B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, 10 August. It was no accident that the choice fell on this city. The whole republic's attention is riveted on the Bashkir Nuclear Power Station which is being built here and the safety of which is causing serious fears in the population. A citywide referendum indicated that 99 percent of Neftekamsk's inhabitants say "no" to the nuclear power facility. A similar assessment was given by a social and scientific expert study conducted by the republic's leading specialists. The question of whether or not work should be continued was raised at an extraordinary session of the Bashkir ASSR Supreme Soviet.

It is well known that scientists assess the future of nuclear power far from uequivocally. The deputies will face a difficult task. But, of course, it is impossible not to heed the opinion of the citizens themselves in this.

B.N. Yeltsin visited the construction site, met with workers' and engineering and technical staff collectives, and made proposals about the future fate of the facility, the study of which will begin at the earliest date. It is planned to speed up the completion of the expert ecological report and to examine the possibility of redesignating the nuclear power station as a gas thermal power station, and in the event of negative results from this, to mothball the facility.

B.N. Yeltsin visited the "Bashselmash" association.

Arrives in Ufa 10 Aug

PM1408103090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Zinovyev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "B. Yeltsin in Bashkiria"]

[Text] Ufa—B.N. Yeltsin, who is on a working tour of Russia, arrived in Ufa 10 August after his visit to Tataria.

On the same day, the head of the Russian parliament went to the northwest of the republic, stopping off at the site of the nuclear power station under construction near the settlement of Agidel, where he spoke to workers employed in constructing it. Meetings were held with labor collectives at enterprises in Neftekamsk. There followed a visit to Sterlitamak.

Bashkiria is a very important petrochemical center. It is a region with a strong agro-industrial complex. The area sown to grain alone occupies almost 3 million hectares

here. But there are many problems in the republic's economic, social, and cultural development, whose resolution is being delayed by the obsolete system of hierarchical relations between the center and the autonomous formation, whose rights, meager as it is, are further reduced by the diktat of powerful Union departments. This situation is coming to an end. The public movement to raise the Bashkir Republic's status and grant it the rights of a Union republic has gained force. Three alternative drafts of a Declaration on its State Sovereignty have been published, and the question of adopting this document in the immediate future will be discussed at the Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session. These very questions are being discussed at the moment in conversations between the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet chairman and the working people, leaders, and people's deputies of Bashkiria.

"Our forefathers took a wise step nearly four and a half centuries ago when they and their fellow countrymen joined the Russian state," M. Rakhimov, chairman of the Bashkir ASSR Supreme Soviet, said. "During the centuries that went by, permanent ties between our people—economic, political, cultural, and simple human ties—formed and became strengthened. This is noted in the drafts of the declaration on the republic's state sovereignty. There Bashkiria is seen as a constituent [subyekt] of the Union and the Russian Federation. The republic advocates the renewal and constant improvement of the Soviet Federation as a Union of sovereign states.

The important subject of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the soviets and an optimum structure for their representative and executive organs, and increasing the efficiency of their work, is also being discussed. The republic soviets, for example, are managing to assign party committee buildings that are being freed because of a reduction in their apparatus, to medical, cultural and educational, and childrens' institutions, a large number of which are now in a disastrous state.

The deputies, together with journalists, are insistently raising the point that rayon and city newspapers—whose editorial offices and printing houses, incidentally, are maintained at the expense of the state budget—should no longer be considered party publications, but should be totally run by the appropriate soviets.

The ecological situation in the republic, which has recently become sharply exacerbated, also needs to be improved. Union government decisions on this subject have been adopted but this was not followed by the appropriate implementation of the outlined nature conservation and sanitary measures, which is causing great dissatisfaction among the population. The public is resolutely insisting that the construction of the Bashkir nuclear power station be stopped—its fate will be decided at the republic Supreme Soviet session, which will take place at the end of August.

Visits Pechora Coal Basin

LD1308175290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Excerpts] The tour of the republic by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, is continuing. Our special correspondent, Sergey Omelchenko, reports from Vorkuta:

[Omelchenko] This morning Boris Nikolayevich went down the oldest mine in the Pechora coal basin, the Yuzhnaya. [passage omitted]

Today the miners are holding counsel. They discuss with the head of the Russian parliament ways to get out of the situation that has taken shape in which the Pechora coal industry has found itself. Following the declaration of Russia's sovereignty Min-ugle-prom completely lost any kind of influence on the republic's coal industry, and now it is not clear to the miners who will implement the promises of decision no. 608, that unfortunately well-known decision. This question now arises because the miners still do not have full independence. They say that if they have independence then they need no kind of help. They will cope themselves with their problems. People also have a poor understanding of what a controlled market means—who will control it, and who will not be allowed to control it. [passage omitted]

Boris Nikolayevich attentively hears things out, registers each request, each pain of the soil, but he makes no promises. He promises only: Be free, be free. Manage your business yourselves. Learn how to manage effectively and then things will be successful. He urges everyone to do this. In general the miners here receive this in a completely positive way.

Tomorrow the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will be discussing the problems of Komi Republic in Syktyvkar, and then his road lies in the direction of Sverdlovsk, the Urals. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's trip is continuing.

Visits Vorkuta Coal Mine

LD1308190190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 13 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The visit by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin around the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is continuing. Take a look at the reportage by our correspondent from Vorkuta.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Kuznetsov] [video shows Yeltsin accompanied by various officials in the open air. It then shows him indoors wearing a miner's hat and overalls indoors, and then again outdoors where he is surrounded by reporters and answers their questions] One cannot help but be surprised at the tirelessness of the leader of the Russian parliament in his trip around the federation. Well, in Vorkuta, having arrived

during the night, he began his working day at 0730. At Yuzhnaya, the oldest and most neglected pit, there was an in-depth conversation on the ways of carrying out the market economy program in mining. Boris Nikolayevich went down a draft and was acquainted with the miners' working conditions.

[Yeltsin] I am a physical person, rather strong, and have been working permanently 20 hours a day, so to speak, for many years now, and well, nothing's wrong, I'm bearing up to it. But well, not here, I don't envy those who work (?in the pits). It's very hard work, and then, it's an old pit, well, and there are additional difficulties there in connection with that, but, of course, one somehow simply feels oneself awkward and uncomfortable over the fact that what was promised to the miners has not been carried out.

[Kuznetsov] In the second half of the day, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin visited the Vorgashorskaya pit which is operating in conditions of complete independence; then he went to miners' settlements, and had meetings with working people, and with leaders of the city, urban workers and with the strike committee. [Video shows street scene and then shows Yeltsin descending from a bus and then on the rostrum inside a hall filled to capacity. The correspondent addresses the following question to Yeltsin] What if suddenly there's another strike in Russia? What is your attitude to a strike?

[Yeltsin] That's the business of the collectives. [end recording]

More on Promises to Miners

LD1308211590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 13 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The future of the Union is now being determined by relations between the republics, but the future of Russia is being determined to the same degree by what path the so-called small peoples of Russia will take. Will their energy and wealth become the basis of Russian unity, or will the democratic processes on the fringes explode this Union within a Union from within? This is well understood by the new leadership of the Russiain Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. This is why Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is currently in Vorkuta.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Kuznetsov] We visited the Yuzhnaya and Vorgashorskaya pits and went down to the long face, where he became directly acquainted with the miners' working conditions. He visited the miners' settlements, many of which have preserved the gloomy appearance of the ancestral lands of the Gulag. He visited the town workers' strike committee.

[Yeltsin] Of course, it is very hard work and, of course, it is an old pit and there are additional difficulties in this connection, but, of course, one simply feels awkward and uncomfortable that what was promised to the miners has not been carried out. It is shameful, and if Ryzhkov is incapable or unwilling to carry out the decisions, Russia will take them upon itself.

[Kuznetsov] What conclusions have you drawn at the end of the first stage of your trip?

[Yeltsin] I would not hurry with my conclusions yet. This has to be very carefully analyzed and weighed up and there simply has not been time. My program starts at six or seven, and ends at midnight. Therefore I can only say one thing: that in order to lead Russia you have to look at it both from within and from below.

[Kuznetsov] The 500-day countdown has started. What do you think now?

[Yeltsin] It will start in September, when the program is established. [video shows Yeltsin on walking tour, at meetings, speaking to camera] [end recording]

Visits Sverdlovsk During Tour

LD1408101390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] The working tour of Russia by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, continues. Yesterday he familiarized himself with Vorkuta. In the morning Yeltsin visited the Yuzhnaya pit, and in the afternoon the biggest pit in the basin, Vorgashorskaya. In the evening he met representatives of the working people, in Vorkuta's biggest theater.

Today, the chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet flew from Vorkuta to Sverdlovsk. On the way he made a short stop in Syktyvkar, the capital of Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where he acquainted himself with the town and had a conversation with the leaders of the autonomous republic. They discussed problems related to the further economic development of Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and, specifically, the creation of a free economic zone.

After Sverdlovsk, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is to visit Nizhnyy Tagil, Pervouralsk, and Novokuznetsk.

Sverdlovsk Transport Stages Warning Strike

LD1408115690 Moscow TASS in English 1032 GMT 14 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[Text] Sverdlovsk August 14 TASS—Tram and trolleybus drivers in Sverdlovsk, a Ural city of 1.5 million, staged a brief warning strike this morning, demanding higher pay, better housing, longer leave and a lower pension age. In most trades in the Soviet Union at present, men retire at 60 and women at 55.

City council officials assured the strikers that their problems would be dealt with on a planned basis, beginning this year. Not everyone, however, took those statements on trust. Some transport workers pin their hopes for solutions on Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who arrives in the city today.

Silayev Discusses New RSFSR Government

90UN2512A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 30, Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, by correspondent Ye. Sosnin; place and date of interview not given: "Assignment: First Interview with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers"—first two paragraphs are paper's introduction]

[Text] **In the middle of June the previous government of the Russian Federation relinquished its authority. At a session of the republic Supreme Soviet on the same day a new chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers Presidium was installed—Ivan Stepanovich Silayev.**

Three weeks later he proposed a draft of the structure of the future cabinet for the consideration of the people's deputies and named his candidates for ministers. Today the Russian government (to be sure, not yet complete) has begun to carry out its duties. What course will the republic national economy pursue? The head of the government of the RSFSR, Ivan Silayev, discusses this with our correspondent.

[Sosnin] Ivan Stepanovich! In your preelection program you focused especially on the program for the rebirth of Russia and its state sovereignty. To what extent does the structure of the new government correspond to this task?

[Silayev] The structure of the government which was approved at the session of the republic Supreme Soviet, in my view, corresponds rather fully to the goals that were set. For example, a block of committees have been created which are called upon to carry out the economic reforms. And without this, rebirth is simply unthinkable.

The new government has a state committee for land reform. Its creation is linked to much that is to be done in the restoration of rural areas. And through this—the restoration of Russia. There is a completely new subdivision: the state committee for antimonopoly policy and support of the new economic structures. A state committee has appeared for administration of state property. Its main goal is release of state control in the sphere of public production. The structure of the state government also includes such a structure as a state committee for nationalities affairs.

We have very serious intentions of expanding interactions on this plane with all social organizations. In particular we intend to establish good contacts with Patriarch of All Russia Aleksey. We have an agreement for the church also to participate in our program entitled "Health of the Nation."

In a word, the structure of the government and the program of action for Russia are oriented toward increasing state sovereignty. But also clearly expressed in the structure is a desire to do everything in keeping with the principles of the new economic relations.

[Sosnin] Quite recently in the republic Supreme Soviet, figuratively speaking, passions raged—there was a discussion and approval of candidates for the government. On what principles were their nominations based?

[Silayev] Above all, professional training and competence. And second. Since very bold transformations are needed now, it is also necessary to have bold people who are inclined toward revolution. And this is typical of youth. They do not carry the burden of past stereotypes. Young people aspire to the new and take risks more decisively.

The candidates were chosen on the basis of these criteria. And if one looks at the average age of the established members of the government it is in the range of 45 years. The finance minister, for example, is 32 and the justice minister is a contemporary of his. One of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers is 37. At the same time these are people who are professionally trained and have a solid amount of practical experience under their belts.

The candidates were chosen on a competitive basis. We took this path: With the help of experts we evaluated the human qualities and, according to a number of tests, the ability to be a leader in each of the people running.

[Sosnin] That is, you used a scientific approach.

[Silayev] Yes. We invited scholars from the three leading institutes and created a very good team, and practically the candidates were passed through this kind of filter. After that all those who were recommended to run passed a test for maturity in the commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet.

[Sosnin] Ivan Stepanovich, it would be interesting to know how great the spread in points was between those who scored the highest and those who scored the lowest on the test.

[Silayev] We have these figures. And sometimes the spread was fairly large. And tests having to do with human emotions and evaluations of their professional qualities according to the branch principle were conducted separately. Here we encountered this situation: In terms of professional qualities the candidate would receive the highest rating but in terms of individual qualities—the lowest. An ironclad rule was adopted: If a person received a negative rating his candidacy was immediately withdrawn from consideration.

I think that this approach to selecting candidates helped us very much. For people must be evaluated comprehensively and objectively. We weeded out many candidates who had fairly good resumes. But that is clearly not enough today. This is why we intend to staff the second part of the government in the same way.

[Sosnin] Incidentally, about the second part of the government. Why was only half of it selected in the first round? Is this perhaps a tactical move?

[Silayev] I must say that it took 18 days to develop the structure of the government. And during the course of the discussion it was necessary to adjust it, I would say, in the direction of certain concessions. For initially it was formed strictly according to the functional principle and was very compact. But when discussion began it was necessary to change certain things.

[Sosnin] This is apparently the way the Ministry of Communications appeared.

[Silayev] Quite right. Initially this subdivision was not included in the structure of the government. But it was necessary to look for a compromise.

Actually, the selection of candidates took only eight days. But nonetheless half of the government was confirmed. Although we were not able to staff the block for social problems. The posts of the ministers of culture and public health remain vacant. We could not find worthy candidates. For instance, medial experts suggested several people themselves. We began to consider them and found out that the people were not sufficiently prepared for these large and responsible jobs.

[Sosnin] Candidates are now being selected. Have the range of candidates and the area for searching for them not been expanded?

[Silayev] Of course. When we summed up the results of the first round of elections we saw certain shortcomings. The geographical area for the search was fairly small. It was mainly Moscow. The composition of the government did not sufficiently reflect the ethnic composition of the peoples of Russia. So far we have no nonparty members. The search is in progress now, but taking all these aspects into account.

[Sosnin] You advise in favor of granting all enterprises the right to freely withdraw from the branch administration and independently choose their organizational structures and forms of property. Will this not have a negative effect on the entire national economy of the country and the republic in particular?

[Silayev] In the first place, we cannot stop the changes in the structures caused by the direction in which we are proceeding—toward a market economy. Departmental jurisdiction even of large enterprises, and I am firmly convinced of this, is incompatible with administration under the conditions of the market and therefore today we are no longer speaking about some change in jurisdictions. In this case—the Russian government. The enterprises must be economically independent.

The role of the government is to regulate the direction of their activity and stimulate various branches of the national economy through taxes and benefits. For this is the way the entire world does it and it is about time for us to reach this level.

[Sosnin] Ivan Stepanovich, since we have already touched on the question of changing over to market relations, tell us, please, how you envision this process in the refraction of the economic and social interests of the population of Russia.

[Silayev] I shall not talk about monopolies or the system of social protection of underprivileged citizens. A good deal has already been said about this. The main thing now is to skillfully carry out all that has been earmarked. There are two circumstances which must be taken into account now. The main thing is to balance well the material support for the entire production sphere of service. In a word, the entire national economy. And especially in the social direction.

The second thing is to provide for the necessary reserves. Difficult as it may be for us, we must concentrate our reserves, especially food and consumer goods. We must aim for that. Although I as a machine builder am in favor of acquiring equipment and technology abroad, now is not the right time. If we do not fill the market our situation will be unpredictable. Prices will simply soar and the shadow economy will take over everything. This is why we need a selection of certain goods and a reserve of them during the first months of market relations. Only this step will make it possible to control prices and normalize both demand and prices. And here we cannot do without support and foreign loans.

[Sosnin] The Russian Federation accounts for about half the agricultural products produced in the country. But something else is also known. While having an immense potential, the republic's agriculture operates much below its capabilities. The numerous attempts to give it new impetus, unfortunately, have not produced the desired results. How do you regard this problem and what do you see as the way out of the prolonged crisis in agriculture?

[Silayev] It is now absolutely clear that previously we did the rural areas out of a great deal of their fair share. Our national economy was strongly militarized and priority was always given to the defense branches. Hence such poor development of agriculture. But the main thing is that economic relations developed in rural areas in such a way that the producer was not interested in good final results of his work. Man was separated from his product and the means of production. Therefore in order to bring agriculture out of its impasse we need radical measures for improving economic relations and actually changing over to a variety of forms of ownership.

[Sosnin] What is your viewpoint on the prospects for the development of farming? With new forms of management in rural areas will it be possible to change the situation with food resources?

[Silayev] Let us recall our recent history. As early as the beginning of the sixties the rural residents produced on their farmsteads a sufficient quantity of products to feed two-thirds of the population just from this source. But then the private sector was greatly cut back. Even a cow had to be turned over to the public sector. In other words, we must not ignore the experience of those years. And if today the rural worker were equipped with modern technologies and highly productive equipment, I have no doubt that the farms would add a great deal to the republic's food resources. True, one must take into account that at this point the farmer cannot get along without cooperation, and it should be extensive and extend to all areas. So I believe in the farming economy. But I must say that without state support, of course, it will not gather enough momentum.

[Sosnin] Russia is a republic where dozens of nations and nationalities live. Many problems and contradictions have accumulated both in the RSFSR as a whole and in individual krays, oblasts, and territorial-national formations: economic, social, demographic, and more. What position do all these issues occupy in the activity of the republic government?

[Silayev] In my view, interethnic relations are one of the most complicated problems today. If you fail to take something into acccunt in this delicate matter, you will see that it will end up in tragedy. The structure of the Russian government includes the corresponding subdivision for problems of interethnic relations. We are also thinking about creating a committee for federation affairs. And this means that representatives of all autonomous and territorial formations will be delegated to it so that they can solve all these difficult problems together.

In addition to this the republic has a number of regions, especially in the northern part, where social neglect, the misfortune of the people, and the serious ecological situation are being felt especially keenly. All this must be resolved immediately. This is why we envision drawing up serious programs for the development of the northern regions. A state committee for the socioeconomic development of the north has been formed especially for these purposes.

[Sosnin] And apparently also for ecological problems.

[Silayev] To a certain degree, ecological problems as well. Although in the government there is to be a whole block of subdivisions for ecological problems. We have also introduced the position of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers for ecology and the utilization of nature.

[Sosnin] Previously foreign economic activity was mainly the prerogative of the Union organs. Now the RSFSR has its own Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties. How do you envision this direction of its work?

[Silayev] First of all I would like to recall that in the documents of the 28th CPSU Congress there is a section devoted to the role and status of the Union. It considers the problems of our country's governmental structure in a new way. And the interpretation is this: Now it is not a union of republics but a union of states. Consequently there must be a new Union agreement and also all the institutions of authority for carrying on normal activity, including foreign economic. As concerns Russia and its rebirth, I think the foreign economic policy should be fundamentally different from what it was.

[Sosnin] That is, one could say that all the foreign economic activity conducted by the regions and individual enterprises on the territory of the RSFSR will now be conducted under the aegis of the republic?

[Silayev] Yes. Actually, once an enterprise becomes economically independent it should have the same independence in foreign political activity. And the results of labor should be returned to the producer. Including in hard currency if the commodity is sold abroad. Only regulations between the Union and republic budgets will be regulated.

[Sosnin] The government will have to deal with many problems: grain, metal, transportation... And there is one other aspect of the activity—the spiritual sphere. There are many defects today. What does the republic government have in mind in order to halt further deterioration of our spiritual condition.

[Silayev] I shall say right out that the low level of culture bothers me very much. Recently I saw the film "We Cannot Go On Like This." The creators of this picture managed to show clearly, especially in the first part, how far we have sunk. Although on the whole I do not agree with the film. But how our spiritual level has declined and what this leads to are grasped precisely in the film.

As the head of the state I wish to assure people: The program for its activity which we will have to develop in the near future will include serious measures for the spiritual development of the peoples living in the RSFSR.

We must do everything necessary to return the people to the sources of their spirituality. For all this has always been there, but in recent years it has been severely shaken.

There will be a reform of the higher school. We intend to improve in the most radical way the status of the teacher, the physician, the engineer, and the cultural worker. For today can one look indifferently at how skilled personnel and intelligentsia are moving abroad because they cannot find possibilities for their intellectual self-expression at home?

We suggest completing the creation of the Russian Academy of Sciences as quickly as possible. We are

trying to help the republic Academy of Arts, which is being restored by the eminent artist I. Glazunov.

I have already mentioned my meeting with Patriarch Aleksey. So the church has expressed a desire to participate in this noble work. And not only by serving believers. The church intends to make its contribution to the restoration of rural areas.

I understand that the process of the spiritual renewal of the people is long and difficult. But in spite of the difficulties it cannot be put off for another day.

[Sosnin] Allow me to ask one more question. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has been created. How do you envision the relations between the republic government and the party organ?

[Silayev] The government is an organ for managing the national economy. The Central Committee is an organ for managing the party. We must proceed from these positions. The more so since a multiparty system has now been declared in the republic and any party must respect the laws. And the Council of Ministers, being the organ of executive and management power, enforces the laws made by the republic's highest organ—the Supreme Soviet. Our relations with the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party should also be based on this. As a communist, naturally, I support the party program and rules and have consented to join the CPSU Central Committee. But as the head of state of the republic I must say that observance and enforcement of the laws of the high organ of power come first.

[The following two paragraphs appear in the middle of the item next to photograph of Silayev]

I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers

Pages from his biography: He was born in 1930 and is a Russian. He has a higher education: In 1954 he graduated from the Kazan Aviation Institute. He is a CPSU member, a Lenin Prize holder, and a Hero of Socialist Labor.

He began his career as a senior control foreman, chief of the bureau of shop control, and chief of the plant technical bureau. From 1959 through 1974 he was a shop chief, deputy production chief, deputy chairman of the plant trade union committee, deputy head engineer, head engineer, and director of the aviation plant. During 1974-1980 he worked as deputy and first deputy minister of the USSR aviation industry. In 1980-1981 he was minister of the USSR machine tool and tool building industry. From 1981 through 1985 he was minister of the USSR aviation industry. Since October 1985 he has been deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers for machine building.

Prokofyev Addresses Moscow Party Aktiv

90UN2535A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by A. Osinskiy under the general rubric "Yesterday at the Sociopolitical Center of the Moscow City and Oblast Committees of the CPSU": "Anticommunism—A Real Danger"]

[Text] **How is the CPSU to act under these conditions? This was the subject of discussion at a meeting of the first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee], Yu.A. Prokofyev, with the city party aktiv devoted to the results of the 28th party congress and the preparations for the second stage of the city party conference.**

To what extent has the congress justified our predictions and hopes? This question, Yu.A. Prokofyev noted at the very beginning of his speech, is undoubtedly being asked by each one of us. The predictions were most contradictory. A split and mass withdrawal from the party were predicted. These did not happen. After the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] it was established that the conservatives would win at the CPSU congress. But that did not happen either.

The basic question is whether the congress managed to overcome the way the democratic processes in the party lag behind the changes taking place in the renewed society. It would seem that the party did not take truly leading positions in the radical political reform. But the arrears in the rates of democratization were essentially reduced. The congress showed that it is possible and necessary to change from long speeches to creativity.

The congress documents and above all the program declaration, party regulations, the resolution for the political report of the Central Committee, and a number of other extremely important resolutions, including "On CPSU Policy in Conducting the Economic Reform and Changing Over to Market Relations," are fairly radical and reflect the current condition of the party, and their successful implementation, one might say with a great deal of confidence, will enable it to surmount the crisis.

Yu.A. Prokofyev noted that the position paper of the Moscow city party organization exerted an essential influence on the program declaration adopted by the congress and was also reflected in the resolutions. The same thing can be said about the proposals for the party regulations made by the Moscow party organization, although not all of them were adopted. But the main thing is that the new regulations create the possibilities necessary for democratization of party life and further rejuvenation of the party, they give the broadest authority to the local party organizations, and they significantly expand the rights of CPSU members. It is also obvious that we have a basically new Central Committee—new in terms of personal and social composition and in terms of positions. The new approach to forming the Politburo and the new distribution of duties among

the secretaries of the Central Committee confirm that getting away from the "state party" concept is imminent and the process of transferring power at the level of central organs from the party to the state is being completed.

During the course of discussion before the congress in Moscow, principally new factors were defined in the democratization of the party—horizontal structures: a conference of secretaries of local party organizations and the Democratic and Marxist platforms.

The congress of the RSFSR Communist Party evoked contradictory and largely negative evaluations. The congress completed its task of founding the party but its course clearly revealed the lack of understanding by some of the delegates of the processes taking place in society and an adherence to a dogmatic interpretation of Marxist theory. Communists, including Muscovites, are faced with a serious problem: to be a catalyst for democratic processes in the RSFSR Communist Party.

Continuation of radical changes in the socioeconomic base and the transition to market relations—such is the choice made by the 28th CPSU Congress. But there is a real danger on this path: We are already being engulfed by a wave of ideological polemic, personal ambitions, and populist slogans. It will be necessary to solve two problems: to consolidate the party and to consolidate society. These problems are very similar and yet very different from one another. The process of rejuvenation of the party is very hard and complex. Pressure on the CPSU from both the left and right is increasing and the extremes are coming together on the soil of common pathological anticommunism. A recent (15 July) demonstration which was of a clearly antiparty nature is indicative.

Only one thing can counteract attacks on the CPSU: a positive alternative at each stage, for each issue, and at all levels, achieving civil harmony and consolidation of the party. This is even more important because the "Moscow ultras" are attacking CPSU policy more and more vigorously, playing into the hands of anticommunist forces, and trying to join them together into a united front thus undermining perestroyka in the society. It is here and not in illusory conspiracies from the right and left that I see the real danger.

"What can help the CPSU in perestroyka and why is it necessary in general? This is one of the main issues raised by our critics and opponents," Yu.A. Prokofyev said.

The collectivist psychology has deep historical roots in USSR society and even now it continues to be an influential motive for economic activity. Public opinion polls show that the majority of workers give preference to various collective forms when speaking of withdrawal of state ownership of property. Hence the predictable conclusion arrived at by the 28th congress concerning the need for political cells in the labor collectives.

The field of activity of the party organization as a guarantee of the protection of the socialist option is changing radically. These are only a couple of the main functions. The central political and ideological line is elimination of the alienation of the workers from the means of production and from participation in the control and distribution of incomes. An object of special concern is the development and support of the principles of collectivism and self-management. And undoubtedly protection of the social interests of the workers and their rights in production.

The party values highly the political direction of our intelligentsia and its intellectual and creative contribution to perestroyka. But still we cannot but mention that certain of our intellectual leaders have remained for an unjustifiably long time is the stage of public denunciations. Nonetheless the party gorkom is firmly counting on an active civic position on the part of the intelligentsia in the development of social accord around true spiritual values and the goals of perestroyka.

But first of all one must speak of a force that is capable of deciding the outcome of the political struggle and influencing the political solution at any level—this is the worker movement. We must emphasize quite clearly once again that the CPSU is interested in its rebirth. Unless this immense creative potential is put into action there will be no changeover to an effective modern economy. At the same time one cannot but see both the complexity and the contradiction of the process of the emergence of the worker movement.

Yu.A. Prokofyev devoted a considerable amount of attention in his speech to the activity of local party organizations under current conditions and the long-range and immediate tasks of communists of the capital in the socioeconomic sphere, the arrangement of a close, fruitful interaction between the party and the soviets at all levels, the determination of the new structure of the party gorkom and its apparatus, and questions of the forthcoming reports and issues related to the second stage of the city party conference. The opinion was expressed that in keeping with the proposals of the local and rayon party organizations, it would be expedient to conduct the second stage of the city party conference at the end of October; that is, after the completion of the reports and elections in the majority of local party organizations. This will make it possible to approach the development of a program of action in a more detailed way and take into account as much as possible the proposals from communists concerning the candidacies in the electoral organs of the Moscow city party organization.

After his speech Yu.A. Prokofyev answered a number of questions.

How does the party gorkom view the multiparty system at the enterprises?

We have not yet encountered this phenomenon at our enterprises. If one takes the practice of work abroad, one

can observe this in France and in Austria as well. There many enterprises have several party organizations and these enterprises are operating normally. None of the party organizations or cells have functions involving power and they do not interfere with business activity. For example, in Austria I visited a plant where about 2,000 people work. It has six parties. The largest cell is that of the Communist Party.

How will the reorganization of the party apparatus take place in the party gorkom and raykoms [rayon committees]?

In 1988 the apparatus of the city party committee consisted of 347 people. We reduced it to 217. The gorkom's apparatus now has 176. That is, the apparatus is shrinking. The same thing is true in the party raykoms. But were are not speaking just about reducing the number of people employed in the apparatus. The main thing is to change its functions. From the branch principle of oversight to functions of recommendation and functions of studying and proposing methods of party work.

What is the gorkom's position with respect to possibly dividing up party property?

The property of the CPSU would have had to be divided up if a new party had been formed at the congress. Now certain representatives of the Democratic Platform are posing the problem clearly: not to leave the CPSU until they have created another party within it so they can lay claim to part of the property. A fairly clever position. And if one takes the city party organization, then except for the buildings of the rayon and city party committees and the premises of the Moscow Higher Party School, there is nothing special—neither sanatoriums, nor hospitals, nor polyclinics about which people talk so much.

Some of the leaders of the Democratic Platform announced at the congress that they were withdrawing from the party and called upon their allies to follow their example. Now representatives of the Democratic Platform are involved in activity which contradicts the CPSU Regulations. What measures will be taken?

If you mean that some measures should be taken "from above," not to mention expulsion from the party, that is a manifestation of the old thinking. According to the new regulations, only the local party organization can expel people from the party. So if communists violate the party regulations and if their actions are incompatible with being in the party, the measures must be taken by the local party organization.

Do you share the opinion of Ye. Ligachev that the CPSU is not divided into conservatives and radicals?

No, I do not. Not only in the CPSU but also in the relatively recently formed Democratic and Marxist platforms there are people who think differently and there are different groups and trends.

One question followed on the heels of another. The second hour of the meeting came to an end. "Shall we take a break or continue?" asked the leader. The people in the hall voted: "Continue."

Travkin on Coalition of Democratic Parties

90UN2566A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 90 p 1

[Report on interview with N. Travkin, USSR and RSFSR people's deputy and chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, by S. Kiselev; place and date of interview not given: "We Need to Get Going Rather Than Puff Out Our Cheeks"]

[Text] *We reported that, first of all, four "newborn" political parties united in a single bloc "Democratic Alliance" (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 July); second, an appeal to Western governments calling on them to refrain from giving the USSR economic aid was the first action of the "Democratic Alliance" (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 July).*

Nikolay Travkin, USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy and chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, soon called the editorial office and declared: First, his party does not belong to any "Democratic Alliance," second, neither he personally nor the Democratic Party of Russia Board subscribe to the statement of the "alliance" made in their name.

We suggested to meet and "clear the air."

...But You Must Obey

N. Travkin began his "critique": "Indeed, at one of the meetings of the Democratic Party of Russia Board it was mentioned that a meeting of several parties was being organized, and it would be good to take part in it. We consented to the participation of our representative in the meeting; however, I repeat that familiarization was the only object. Then I suddenly found out from your newspaper that the Democratic Party belongs to some alliance, and from the next issue—that the 'Democratic Alliance' adopted some declaration in our name."

[Kiselev] This means that your representative exceeded his authority.

[Travkin] Yes. The party has made no decision on joining any bloc, nor were any assignments given concerning a declaration on behalf of the party.

[Kiselev] That is to say, you are dealing with a violation of party discipline. I am curious about what new parties do in such a situation. Do you "point this out" to the transgressor or do you reprimand him with an entry in his personal file, as is the custom in the CPSU?

[Travkin] On one occasion, we already considered this issue—when one of the rank-and-file party members went to Lithuania and made a statement there on behalf

of the entire party. We agreed at the time that only the chairman and his deputies have such powers; in cases of, shall we say, a delicate nature, even the chairman should state his views as his own. Indeed, we are going to review this episode regarding our "joining" the "Democratic Alliance" at the next meeting of the Democratic Party of Russia Board. However, I would like to stress that we are a parliamentary party. We have neither personal discipline cases nor monthly meetings that review such cases. However, "organizational measures" up to and including expulsion may follow in the event of violating moral norms and deviating from integrity with regard to the party.

So, all of this is clear. Despite Travkin failing to speak the words about the notorious "democratic centralism," I believe it is still clear that at issue is exactly democratic centralism or one of the modifications of this principle, that is, you do not have to agree but you must obey. Party discipline in the new party is also built on the principle of the subordination of a minority to a majority and on special powers of the democratically elected center (board), and in the future—on the powers of the general meeting of the primary structure.

So, do we have yet another centralized party here? However, N. Travkin himself calls it differently—"strict."

A Big Amorphous Blob

[Kiselev] So, Nikolay Ivanovich, does it mean that by distancing yourselves from "Democratic Alliance" you come out against the unification of democrats in principle?

[Travkin] No, it does not. There is a very acute need for a unified bloc of leftist forces. If we succeeded at present in uniting democratic forces we would go through stage after stage painfully, because national accord would be the result of such unification. However, this is not the foremost task. Of course, we can sit down at a roundtable right now and puff out our cheeks: Supposedly, we represent such and such a party. All of this is nonsense! So far, we do not have a single party which has gotten on its feet and represents a force. Several dozen parties have made their presence known, held conferences and congresses, and this is it. Now they have to get going; pedestrian work on organizing party structures is necessary. This is the main task.

[Kiselev] If memory serves, it was exactly with regard to this foremost task that a conflict flared up at the constituent conference of your party.

[Travkin] Indeed. Some people argued that we should not create a strict party, that the party should allow a "democratic slack," some permissible amorphousness (when people join and quit at will) and should not have any kind of internal discipline, that ultimately we should get something akin to a somewhat disciplined people's front. The second point of view was that all resources should be committed to creating strong points of the party in all regions of the RSFSR. These may be action groups consisting of five people. Let them become organizational committees with 15 members tomorrow, and, finally, regional organizations of 180 to 300 people will appear. A system of roots will emerge—fine! This is how we will get on our feet and amount to a serious political force.

[Kiselev] That is to say, you disagreed on tactics. In principle, nobody has come out against an alliance of democratic forces, and the debate is only about how to create this alliance and what to join it with. It is one matter when clearly delineated parties, which are aware of their league and real influence on society, set up an alliance, and quite a different matter when democratic movements which have neither structure nor internal discipline do so.

[Travkin] Correct. Most likely, the "Democratic Alliance" is yet another attempt (not the first one by now) to assemble an influential team, in which I did not take part, being convinced that this is a futile scheme. You cannot assemble several amorphous parties which do not yet amount to anything around a round table and say—this is an alliance of democratic forces. This is swindling. The sum of amorphous parts is not a bloc but just a big amorphous blob.

[Kiselev] You are saying: Let us unite in blocs once we become serious political forces. However, a serious political force should enjoy, at a minimum, support from above on top of support from below. I mean party factions in parliaments.

[Travkin] This is a separate aspect of the issue. Indeed, a faction is the reflection of a party in parliament. Factions operate on the basis of a party program and internal discipline in the course of voting, as when the head of the faction knows what number of votes he can count on having on specific issues, i.e., once again we are talking about rigid structures, whose representatives may conduct negotiations and come to an agreement. This is parliamentarism, whereas what we tried to accomplish through the blocs of democratic movements is amateurish. Look at the bloc "Democratic Russia." Whether in the Moscow Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet, or at the Russian congress, it only managed to act once as a parliamentary faction—in the election of the chairman. This is it. Like-minded people could not be found on any other issue.

This is why I favor the following tactic: First, let us do pedestrian work on creating a party, then fight for a party faction in the parliament, and only at last create alliances.

This point is also absolutely clear by now. A single huge unicellular organism, which is what our political system was for many years, should finally embark on the path of evolution. This means division. Only sophisticated multicellular organisms are capable of surviving in a continuously changing environment. This is the case in biology;

however, it is exactly the same in politics. Democratization means a path from amorphous, amoeba-like totalitarianism to a structured, multicellular parliamentarianism.

We Are Friends, But What About Money?

[Kiselev] What is your position with regard to the appeal from the "Democratic Alliance" to the governments of the West to refrain from giving economic aid to the USSR?

[Travkin] Such statements cannot be made in one or two phrases without rhyme or reason. The country is ruined and almost on the brink of famine. There are regions in which they do not even have goods to cover ration card allocations. There are children who have suffered from Chernobyl and whom we cannot send for treatment because there is no money. Suddenly these eccentrics refuse to accept help. This is how the statement is perceived, and it cannot cause anything but irritation. Still, I would take a broader view of this issue.

If loans are at issue, I am categorically against them being given to the Union government. Why?

The first reason. We still do not have any guarantees that these loans will not settle on gun barrels and will not turn into missiles.

The second reason. Borrowing is no big deal, but who will pay it back? Even now the Union is "weighted down" by a 50 billion external debt. When I happened to discuss this topic with the leadership of other republics, they answered: "We did not borrow this money!" This is as far as old debts are concerned. With regard to new credits, they declared: Supposedly, we have nothing to do with it; therefore, if you want them yourselves get them, but leave us out of it. I have an apprehension that all the new debts of the Union government and a large segment of the old ones will be hung around the neck of Russia alone. This is why as a deputy of Russia and a member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium I categorically object to the Union government increasing our foreign debt without the knowledge and participation of the republics.

[Kiselev] Wait a moment. After all, at issue is nonrepayable aid rather than credit...

[Travkin] Indeed, these are purely human motives. They want to help us, and I vote "in favor" with both hands. However, once again, the money should not be given to a Union government which, with all due respect, I do not believe to be sober-minded. If you want to help, here are the children affected by Chernobyl, here is Nizhniy Tagil dying an ecological death, here is the semistarving non-Chernozem area. Please invest! Help local soviets solve specific problems, thus improving the situation of the people. The soviets will not squander the money.

Therefore, I am not against nonrepayable aid; I merely refer to a mechanism for its transfer and monitoring.

On this issue, Nikolay Travkin and I did not clear things up. I, for one, know where the guarantee is that the new loans will not settle "on gun barrels." They are found in the anger of our undernourished and poorest people. One has to be suicidal in order to play with the matches of new armaments while sitting on the powder keg of mass consciousness aroused by endless rallies. We may doubt many of the traits of our government, but not its sense of self-preservation.

The issue of the foreign debt is more complex. No matter how convincing the "common sense" arguments are which have always been Travkin's forte, this issue may be ultimately resolved only by the signatures of the empowered representatives of republics under the Union treaty. I believe that there will be complete clarity then: Who will ultimately pay the bills of exchange, to whom, in what amount, and for what needs. For now, we are merely counting the chickens before they are hatched.

P.S. After the interview with Democratic Party of Russia Chairman Nikolay Travkin was already prepared for publication the editorial office received a letter from the Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Its topic was the same: The Constitutional Democrats reported that they had learned from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA to their extreme surprise that their party had supposedly joined the "Democratic Alliance." They explained: Another person speaks using our name to advertise his quasi-political activities.

Everything became confused...

Bakatin Attends Internal Affairs Collegium

PM1408113490 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) Ministry of Internal Affairs Collegium"]

[Text] Results of the work of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] internal affairs organs in the first half of 1990 and their short-term tasks were discussed at a collegium of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs which took place 9 August.

Council of Ministers Chairman I.S. Silayev and USSR Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin participated in the collegium's work.

RSFSR's Isakov Receives 'Moldovan' Delegation

PM1408104090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Moscow Meeting"]

[Text] A meeting took place on 7 August in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets between V.B. Isakov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic, and a Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] delegation which

included Moldovan SSR People's Deputies I.G. Borshevich, P.I. Muntyanu, and M.N. Patrash, and S.V. Maksimilian, representative of the republic's government.

Participants in the meeting considered questions associated with the elaboration of a new Union treaty, the prospects for economic cooperation between the republics, and ensuring social guarantees and legal protection for citizens.

Reform of RSFSR Banking System Discussed

904A0506A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jul 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Yu. Voronin, doctor of economic sciences and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Budgets, Plans, Taxes, and Prices, and O. Tarasov, chairman of the board of the Russian Bank of the USSR State Bank, by unidentified SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent; place and date not given: "On the Russian Account"]

[Text] **The resolution "On the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Bank and Banks on the Territory of the Republic" adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and published in our newspaper on 14 July raised many questions. Yu. Voronin, doctor of economic sciences and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Budgets, Plans, Taxes, and Prices, and O. Tarasov, chairman of the board of the Russian Bank of the USSR State Bank, have expressed their desire to respond to the questions.**

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What necessitated the adoption of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution?

[Voronin] The existing banking system is an attribute of the USSR and is subordinated to the USSR government; its activities are geared to implementing the political and economic measures of Union organs. Moreover, recently they have begun to take measures which are aimed at transforming banks and their structural subunits and reinforcing through legislation the monopoly of Union organs on banks.

With a view to defending the sovereignty of the RSFSR, on 13 July the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted the resolution "On the RSFSR State Bank and Banks on the Territory of the Republic" in which the network of banks and their offices operating on the territory of the RSFSR were declared to be the property of the Russian Federation. The RSFSR State Bank that was set up was made an executive organ and the subject of property for the implementation of this measure.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What is the substantive aspect of the document?

[Tarasov] The adoption of this document is a step aimed at preparing for a transition to market relations in the economy, for demonopolizing banking, and for signing a new Union treaty. After all, the existing banking system is one of the impediments on the road to changes in the economy. In essence, the multielement structure of specialized banks created in 1988 preserved the administrative nature of management and augmented the apparatus, but introduced few new elements in the development of a partnership between the banks and the national economy. Moreover, since 1988 the State Bank in its capacity as the country's central bank of issue has been deprived of levers controlling monetary circulation. This has brought about an increase in the amount of monetary funds not backed by the appropriate supply of goods. Loans acquired the form of cash in the process of paying wages, and the State Bank had no option than to put the funds into circulation. Therefore, there has been no unified system for controlling the monetary circulation of the country and no economic methods for regulating it.

It has become necessary to introduce a mechanism of credit and monetary regulation which is known in world practice. Proposals for making a transition to a two-tier banking system and the switching of specialized banks to commercial, resource-oriented principles of operations were supposed to accomplish this. However, a fundamental reorganization of the banking system at the level of the Union has been unjustifiably delayed. For example, draft laws on the USSR State Bank and on banks have not even been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet yet.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Did it make sense to perhaps wait for the adoption of the necessary decisions at the USSR level and take no action in the republic for the time being?

[Voronin] We can hardly agree with this approach to the issue. The point is that in the last two months the situation in Russia, as well as in the country as a whole, has changed abruptly. At present, in determining the structure and principles of operation of the socioeconomic system, including the banking system, we should proceed from the fact that the republics of which the Union consists are sovereign states. Consequently, legislative codification of a new USSR banking system is required. It should be created beginning with the signing of a treaty between the Union republics on the basis of the qualitatively new banking legislation of the republics (and not that of the republics only!). The RSFSR Supreme Soviet accelerated the process of reorganization proceeding from the fact that protecting the interests of the enterprises, organizations, and citizens of the republic by creating an effective system of regulation and monitoring of the monetary circulation is an urgent socioeconomic and political task, a means of reaffirming the sovereignty of the RSFSR.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What will the practical impact of the resolution be on the financial situation of enterprises and organizations, as well as you and me—the citizens?

[Tarasov] The banking system is the backbone of the entire economy. All changes in it affect the entire national economy. Suffice it to mention the confusion in settlements which developed in early 1988, when specialized banks were set up. These aspects were taken into account in the resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, before we "unveil" the new mechanism for the national economy and citizens we intend to put our house in order and resolve all technical issues. This is exactly why the RSFSR State Bank together with the specialized banks has already given instructions to all establishments of the republic banks to the effect that they should perform settlements, provide credit, finance capital investment, and provide other banking operations along the old guidelines until instructed otherwise. Protecting the interests of our clients is our priority task. The complete safety of their funds and unconditional compliance by the banks with all the obligations assumed are guaranteed to all clients of the banks of the republic, whether they are enterprises, cooperatives, offices, or citizens.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What will switching to commercial principles of operation in the specialized banks do for the economy?

[Tarasov] The economic relationship of a commercial bank with its clients is different in principle. It is an interested partner with equal rights, and at the same time a defender of the interests of its clients. This creates new economic conditions for the effective application of credit in the most promising spheres of the economy and the social sphere, as well as the expansion of the assortment of banking services.

As far as the condition of monetary circulation is concerned, the transition of the specialized banks to a commercial basis means that commercial banks operate strictly within the framework of their own credit resources and those attracted by them. In the process, no lack of correspondence between these resources and investment occurs as used to exist in the system of specialized state banks. Besides, the RSFSR State Bank is introducing a standard rate for the mandatory reserve deposition of a segment of commercial bank resources in a centralized regulatory fund of credit resources which may increase or decrease depending on the condition of the economy, as well as other regulatory instruments.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What will happen to the specialists of the establishments of specialized banks? Is the liquidation of the apparatus of the boards of Russian specialized banks, which is mentioned in the resolution, a step back to the monopolistic single-tier system?

[Voronin] The elimination of the apparatus of specialized banks is aimed at speeding up the transformation of the specialized banks into commercial banks that constitute the foundation of the second tier of the banking system. There is no concealing that at present the banking system is experiencing a shortage of qualified cadres capable of performing to world standards. We will have to train the cadres in an accelerated manner, also abroad. For now, the cadres which are there will have to be used. Some of the employees of the specialized banks will be transferred to the republic State Bank. After all, its functions as a central bank, which are new in principle, presuppose a profound revision of its own work and structure. Another segment of the specialists will transfer to work in the commercial banks set up on the basis of the specialized banks.

I would like to stress in particular that we are categorically opposed to the method of transforming the specialized banks into commercial banks "by decree." This will accomplish nothing apart from yet another change of signs. We view this process as issuing both from "the top" and "the grass roots," with the active participation of enterprises, organizations, and offices of the specialized banks themselves which will voluntarily switch to commercial principles of operation as they become ready, taking into account the real financial potential of these offices, the mandatory execution by the banks of all previously signed contracts with their clients, and so on.

The executive committees of local soviets may also act as shareholders of commercial banks, thus vigorously influencing the development of vital sectors of the economy through the banks without resorting to administrative methods of management in the process.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What is your view of relations between the Russian banks and the Union structures and other Union republics? Will a unified monetary unit of the country be preserved under the circumstances?

[Tarasov] The need to preserve a unified monetary unit and to implement a unified monetary and credit policy in the country is an objective necessity as far as the normal operation of the existing national economic complex and the free development of goods-and-money relations within the framework of the Union are concerned. The unity of the monetary unit presupposes the unity of regulating monetary circulation, including emission. With a view to exercising the sovereign rights of the republics and simultaneously to maintaining the unified regulation of monetary circulation, a harmonious banking system should be created in which the independent banks of the Union republics endowed with the full scope of rights of central banks, pursuant to the rights given to them by their Supreme Soviets, form a banking union. In this case, the USSR State Bank will stand for the unity of the state banks of the Union republics. By joining the union, the central banks will voluntarily restrict their rights in the field of monetary and credit policy, including emission. The banking union will create a USSR State Bank Council consisting of the chairmen of the boards of the Union republic state banks and the chairman of the USSR State Bank Council. The decisions of the council will be made on the principle of unanimity and will be binding on all banks.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] What needs to be undertaken in order to fully implement the proposals set forth in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution?

[Voronin] The time has come for the Union republics and the center to embark on specific work on the mechanism of transforming the banking system with a view to bringing it into compliance with the sovereign rights of the Union republics and the requirements of a market economy. The results of this work should be reflected in a new Union treaty. This work should not be dragged out.

RSFSR Vegetable Procurement Worsens in 1990

904D0196A Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 p 2

[Report on comments by A.S. Kolychev, deputy chief of the trade administration for food goods of the RSFSR Ministry of Trade: "What Happened to the Vegetables—Commentary on a Report of the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics"]

[Text] The reports of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Committee for Statistics on how purchases of fruit and vegetable products are progressing are not encouraging—in comparison with last year things are going worse. And judging by the latest data, they still have not improved. Here is the report for 23 July: Purchases of potatoes are 23 percent lower and purchases of vegetables are 13 percent lower than at this time last year. The cabbage situation is especially poor—purchases are 41 percent lower. And here is how the data looks from the processing organizations: The State Agro-industrial Committees of the RSFSR and the non-Chernozem region have purchased 48 percent more potatoes than by this date last year, but they have purchased 15 percent less vegetables. The RSFSR Ministry of Trade—21 percent less potatoes and 0.4 percent less vegetables; the Russian Union of Consumers' Societies—41 percent less potatoes and 27 percent less vegetables.

A SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA correspondent asked A.S. Kolychev, deputy chief of the trade administration for food goods of the RSFSR Ministry of Trade, to comment on the report of the State Committee for Statistics. Here is what he said:

The fact that organizations of the Ministry of Trade system have almost never had a decrease in purchases compared to the previous year is, of course, gratifying, but we trade only in the small cities. The agro-industrial system takes over this function in the major industrial centers. And it is the system that influences events today in the trade of vegetables. Meanwhile, business for the Russian agroindustrial committees, as the report shows, is worse than last year's. What does it mean when they say that they bought 15 percent less than at the same time last year? In absolute terms this is 84,000 tons less! But even last year the shelves were not thick with vegetables.

What happened? Why has the supply of early vegetables to the cities become worse? We will start with the fact that, on the whole, the area under cultivation to vegetables across the entire Russian Federation has declined by 12 percent and the land under cultivation to potatoes has declined by 10 percent. The reason is that the farms do not have the men to till and harvest the area that was cultivated previously, and the cities refuse to help them. The enterprises have made the transition to cost accounting, and personnel levels in other organizations have been reduced to the bottom limit—there is no one to send to the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. And when people do agree to help, they demand great amounts of money from the farms to do so. This is why many of them have quit cultivating more area to vegetables and potatoes than they can till themselves.

Moreover, previously the farms often increased the harvest of vegetables by abusing chemical fertilizers. Inasmuch as the inspections of the vegetables at the agroindustrial committees were done by their own departmental people, the certificates for the vegetables often said that the nitrates were normal. Now they have begun to check the nitrate content in the cities because they now have the instruments necessary, and a large part of the vegetables is being turned back.

In addition, the farms of the agro-industrial system, trying to improve money management, attempt to sell products as much as possible at contract prices. Indeed, there is no longer any state ordering system. And maximum retail prices have been established for state trade in six basic types of vegetables. This means that auctions are forced to buy vegetables at a price that is higher than they may sell them for, that is to say at a loss. It is presumed that they will be compensated for the difference from the local budget. But that is on paper, and in fact there are usually not enough funds. And under conditions of cost accounting and especially of leasing, unprofitable trade and labor is simply ruinous.

Now we are especially alarmed by the situation with deliveries of vegetables and potatoes to the far north and to regions scheduled for early delivery. The farms of a number of oblasts which always sent their products there are now agreeing to do it not only for contract prices but in exchange for materials and goods in short supply.

I believe that a state ordering system is absolutely necessary in order to guarantee such deliveries. And in general, certain tax privileges should be established for farms so that they have an interest in selling vegetables and potatoes for deliveries to the north and to hospitals, children's institutions, and other socially important facilities.

For a fundamental resolution of the problem of supplying cities with potatoes and vegetables, I propose that it is necessary, along with mechanization of major specialized sovkhozes and kolkhozes, to widely develop suburban private farms.

If private farmers are given land around the cities and a network of small stores, in a short time they will create an abundance of vegetables, and they will force the large farms to work harder in order to hold their ground under such competition.

Moscow Soviet To Monitor Fruit, Vegetable Supply

LD1308173490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] A deputies' headquarters of the Moscow City Soviet to monitor the city's provision with fruit and vegetables has been set up. The city's inhabitants may address questions to it concerning all stages of the organization of the green conveyor from the field to the consumer.

The acute situation requires that the headquarters be set up. Many complaints are received from Muscovites about the poor supply of fruit and vegetable produce. At the same time, rumors are spreading that on the Ring Road and on the tracks of the Moscow rail junction a great deal of vegetables and fruit have allegedly accumulated which are not reaching the stores.

A check carried out by the deputies showed that most of these rumors are groundless. The main failure in the work is in the intermediary sections, on the way from the field to the depots and from the depots to the stores.

New Democratic Party Founded in Chechen-Ingush

LD1108163190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] The (?Vaynakskaya) Democratic Party [(?Vaynakskaya) Democraticheskaya Partiya] has been established in the Chechen-Ingush republic. Its rules and program were adopted at a founding congress. Over 1,000 people have joined the new party. They are intellectuals, workers, and peasants. The founders are setting themselves the goal of involving more extensively representatives of all the peoples living in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. For the time being, 80 percent of the new party's members are Chechenis and Inguishs. (Zilimkhan Inderbayev), the eminent Chechen-Ingush publicist, poet, and prose-writer, has been elected chairman of the party.

Amur Oblast Becomes Special Economic Zone

OW1408110590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Report by A. Kryuchkov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The stabilization of mutual economic relations and the defense of regional interests were the main themes discussed in Khabarovsk at a meeting of the chairmen of oblast and kray soviets of people's deputies of the Far East. The creation of free economic zones is considered one way of overcoming the Far East's economic crisis. Our report from Blagoveshchensk: [Video shows street scenes from Blagoveshchensk, construction sites, shots of river port]

[Kryuchkov] The decision at a session of the Amur Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies to proclaim the oblast a special economic zone is a unique answer to the collapsing government program for the development of the Far East. It turned out to be unprofitable for Union ministries and departments to invest in this region. It has become clear that in market relations there is no way around the creation of individual mechanisms for economic development.

But you must agree that it is not enough to just declare a zone's economy free. The zone's infrastructure must be created. Here, longstanding cooperation in border trade between the Amur Oblast and Heilongjiang Province in the People's Republic of China has helped. The volume of this trade reaches into the tens of millions of Swiss francs. Already the capacities of the Blagoveshchensk river port are being increased. An international ferry service between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe is in service. Through joint efforts, a comfortable hotel, the Druzhba, has been built.

Investment from Southeat Asian countries—and they are the most suitable investors for the Amur region—will help the oblast move from just being the nation's unlimited supplier of raw materials into a highly developed area. this process has already begun.

[Begin A.N. Belonogov, oblast soviet chairman, recording] Today our enterprises work with the Chinese on the questions of the creation of joint enterprises, the processing of skim milk, the construction of a baby food shop, in particular in the city of Belogorsk, and we sent an appropriate letter to the RSFSR Council of Ministers asking for support since Belogorsk is located on the Trans-Siberian mainline. Currently a draft plan for a comprehensive joint soy bean processing enterprise is under economic review. It will use our own variety of soybean.

Today in the oblast there are two state farms, producing vegetables and our soybean variety, where Korean workers are working with Soviet specialists. Thus, we are not waiting around for any final decisions. But I must note that foreign firms and companies are approaching us rather cautiously, and therefore approval from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of the decision of our session will increase trust in our oblast and our entire republic. [end recording]

Poll Reveals Muscovites Favor Rationing

904D0185A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[INTERFAX correspondent report on poll of Muscovites: "The Attitude of Muscovites Toward Regulated Trade"]

[Text] At the request of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted a poll of Muscovites regarding the trade problems that have surfaced in the capital. It involved the participation of 2,894 Moscow residents. An INTERFAX agency correspondent acquaints us with the results of the poll.

Fifty-four percent of those polled prefer to see trade in the next three months by invitation card, 17 percent by passport; 24 percent favored a return to the regular system. The remainder had difficulty giving a definite response.

In the next question, respondents were given four choices with respect to organization of trade for the coming period, expected to be a difficult time of transition to a market economy. Forty-five percent of those polled opted for a system of rationing, 27 percent for a market and free prices, seven percent for "social money," and five percent for increased prices with compensation, i.e., a variation of the transition period proposed by the USSR Government. Sixteen percent had not formed an opinion. Persons with lesser education and social status (unqualified employees, workers, pensioners, housewives), individuals from the older age groups, and women in general showed the greatest leaning toward trade with rationing.

Preference for distribution of food and commercial goods in short supply was indicated as follows: by workplace—20 percent, sale in the stores—49 percent, distribution by place of residence—27 percent. Four percent of respondents had difficulty giving a definite response. As might be expected, pensioners and housewives comprised the largest group in favor of trade distribution by place of residence.

Forty percent of people surveyed agreed with the idea of preferential distribution of goods in short supply to the needy; 37 percent—to the disabled; 26 percent—to veterans. Twenty-four percent of those polled do not consider it necessary to extend preferential treatment to anyone. Only about one percent came out in favor of privileges for executive functionaries in distributing goods in short supply. Among the leaders themselves, however, this opinion was more popular and was advocated by them 3.5 times more frequently than among Muscovites in general.

The sociologists also paid attention to the attitude of residents toward the activity of G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet. Exactly half of those polled have not yet formed a definite opinion regarding the new chairman since he has occupied the post. Forty-four percent of those surveyed evaluated his activity positively, six percent—negatively.

Periodical Association Formed in Kamchatka

LD1108053690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] No to monopoly! That is the slogan under which the newspapers of Kamchatka have united, by setting up an association of periodicals here. What has made the editors forget their political differences and stand united? The fact of the matter is that, with the advent of the new economic relationships between the editorial offices, founders and publishers on the one hand, and the printing presses and Soyuzpechat on the other, there is a real danger that all the publications will prove financially unviable. The association is to start drawing up a standard contract for all newspapers with Soyuzpechat and the printing houses. If no agreement is reached, the members of the association have decided to create an alternative publishing house and distribution agent by taking out shares in them.

Western Republics

Ukrainian Ralliers Denounce Union Treaty

LD1308162690 Moscow TASS in English 1622 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—More than 1,500 people took part in an unofficial rally in Kiev late on Sunday to demand help for Chernobyl victims, the removal of monuments to Vladimir Lenin, the abolition of communist party committees at enterprises and to protest against the signing of a new Union treaty.

The rally was organised by the city strike committee and the inter-party assembly, Soviet Interior Ministry officials told TASS.

After the rally, some of the protesters marched on the navy political school, chanting "Down with the Occupiers" and "Down with Commissars."

In another action on Sunday, a crowd gathered in Ivano Frankovsk to mark the anniversary of the death of Ukrainian nationalist leader R. Levitskiy, who was killed in a brawl.

Speakers at the rally, including local lawmakers, claimed Levitskiy took "martyrdom for the Ukrainian revival."

The rally pased a resolution, demanding that the Ukrainian parliament dismantle monuments to communist party leaders, denounce the new Union treaty and disband communist party committees at enterprises and schools.

Protesters burned portraits of communist founders Lenin, Marx and Engels.

Belorussian People's Front Holds Conference

90UN2479A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 10 Jul 90 p 2

[Report by Sergey Shapran, SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent in Minsk: "Belarus—The Course to Independence Without Communist Totalitarianism"]

[Text] On 30 June-1 July, a conference of the Belorussian People's Front "Adradzhenne"-"Nazalezhnaya Belarus" ("Independent Belarus") convened in Minsk.

About 500 individuals took part in the work of the conference. They include 383 delegates, of whom 62 are people's deputies at all levels.

Zenon Poznyak, chairman of the Belorussian People's Front [BNF] Assembly, presented an address on the political situation in the republic. He ascertained that in the year that has passed since the front's constituent assembly the situation has not changed. Official structures to this day deny registration to the Belorussian People's Front. In our present time, Poznyak stated, we see not only the bankruptcy of the authorities, but weakness in democratic forces as well, due to a lack of active and constructive support on the part of the masses. Communists saw in the Belorussian People's Front a real political force, supported by the people and coming out against the totalitarian system. The front is an opposition force to the CPSU, the BNF leader stated. And communism in the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] today has no future. The reasons for this are the utter failure of Marxist-Leninist ideology, an antipopular, antihumanity posture and utopianism, the absurd and unscientific nature of this system of political views, and the complete inability of the CPSU to resolve socioeconomic problems. The main thing in Belarus has been the inability to organize deliverance of the republic population from the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The BNF leader noted, however, that the front cannot help but be alarmed by the fact that the anticommunist movement in Belorussia is developing in basically uncontrolled fashion. The mission of the BNF is to bring organizational forms to the anticommunist movement, which may be diverse—from political parties and the democratic movement under the BNF banner to independent trade unions and citizens' committees.

Zenon Poznyak turned the attention of the conference to the fact that the main problem of Belarus today is radiation-caused genocide. The Chernobyl problem is a political one, Poznyak stated, and must therefore be resolved by political means. Two conditions are necessary for this—state sovereignty and a democratic authority. There will be no end to the troubles of the Belorussian people for as long as the party-monopolistic system exists.

The BNF leader acknowledged that the front was also to blame, in that society was poorly prepared for the concept and act of sovereignty. Yet it is impossible to imagine the future of Belarus without sovereignty.

Yuras Khodyko, deputy chairman of the BNF Assembly, then spoke and expressed the view that one of the tasks of the front was to create conditions for dissolution of the present republic parliament, which does not on the whole express democratic sentiment, and convene a new one. Delegate L. Zlotnikov, a participant in BNF economic projects, called for removing the right from the nomenklatura of granting permission for enterprises to leave the current economic structure. The delegate introduced a proposal according to which the collective of a Union-subordinate enterprise should have the right to redeem this enterprise and subsequently lease it. Literary critic Anatol Sidorevich, presently engaged in historical research in Vilnya, confirmed through documents that the leader of the Soviet state himself, V.I. Lenin, acknowledged the annexation of Baltic and Belorussian lands as an occupation. Sidorevich stated that Belarus, as a full-fledged entity of international law, should conclude a treaty on borders with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Ukraine, and register it in the United Nations. He added that the law on secession from the USSR is not binding on Belarus, insofar as the law on including republics in the composition of the Union was not ratified by Belorussia's supreme authority.

Delegates made subsequent presentations touching on various issues. Delegate A. Barovskiy informed the conference that Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 105 divides participants in eliminating the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident into two categories: pre- and post-1989. But such a division is unfounded since the danger to life is not decreasing. Barovskiy cited a figure for such participants which differs from the official number—16,000 instead of 9,000.

BNF Assembly member O. Trusov read the draft declaration on power, drawn up by the Deputies' Club of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. Several BNF members announced the fact of their leaving the CPSU. An appeal resounded to international communities "not to provide credits to the Bolsheviks in any form—otherwise the agony of Bolshevism will be still more prolonged."

Sharp disputes were provoked by the question as to whether membership of the BNF is compatible with membership of the Communist Party, which was defined as a "fascist party." A warning was sounded not to proceed along the path of Romania. The conference adopted the draft Declaration on the Independence of Belarus, which will be presented by the BNF deputy group for consideration by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

A resolution was adopted on attitudes toward the CPSU and other political parties, in which it was established that the BNF will, from this time forward, continue to expose the antihumane and antipopular essence of the communist system. The conference called upon communists to leave the party which had discredited itself. Individual membership in the BNF and payment of

voluntary dues were introduced by separate resolution, and the need to establish citizens' committees was expressed.

"I do not think any declaration will be able to save Belarus," stated USSR People's Deputy V. Bykov in an interview. "The only thing that can save the republic is a complex of measures, more specifically—an all-people's movement for its preservation."

The conference charted future plans for striving to suspend the powers of the soviets, to convene the constituent assembly and establish the Democratic Belorussian Republic. It is planned at the end of this year to conduct an extraordinary congress of the Belorussian People's Front, which will introduce changes into the rules and program of the front.

Results of Belorussian Repeat Elections Reported

90UN2495B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] **In the Central Commission for Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]**

The Central Commission for the Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies met in Minsk on 4 July. It reviewed the results of the repeat elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies that took place in 16 electoral districts on 30 June of this year.

In accordance with the Law on Elections, the district electoral commissions registered 26 candidates for Belorussian SSR people's deputies. There were two or more candidates on the ballots in the electoral districts. Deputies were elected in five electoral districts. All the elected deputies were registered by the Central Commission. The list of elected people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR is published here.

In 11 electoral districts, fewer than half of the registered voters took part in the elections. Due to this fact the elections in those districts were pronounced invalid. The time of the repeat elections in the 11 electoral districts will be announced later.

List of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies Elected at the Repeat Elections on 30 June 1990

Kichkaylo, Aleksandr Trofimovich; deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, CPSU member, city of Minsk. From the Bobruyskiy-Berezinskiy Electoral District No. 285.

Matskevich, Ivan Fedorovich; first secretary of the Minsk Pervomayskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee] of the Belorussian Communist Party, CPSU member, city of Minsk. From the Kalinovskiy Electoral District No. 29.

Rakhatko, Kazimir Vladislavovich; manager of the "Maloye Mozheykovo" sovkhoz [state farm] of the Lidskiy Rayon, CPSU member, village of Maloye Mozheykovo, Lidskiy Rayon of Grodno Oblast. From Berezovskiy Electoral District No. 260.

Freyberg, Andrey Petrovich; senior physician of the territorial medical association of Zelvenskiy Rayon, CPSU member, town of Zelva, Grodno Oblast. From Zelvenskiy Electoral District No. 253.

Yurkevich, Nikolay Aleksandrovich; manager of the Grodno shoe producing factory "Neman," CPSU member, city of Grodno. From Grodnenskiy—Suvorovskiy Electoral District No. 242.

Publication of Supreme Soviet Record Deplored

90UN2495A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 5 Jul 90 p 5

[Letter to the editor followed by editorial comment: "They Did Not Even Ask the Subscribers"]

[Text] Should SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA publish the stenographic records of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet sessions? Why do you not ask the opinion of hundreds of thousands of your readers and subscribers? Are you, the journalists and your colleagues, not sorry to waste the barely available paper or the newspaper space that you use so thoughtlessly? The same can be said, by the way, about the radio and TV time wasted on the broadcasts; and that is apart from the fact that the radio broadcasts take place during working hours.

It seems we have never witnessed yet such reckless squandering—not under any "administration" system. Is it done only because the current people's deputies want to "perform" in front of the microphones or see their names on a newspaper page? Cannot we publish the required number of copies of the session transcripts and let those who need them buy them? And do it only with their own money.

And one more thing: Why is the stenographic record published in Belorussian in a Russian-language newspaper?

[Signed] V. Barmichev

From the editor: We probably would not have published this letter. But unfortunately the editors receive too many "angry" telephone calls about the same issue...

U.S. Firm Studies Belorussian Contaminated Areas

LD1008105490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Summary] Representatives of the Monsanto international chemical concern have planned activities in Belorussia's contaminated areas. A large sum of money is needed to carry out all the work. The Monsanto

representatives will present the results of their tests to the United Nations in the hope of obtaining a grant for it.

Moldavia's Snegur Addresses Country 23 Jul

90UN2544A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 24 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech by Mircha Iona Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, on Moldavian national radio and television on 23 July 1990: "The People Are Waiting for Practical Actions"; published in Romanian and transliterated into Russian]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen! Comrades!

Highly esteemed compatriots!

We are living in a very difficult period when we must bear responsibility to our descendants for the destiny of our region. History is giving us a chance to become the real masters of our wealth, to return to real national values, and to become a truly sovereign state.

The path we shall have to follow to these sacred ideals will by no means be strewn with flowers. On the contrary, serious political and social difficulties await us. As we dismantle the Stalinist model of organization of society we must lay the basis for a democratic society of free people. To this end we must make a radical change in the political system and establish real democracy based on free elections and a multiparty system and on respect for the rights of people and the law. For real sovereignty of the people it is also necessary to dismantle the old production relations which have alienated man from his property and the results of his labor. We must create conditions for free competition among producers of material goods and replace the ideological dictatorship with free thinking so that all the creative potential of the people is directed toward the good of society.

We are in a transitional period when the dismantling of the old system is certainly not complete and there is still much to do for the construction of the new one. It is precisely on these aspects of the historical turning point that we must act most persistently, for delay could exacerbate the situation in the republic. We must speak honestly and openly with the people who have entrusted us with the management of their long-suffering region.

Based on what has been said above, I should like to share certain ideas and considerations about the socioeconomic and political situation in the republic.

I wish to especially emphasize that the situation in the production sphere remains fairly strained. In terms of many parameters we have not only not moved forward but are even behind last year's level. The volume of industrial production in the first half of 1990 increased by only 2.3 percent as compared to the period from January through June of 1989. Every second enterprise has reduced its production volume. We are very disturbed by many cases of failure to fulfill contractual commitments for deliveries of industrial products.

An alarming situation has developed in capital construction. Unfortunately, the collectives of builders of our republic have not only failed to carry out state plans but have also taken a large step backward as compared to last year's level. Here are just a couple of figures. During the first six months of the year we assimilated only 38 percent of the annual limit of capital investments, and the amount of construction and installation work we did was 35 percent of the annual plan, which is 11 percent less than for the corresponding period of last year.

The problem of construction of housing and objects for social and cultural purposes is critical. Since the beginning of the year the republic has built 8,500 apartments, which is only 22 percent of the annual plan. In order to fulfill the annual program for housing construction, in the second half of the year it will be necessary to release an overall area of 2 million square meters financed from all sources. This is 3.5 times more than the area released during the first quarter. The task is extremely difficult but also very important. The construction of schools, kindergartens, hospitals, and polyclinics is at approximately the same level.

The food problem remains critical. Of course one could blame nature, which has placed us in a very difficult situation this year. But this does not change the situation. The agrarian sector and our rural areas in general require radical changes in terms of social support and strengthening of the material and technical base. It is time to recognize the correctness of the demands made by peasants in various forums for financial aid and material support for rural areas and the entire agrarian sector. In the near future parliament will have to adopt a number of legislative acts and the government will have to adopt the corresponding decisions whose implementation will provide for a significant redistribution of allocations for the development of rural areas. At the same time we understand quite well that unless economic relations change, unless new incentives for the labor of the peasants appear, and unless they become the real masters of the land, no investments will help.

I wish to especially emphasize the problem of providing the people with goods. We have very many difficulties here. We need sober evaluations, weighed conclusions, and practical actions. Government proposals for solving these and other economic problems of the republics will be discussed at the session of the Supreme Soviet, which will resume its work on 25 July.

The socioeconomic situation remains critical and the very logic of perestroyka presents us with the need for a radical change in the economic system. We are speaking about creating a new model of the economy which includes many sectors with various forms of ownership and management with a modern infrastructure. This is the only way we will create conditions for the economic

activity and initiative of the people, fruitful labor, and increased effectiveness of the economy. The transition to a market economy will enable us to solve these problems more quickly.

In the existing conditions the republic leadership, the parliament, need as never before the support and confidence of the people and unity of all progressive forces who are eager to contribute to a radical change in the situation.

You all know, dear compatriots, how many rumors and sometimes provocations are being spread around the republic. Many are deliberately speculating on the difficulties and problems which are in no way a result of the actions of the present leadership. We have not had enough time to deal with them in practice. Moreover, there is outspoken opposition to the changes begun by the new parliament and government from certain bureaucrats in the administrative structures, especially at the middle level. They are the ones who are trying to defend their conservative interests, taking cover under slogans about fighting for the interests of the people.

To a large extent this pertains to the leadership of the cities along the Dnestr. It is time to call things by their real names, for the separatist actions of the city soviets of Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, Bendery, and the Rybnitskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies are becoming more and more blatant. They have gone from a lack of respect for the laws and decisions of the higher organ of state power in the republic to the point where they are calling for the masses to disobey the constitution and the laws of the SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova. The referendum in Bendery and the extraordinary sessions arranged in the aforementioned localities confirm this. From the simplest analysis of the documents adopted at the sessions of these soviets it immediately becomes clear that they were "directed" by one and the same hand.

As you know, the republic Supreme Soviet has expressed its opinion about this in its address to all the parliaments of the Union republics. The so-called local leaders are always looking for consultations and meetings in Moscow offices. I became convinced of this during the work of the 28th CPSU Congress. Moreover, I can say that they present the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet as an ardent "nationalist," not to say monster.

The ultimate goals of the organizers of these actions are clear:

To take these population areas out from under the leadership and control of the Supreme Soviet and the republic government, out from under the influence of the constitutional norms and laws of the SSR of Moldova;

to set the interests of the population of the Dnestr zone against the interests of all the people;

to provoke sociopolitical instability, suspicion, and mutual mistrust;

to halt or even turn back the process of establishing the real sovereignty of the republic in all spheres of life.

This is shown by the suspension of the effect of all laws on the territory of certain population points, beginning with those that were adopted at the 13th session of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet, the address of the Tiraspol City Soviet to the Odessa City Soviet proposing to create an association of cities of a so-called free economic zone. Or how is one to assess the appeal of the sessions of the city and rayon soviets of Rybnitsa to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet requesting the formation of a commission to study the problem of creating the MASSR [Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] in 1924 and how justified its entry into the Moldavian SSR in 1940 was, and so forth?

These destabilizing actions have gone too far. They cannot be called anything but political provocations which simply test the patience of the people. The people have long been demanding the punishment of the organizers of last year's political strikes and those who openly violate the law and ignore the state flag of the SSR of Moldova. We cannot go on failing to listen to the people's opinion. Everyone must be responsible for his actions under the law. We have "paid attention" and used kind words with those who are against the sacred place of our people. Do the leaders of these cities and other locations in the Dnestr zone think about the fact that their fierce struggle for their own personal political ambitions will mainly affect their own brothers and sisters, their own offspring, who in time will curse them for the fact that instead of harmony and civilized cooperation with the indigenous people they have opted for confrontation.

Who are these people? They are Comrades Smirnov from Tiraspol, who has only been living in Moldova since 1987, Belitchenko from Rybnitsa, who has lived here since 1985, and others who in equally short periods of time have mastered our history so well that they feel they have the right to teach it to us. I am appealing to the residents of these cities and other localities of the Dnestr area to think hard about where their leaders are taking them. And I am notifying the leaders in these places that as of today all moratoriums on the effect of certain laws and certain articles of the constitution are revoked. From now on the law enforcement organs must efficiently take the measures prescribed by the law in such cases.

Now that the declaration of the republic's sovereignty opens up broad prospects for the free development of all branches, our future depends more than ever before on our ability to manage and live in friendly harmony with our neighbors and the world market, and it is here that we can expect full support and full understanding from the Gagauzes. We are prepared to consider and resolve the sociopolitical problems they have raised, without shrinking even from purely political problems. But there are forces who do not wish to understand this and are constantly maintaining the tense situation as if hoping

that we will forget the efforts of the initiators or, more precisely, the fabricators of the problem of Gagauz autonomy.

Each time we have hoped that the Gagauz leaders would look at things realistically. Several times, including during my last meeting with Gagauz parliamentary deputies, it has seemed to me that they want this as well. And again, as soon as we reach a certain level of agreement, some new occasion is found to inflame passions. This is confirmed also by the convocation of the extraordinary congress of the Gagauz people on 22 July. Obviously, it is easier for the Gagauz leaders to maintain their popularity by taking political measures like this and holding weekly rallies than to solve the essential problems by the parliamentary method, with the help of the law, under mutually acceptable conditions. Will the appeals to the government of Russia and the enlistment of all kinds of convenient "experts" really help move the people to divide up the land of their ancestors? I appeal to the Gagauz people: Good people, beware of those who would deceive you. We have lived a long life in peace and harmony and we can continue to live this way. As concerns your problems—preservation and development of the language and culture and training of personnel—I assure you that they will be solved at the same time as the problems of the indigenous population are solved. I will be very sad if misunderstanding arises among us and if it becomes deeper with time.

We are well aware of who is actually to blame for the current situation of the Gagauzes, Ukrainians, and representatives of other nationalities living on the territory of the republic, including those who have come since the war. Are the Moldavian people really to blame for the fact that the Stalinist transplantation turned out to be tragic for thousands and thousands of people? Did the Moldavian people, tens of thousands of whose sons and daughters were sent to Siberia, suffer any less?

History has its own measure of restitution for any act. Those who really want to understand us and help in the restoration of the republic are now being given all opportunities. Arrogance and obstinacy and organized open attacks against the sacred place of the indigenous population will never lead to any good.

As the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Moldova I have always tried to preserve the peace, to find ways of avoiding conflict, and to reconcile everyone. But there is also a limit to my patience. How can one preserve the peace, for example, if things have reached the point where People's Deputy Dyukarev from Dubesar accuses me in an open letter, published in the rayon newspaper, of pushing the regions of the Dnestr area toward autonomy and even to withdrawing from the republic and joining Odessa Oblast to the detriment of the economy of Moldova? This is not merely naivete, this is a well-considered action. Its purpose is to protect the adventurer-leaders from this zone who know that soon the local population will call them to account for the policy of destabilization they have pursued which is increasingly impeding the process of the sociopolitical development of this zone and the region as a whole.

By the way, about Comrade Dyukarev. He did not come to Moldova until 1977 but, as you see, he considers the time that has passed more than enough to show the indigenous population the light.

As concerns the Dubeksarskiy Rayon newspaper, one gets the impression that it has become the organ of a group of Russian-speaking deputies who are always among the opposition. Recently this publication printed a mocking article against the republic leadership signed by Deputy V.N. Yakovlev.

And in general certain of the mass media with an anti-Moldavian direction have undertaken an organized campaign of criticism and mocking, especially against Prime Minister M. Druk. The authors of these articles comment on each word and each step of the republic leaders and do everything possible to show everyone that we bear the largest share of the blame and are the greatest enemies.

I should like to draw the attention of these authors and publishers to the fact that through their actions they are besmirching the honor and dignity of all the people, not only of individuals. Would it not be more useful and praiseworthy to abandon their ambitions and direct their efforts toward disclosing the real causes of the situation that has been created in relations between the Russian-speaking and the indigenous population and help the former to overcome the linguistic barrier of the traditional arrogant disdain for those who at one time gave them refuge in their small but hospitable home? As concerns the dirty attacks against the new republic leadership, do not try to frighten us, you gentlemen who are regular and extra correspondents. We do not scare easily! At the same time do not forget that you can be held accountable under the law for such actions.

I have also been saddened by the events that took place near the Triumphal Arch and other places in the center of Kishinev. I do not allow vandalism in any situation, regardless of the circumstances or explanations. The only thing I have left is to express my regret that we have not yet found the forces and people who would finally put a stop to these ill-considered actions and would contribute to a legal solution to this problem. We must be firm when it comes to order and we must make sure that the laws of the republic are observed absolutely by all groups of the republic's population. Otherwise the tension will continue forever, threatening unpredictable consequences at any moment.

The work and especially the decisions adopted at the Second Congress of the People's Front of Moldova did not contribute to improving the sociopolitical situation in the republic either. We are always speaking in favor of a realistic policy, and in general we need to be realists. But when, against the background of these concepts,

there is escalation of anticommunism and anti-Leninism, of course, these actions become explosive while at the same time they are incomprehensible to many people. We must be cautious and serious. We cannot allow ourselves to change the name of the sovereign country of Moldova every week or every month.

This is not intervention in the internal affairs of sociopolitical formations. I have touched upon this problem because members of the People's Front and those sympathetic to it should recognize all of their responsibility. The front must take a constructive position and in no case should it move over to the opposition. Many of its members hold fairly high positions in the republic leadership organs and therefore every decision of the front had great political repercussions in Moldova. The people are now expecting from members of the People's Front not so much political decisions as practical actions, especially of a socioeconomic nature, and it is hoped that the front will consolidate the democratically inclined forces and people in the parliament and not lead to splitting them into small factions.

This is why I wish that we would make peace and unite and be wise and decent as at one time we swore to do. This is the only guarantee I can see of stabilizing the situation.

And another thing: We are speaking about the decisions of a political movement and nothing more than that. And so we must analyze them precisely in that context and no other.

We have declared sovereignty and are gradually moving along the path of consistent realization of its principles. I announce once again that neither the parliament nor the republic leadership will raise the question of unification with Romania. I repeat once again that the present leadership of the SSR of Moldova bases its policy on concrete reality which cannot be ignored.

Dear compatriots!

In the situation that has developed in the republic I have been forced to ask the people to support my efforts undertaken within the framework of laws that are in effect to arrest destructive processes in order to guarantee peace and quiet for the people so that they can create optimal conditions for the advancement of Moldova along the path of true sovereign statehood that is highly developed from all standpoints—efforts directed toward the good of the people and all those who wish to understand us and stand beside us.

I thank you for your attention.

Impact of 'Moldovan' Popular Front Waning

LD1308193690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Now we shall report on the results of a poll carried out by the Institute of Sociopolitical Research of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee in seven rayons of the republic. They point to a sharp reduction in the impact of the Popular Front. We recall that it emerged on the foundations of the Democratic Movement in support of perestroyka. In the course of time the positions of the Popular Front have begun to acquire a more and more anticommunist direction. Moreover, judging by an interview given by Khadyrke, chairman of the Popular Front and first deputy chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, to the newspaper DREPTATEA, the organ of the National Peasants' Party of Romania, the front is endeavoring to do everything possible to speed up the end of the communist regime, proclaiming itself an antitotalitarian and anticommunist force.

The anticommunist direction of the front's news program and the basic documents which it has adopted have met with a negative response on the part of the majority of the republic's population. For example, the front's proposal to rename the Moldova is supported by only a few. The overwhelming majority opposed it.

Extraordinary Congress of Gagauz People Held

90UN2571A Kishinev MOLODEZH MOLDAVII in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 3

[Unattributed article published under the rubric "The Issue's Photographic Feature": "Extraordinary Congress in Komrat"]

[Text] An extraordinary congress of authorized representatives of the Gagauz people has taken place in Komrat. Taking part were 411 delegates from the republic's southern regions as well as representatives of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova and representatives of various sociopolitical movements, including the NFM [People's Front of Moldova].

It was noted at the congress that the political situation in the republic, especially in its southern region, has been complicated "by rash actions of some members of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the SSR of Moldova who do not wish to recognize the legitimate demands of the Gagauz people concerning the creation of their own autonomy." The decree from the congress notes that the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet is passing laws which do not take into account the interests of all the citizens of the republic and which are in fact directed against the non-Roman group of the population. The Gagauz are hoping the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet will provide a positive resolution of the problem of creating a Gagauz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] inside the SSR of Moldova, and they believe that stabilization of interethnic relations in the southern part of the republic depends on whether or not last year's 12 November formation of a Gagauz ASSR is approved.

The congress approved the national symbols of the Gagauz people—a flag, a coat of arms, and an anthem; a provisional decree on elections of Gagauz ASSR people's deputies was adopted; and amendments were introduced

to the regulations for a provisional committee to promote the creation of a Gagauz ASSR within the SSR of Moldova.

The documents adopted by the congress gave rise to a negative reaction from some of the guests, including A.I. Arseni, chairman of the commission on ethnic questions under the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet. "All the decisions you have affirmed today," he said, "will be overruled tomorrow as illegal."

Caucasus

Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan Outlines New Policy

LD1308163990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, has stated that the new government of the republic will not be a coalition government, but a government outside the party. It will be a government of specialists.

It became known today that the highest body of power in the republic has accepted the resignation of the government of Armenia. The Council of Ministers has been instructed to carry out its functions until a new body of executive power is formed.

Using his right, Ter-Petrosyan, head of the Armenian parliament, proposed Manukyan, lecturer of Yerevan State University, to the post of head of government. As a result of a secret ballot, Manukyan, by a majority of votes, was also elected chairman of the Council of Ministers of Armenia. Manukyan is not yet 50 years old. He is a specialist in the field of applied mathematics, married, with three children. He is one of the leaders of the Armenian National Movement.

The new head of the government of the republic said that he is a supporter of the denationalization of property, and the independence of Armenia in all internal and external affairs. He named the primary national task as the struggle against armed crime, brigandage, and corruption.

Further on Leader's Policy

LD1308172190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Excerpts] Markaryants, chairman of the republican Council of Ministers, made a statement on the government's resignation at the session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet today. He stressed that he fully acknowledges the difficult time at which the step was taken but acts in accordance with the constitution of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The resignation was accepted. The Council of Ministers was instructed to perform its functions until a new composition of executive power is formed. Our special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich provides further information.

[Lazarevich] Immediately after the government's resignation was accepted, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, named the candidate to the republic's prime minister. It was Vazgen Manukyan, 44 years old, senior lecturer at Yerevan University, candidate of physicomathematic sciences, specialist in applying mathemetical methods in the national economy. [passage omitted]

The candidate to the post of prime minister acquainted Armenian deputies with the principles the new government would adhere to. He said that the socialist economy is crumbling and will be crumbling further, and there is no possibility of stopping this process. Therefore, Armenia should be ready for the fact that very soon it will not be able to receive raw materials from other union republics or the Soviet Union. Second, he said, a transition from state to private ownership and a transition to market relations is the only way out of the situation that has arisen. Third, he stressed, nothing will help Armenia if armed detachments not subordinated to the parliament and the government continue to be active. If such detachments exist, no Western partner will invest in the Armenian economy. From the point of view of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet [as heard], detachments that do not obey the government are of a bandit nature. Fourth, he said, all problems can be solved on the sole condition that all Armenians unite and act jointly.

Giving this speech, the candidate to the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers stressed that the main goal is achieving Armenian independence. After that he answered questions from deputies for a long time, and then a vote was taken. As a result, he was approved.

Ter-Petrosyan Addresses Armenian Supreme Soviet

NC1308211890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 10 Aug 90

["Speech by Deputy Levon H. Ter-Petrosyan, president of the administrative board of the Armenian Pannational Movement, at the first session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on 3 August"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Sooner or later all the republics will choose the path of autonomy and democracy with which the central authorities will also have to become reconciled, though with some reservations.

This brings into focus the divergent guidelines of principles forming the basis of the national program of each republic; guidelines which are needed to give the people the possibility to orient themselves and to make choices.

In my view there are two objective factors which can determine our orientation: The first is our stance toward the new Union treaty or toward the future of the federation, and the second is the discovery of those political forces which are in a position to implement the national program. [passage omitted]

I will now touch upon the second point; that is, which social forces are in a position to implement those measures that would create the political, economic, legal, and spiritual preconditions for the autonomous and independent existence of Armenia. In considering this question, one must take into consideration the fact that along with the similarities it shares with the other Soviet republics, Armenia has also peculiarities of its own owing to the problem of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], the fate of the refugees, restoration of the disaster zone, and the unstable domestic situation due to the existence of the armed formations. All of these further complicate the historic mission of the future authorities in Armenia.

In contrast to the Baltic republics, Russia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia—all of which have taken the road of independence or autonomy—every lever of executive power in Armenia still remains in the hands of the upper strata of the Communist Party, which apparently still has no intention of resigning from power or sharing it with the new democratic forces that have emerged in the republic and thus also share the responsibility before the people. This is evinced by the bitter election campaign waged by the Communist Party apparatus and the unconstitutional and undemocratic stance it assumed at this session when by its votes it tried to undermine the examination of the credentials of the elected deputies and of the decision to call to account the electoral commissions which had allowed irregularities to take place.

Is it possible in such situations to once more entrust the fate of the Armenian people to a party whose 70 years of criminal activity have brought our republic to the brink of destruction? This party, which was created at the initiative of the foreigners and which serves foreign interests, has in fact nothing to do with our national aspirations and objectives. It was this party which in collusion with the foreign powers eliminated the independent republic of Armenia in 1920 and in the name of the victory of international revolution donated more than half of the country to Turkey and Azerbaijan; it took property away from the peasants, destroyed the fabric of the traditional village, and organized the mass executions and persecutions of 1937 and 1949.

They may argue that all that is already history and that the communist party of the restructuring period has nothing to do with the crimes mentioned. Such an argument would have been to the point had the communist party given assurances that it would work for our national interests at least during the national liberation struggle which started in February 1988.

But instead of leading the powerful democratic movement of the Armenian people, the leadership of the Armenian Communist Party constantly appeared in the role of Moscow's fifth column for almost two and a half years and thus obstructed all the political initiatives coming from below. Only under the formidable pressure of the masses did it feel forced to to make some concessions on expanding the republic's autonomy, on speeding up democratic processes and on solving the Artsakh problem. [passage omitted]

As long as the Armenian Communist Party is attached to the CPSU on the principle of democratic centralism and is directed from outside, it cannot serve our nation's interests and solve the vital problems facing our republic. Only after severing its subordinate ties with the CPSU could it turn into a national party and substantially contribute to the realization of national aspirations. [passage omitted]

Armenian Cause Organization Demilitarizes

NC1208091490 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] The press has published the following statement of the Armenian Cause [Hay Dat] organization:

Despite the fact that the Armenian Cause organization operated in a military capacity only in defense of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and of the border regions and has never participated in widespread business speculations, plundering, and confiscation in the republic, its council of representatives has nevertheless decided:

1. To demilitarize the Armenian Cause organization, voluntarily renouncing the possibility of influencing the republic's internal social and political situation through physical force, considering such force to be the exclusive right of the legal national authority.

2. Considering that the Armenian National Army is the nucleus of the future legal national army of the Armenian republic, the Council of Representatives decided to hand over the military possession of Armenian Cause to the Armenian National Army.

State Security Forces Attacked in Armenia

LD1308134890 Moscow TASS in English 1324 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—Tensions continue to run high in Armenia after a weekend of attacks on the security forces.

On Sunday, several armed men seized an Army vehicle in the republic's capital. The driver was released.

Later in the day, a group ambushed a militia major. They stole a pistol. The major was beaten and kidnapped.

Two money collectors were disarmed in Yerevan on Sunday evening. The attackers did not steal their money, but stole three cars.

Several state traffic inspection posts were shelled and a district Interior Ministry department was attacked on

Sunday. A helicopter landing pad, eight tents and scores of people dressed in paramilitary uniform were discovered in Vardenis District.

Details of Azerbaijan Bus Explosion Reported

PM1308190390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 14 Aug 90 p 4

[Report by V. Shchedrin]

[Text] Thirteen people died when an explosion occurred on a bus in Azerbaijan. This is already the second such terrorist crime in the republic. The first occurred last year and has gone unpunished.

The explosion occurred on the highway not far from the city of Gyandzha. Your correspondent got through to Baku and ascertained that the circumstances of the case are being investigated by organs of the Azerbaijan MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Prosecutor's Office. Here are few a details of the tragedy.

The 32-seat bus was making a run on the Tbilisi-Agdam route. From Tbilisi 10 passengers alighted. Their number increased at stops. But it has not yet been possible to establish how many people were on the bus at the time of the explosion.

When the bus was approaching Gyandzha, where it was to pick up new passangers at the bus station, a powerful explosion occurred. Of all the people on the bus, only the driver and one passenger were not hurt. The blast wave also hit passing Zhiguli cars: One woman passenger was killed.

According to provisional figures, 17 people received serious injuries as a result of the explosion.

According to preliminary assessments by specialists, the explosive device eq pped with a timing mechanism was placed in the rear section of the bus. It is worth noting that the bus should already have been at the Gyandzha bus station when the bomb went off. Only a chance delay en route prevented far more numerous casualties.

Officials Extend Condolences

NC1308094390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] An explosion aboard a bus which was traveling to Tbilisi via the Agdam highway has killed many people. With profound sorrow, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, and the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers extend condolences to the families of those who have been killed.

Bid To Return Azerbaijanis to Krasnovodsk

NC1308085290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] As reported earlier, more than 200 Azerbaijanis living and working in Krasnovodsk traveled to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] as a result of an incident a few days ago. A group composed of a number of social figures from Baku and employees from the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs traveled to Krasnovodsk to shed light on the causes of the Azerbaijanis' mass migration and assess the situation in Krasnovodsk.

The group held meetings with work collectives, Azerbaijanis, and city aktivs. The situation and the measures required to normalize it were examined during a meeting that was held by the CPSU Krasnovodsk Party Committee Bureau. A principled assessment was made of the incident. It was decided that measures should be taken to enable the Azerbaijanis who immigrated to return to Krasnovodsk and to create the necessary living conditions and [word indistinct] for member of all nationalities in the city. It was also decided that a delegation should travel to Azerbaijan to carry out the necessary work for the return of the immigrant citizens.

The situation in Krasnovodsk is normal at present.

Gumbaridze Interviewed on 'Quest for Independence'

LD1308140590 Moscow TASS in English 1216 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS—The quest for the independence of the communist parties of the Union republics is becoming a uniting force, Georgian Communist Party leader Givi Gumbaridze told TASS.

The discussion of the 22nd paragraph of the new rules of the Party concerning relations betwen the communist parties of the Union republics at the 28th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) revealed a clash of conservative and realistic approaches, he said.

The Georgian Communists proceed from the assumption that the restoration of Georgia's state sovereignty is not a one-off act, but a consistent process encompassing political, social, economic, inter-ethnic and other spheres, Gumbaridze said.

On the initiative of the Georgian Communist Party, the republican parliament endorsed legal acts laying the foundation for a realistic departure from the Stalinist administrative-totalitarian, unitary model of the Union, and for an advance towards the genuine independence of Georgia, and began to work out a mechanism for the stage-by-stage restoration of Georgia's statehood, he said.

Speaking about the political life of the republic, Gumbaridze emphasized that the Georgian Communist Party had renounced its monopoly on power and is now

building relations with other socio-political movements on a democratic and equal basis.

At the same time, opposition forces which received an opportunity to get to the political arena, quite often resort to forbidden methods, reminiscent of the epoch of totalitarian arbitrariness.

This is a temporary, transitional process which runs counter to the logic of society's development, Gumbaridze maintains. In such conditions, the Communist Party should show wisdom and restraint and continue to look for ways to consolidate all socio-political strata and groups of the population.

Meskhetian Turks Postpone March to Georgia

LD1008200190 Moscow TASS in English 1931 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Text] Sochi, Krasnodar region August 10 TASS—A march to Georgia, planned by Meskhetian Turks, has been postponed. An agreement about it was reached last night at a tripartite meeting between representatives of Meskhetian Turks, the Abkhazian and Sochi authorities. A telegram was sent to the Centre and to the Georgian government, asking to name the date by which the problems of Meskhetian Turks will be addressed.

Now Meskhetian Turks, exiled from their native land in the Caucasus on a false accusation of collaborating with Nazis during the Second World War, are living at stadium in the city of Adler. There were some 800 of them this morning. The figure is expected to reach 15,000 in the near future. Adler is the southernmost populated locality ion the Russian Federation. A border with Georgia is eight kilometers away from it, by the Psou River.

The Sochi City Council of People's Deputies displayed understanding with regard to these developments. Snack bars were opened at the stadium, people were supplied with hot meals. Additional militia units were assigned there to maintain order. The deputies interrupted their session to hear information about the situation with Meskhetian Turks. They sent messages to Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatoliy Lukyanov, Boris Yeltsin and Givi Gumbaridze, asking them to discuss the refugee problem and the problem of the return of Meskhetian Turks to their native land as soon as possible.

Migration processes intensified in the Kuban region recently. There is no end to a flow of settlers from other republics, some of whom can hardly be regarded as refugees. It further increased during the past several months. Some 27,000 Armenians, Kurds, Azerbaijanians, Meskhetian Turks and Russians came to the Krasnodar region since 1988. Social tension is growing in some areas, where the inflow of refugees is especially great.

Abkhaziya Issues March Warning

LD1208012390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2130 GMT 11 Aug 90

[Text] A joint session a few days ago of the Bureau of the Abkhaz Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and the Council of Ministers of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic examined the question of (?further) measures to prevent further exacerbation of the situation in Abkhaziya in light of the mass march across the territory of the autonomous republic planned by the leaders of the national movement of Meskhetian Turks. The resolution adopted stresses that in the acute socio-political situation that has come about in the republic, the (?intended) action is totally impermissible, since it could run out of control, [words indistinct] protest. The leaders of this national movement were warned about this in a letter from the Presidium of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Publicity is being carried out among the population, aimed at heading off any possible provocations and mass excesses. A republican coordinating council has been formed, headed by (Khaburdzane), second secretary of the Abkhaz Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. An operations headquarters has been set up at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhaziya for ensuring public order and mobilizing forces and resources of the internal affairs bodies for the purpose of halting mass violations of public order.

On Saturday, an IZVESTIYA correspondent reported as follows: Talks have been held at the Sochi town executive committee with a delegation of the Meskhetian Turks society Vatan. Those taking part reached the conclusion that it is more sensible to disperse and await a social solution to the problem.

Turks End Settlement Efforts

LD1408081690 Moscow TASS in English 0803 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Text] Tbilisi, Georgia, August 14 TASS—Thousands of Meskhetian Turks who set up a camp at a stadium in Adler near Sochi, south Russia, before starting a march to Georgia, on Tuesday began to leave for home.

The move has reduced tension in Georgia where people have been protesting for months against the arrival in the republic of tens of thousands of Meskhetian Turks for permanent residence.

The march was cancelled after talks between representatives of Meskhetian Turks, an ethnic minority deported from Georgia in 1944, parties and organisations grouped in a "roundtable" of Georgia's National Liberation Movement, and the authorities of Sochi and the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in Georgia.

Participants in the talks expressed their sympathy for the fate of Meskhetian Turks and their problems but said these problems should be solved "above all by legal

means, rather than by power pressure and without taking account of the situation in Georgia, specific realities and people's sentiments."

Georgian newspapers published a statement of the Central Council of the Meskhetian public organisation Vatan, signed by Council Chairman Y. Sarvarov, saying that Vatan's leadership "accepts the appeal of the 'roundtable' to people deported in 1944 from Meskhetia, and shares the view that the issue of Meskhetian Turks is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the parliament of an independent and democratic Georgia."

The situation on the Georgia-Russian border is coming back to normal. Reinforced police posts were removed from the border on Tuesday afternoon and Interior Ministry troops were pulled out. Civilians have also stopped picketing the area.

Arms Seized in Raid on Hospital Guard Post

LD1308155490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] At the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: A daring crime has been committed in the town of Poti, Georgian Republic: In the dead of night of 11 August, two masked armed ciminals raided the duty post guarding the special pediatric hospital of the republic's Ministry of Health. They tied up two guards and seized from the armoury 15 pistols and a large quantity of ammunition.

Central Asia

Stroyev Visits Tselinograd Field Workers

LD1008174590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Our next report, from Kazakhstan—from Tselinograd—is devoted to one of today's important subjects: grain harvesting. Once again we are talking about a battle for the crop. But if we are to use the usual term, we must say that, as in every battle, here too you win some and you lose some. Regretfully, today there are quite a few losses and they are multiplying every day. This is particularly annoying in a year of abundant grain.

[Correspondent F. Dzhakushev] It has been a long time since the fields of the virgin lands of the Irshymside have produced such a grain crop. According to preliminary estimates, the virgin lands workers will get on average 16-18 centners from each hectare, while some farms, where more favorable climatic conditions prevail, are planning to cross the 30-centner line. But so far, all this wealth is in the fields. The task is to harvest it and store it on time and without losses.

But as if the fact that the permanent July rains prolonged the crop ripening by 10-12 days was not enough, the provision of the necessary numbers of men and equipment for the harvesting has become an additional heavy burden among the unresolved tasks. The decision adopted by the USSR Government on additional measures for safeguarding the 1990 harvest and the appropriate decision of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers are being allowed to slide and to come into operation unhurriedly. There should be 19,000 combine harvesters working in the fields of the oblast. In order to provide mechanizers for this amount of equipment, more than 4,000 men should come from other union republics to assist the Tselinograders. But so far, just over 800 have arrived.

Especially alarming is the insufficient motor transport. If in 1979, which was similar to this year, there were 12,000 motor vehicles engaged in transporting the grain, today the oblast has 5,000 at its disposal, and even those so far only on paper. There is no rubber, no spares. The situation is the same with tractor-trailers. Combine harvesters are standing idle because of a lack of batteries. There is not enough fuel and lubricants.

All these serious problems were described to Comrade Stroyev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, who was familiarized with the state of affairs in the fields, and then at a conference held at the Barayev Order of the Red Banner of Labor All-Union Scientific Research Institute. The Tselinograders place great hopes on this meeting. If the country comes to their assistance on time, the Tselinograders will respond with abundant bread supplies.

Kirghiz Declaration Up for Nationwide Discussion

PM1008154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Ryabushkin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Route to Sovereignty"]

[Text] Frunze—The draft declaration on the Kirghiz SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] state sovereignty has been submitted for nationwide discussion in the republic.

It establishes that Kirghizia is a sovereign socialist multinational state which, on the basis of the people's free self-determination enshrined in the Union treaty, is voluntarily part of the USSR. The republic has absolute power over the whole territory, with the exception of the powers delegated by it to the USSR's control. This means the questions of ensuring the country's security and defense.

In the opinion of people's deputies with whom I have talked, the fiercest debate will erupt during discussion of the declaration's provisions about the fact that "supreme oversight over the precise and uniform application of laws is exercised by the USSR general prosecutor and the Kirghiz SSR prosecutor, who is appointed by the USSR general prosecutor and approved by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet." The ownership of Union enterprises

and organizations located on the republic's territory is inadequately defined. The draft declaration merely says that they pay a contribution for the use of land and other natural and labor resources and taxes on foreign currency receipts, and also that they pay taxes to local budgets.

After wide discussion of the draft declaration, it will be submitted to the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet for consideration.

Osh Oblast Holds Party Plenum in Kirghizia

Masaliyev, Girenko Attend

LD1308143990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Aug 90

[Text] A plenum of the Osh Oblast party committee in Kirghizia has been held. The interethnic conflict in the oblast and measures to improve and stabilize the situation were on the agenda. It was noted that the tragic events which have taken place in the oblast are the result of serious deformations in the social and economic development and cultural construction of interethnic relations. The oblast, rayon, and city party committees did not take into full account the variety of the population's ethnic makeup when implementing its cadre policy. As a result, distorations occurred, especially when forming the cadres of the bodies of law and order, and in a number of other important fields. All these twists were grounds for the growth of social tension and the creation of an explosive situation. The plenum has planned measures aimed at removing defects.

Masaliyev, CPSU Politburo member, first secretary of the Kirghizian CP, and Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary took part in the work of the plenum.

Casualties, Damage Listed

LD1308161590 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 13 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[Text] Osh, Kirghizia, August 13 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Osh regional committee of the Soviet Communist Party, held here, discussed the ethnic conflict in the region and measures to stabilise the situation.

Tension in relations between Kirghiz and Uzbeks began simmering in May when the Uzbek Adyalyat informal association demanded that an Uzbek autonomous republic be set up within the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.

More than 500,000 Uzbeks live in Kirghizia. They make up a quarter of the local population.

Activists from the Kirghiz informal organisation Osh-Aimagy demanded that they be allotted lands for individual construction. Regional party officials and government executives, who failed to evaluate the situation, decided to meet their demand. The simmering dispute then swiftly reached boiling point.

Clashes in Osh region, which occurred on June 4, and the second eruption of unrest on July 14 claimed 230 human lives, according to official figures.

About 400 people are missing and more than 2,000 were injured. Some 500 buildings and 100 cars were burnt. The damage was estimated to top 40 million roubles. Part of the harvest was ruined.

Speakers at the plenum pointed out that the tragic events in the region could be traced back to serious deformations in socio-economic and cultural development and in ethnic relations.

The party regional, city and district committees, in pursuing the personnel policy, did not fully take into account the multi-ethnic nature of the republic's population. As a result, they made blunders, especially in recruiting staff for law enforcement agencies, and in several other important areas. All these mistakes were the breeding ground for the rise of social tension and the emergence of the explosive situation in the republic.

The plenum mapped out measures to remove the failings.

Reportage on Recent Events in Osh Oblast

Situation Seen as 'More Stable'

LD0808160290 Frunze Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 8 Aug 90

[Text] The situation in Osh Oblast is begining to take on a more stable character. All the enterprises, institutions, and organizatons are working, and agricultural work is continuing. In the Uzgenskiy Rayon the situation is normalizing. At the rayon executive committee a meeting was held of the leaders and the main specialists of the collective farms. About 200 people were present. Questions on the harvesting of crops and other problems connected with agriculture were discussed. At the enterprises and organizations the work process is normalizing. In 24 hours in the oblast there were 47 incidents and crimes, including two cases of looting, 4 bodily injuries, 6 cases of hooliganism, and 25 thefts; 20 of these crimes were committed during the mass unrest in the town of Uzgen. On the territory of Osh, ammunition was found, and the body of a girl with signs of violent death. According to preliminary findings she died five to seven days earlier.

Including the corpses found earlier, the number of dead during the mass unrest is now 230, while the number of those injured and hospitalized has not changed. The number of persons lost without trace is 91, with three new cases noted. Within 24 hours 17 rounds of ammunition and 6 petrol bombs have been found in the oblast.

Relief Supplies Arrive

LD0908160290 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 9 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[Text] Frunze August 9 TASS—On the roads leading to the Osh region of Kirghizia, there is a crush of motor vehicles carrying clothes, food and building materials to areas affected by the conflict between Kirghizes and Uzbeks.

A money-raising campaign in aid to unrest victims is now in progress in Kirghizia. Millions of roubles that have been raised turn into goods and are sent to Osh region. Relief supplies are being delivered to both Uzbeks and Kirghizes.

According to the latest official data, the June 4 clases and the flare-up of violence on July 14 claimed a toll of 230 human lives.

About 400 people are reported missing, more than 2,000 people have been injured, almost 500 buildings and about a hundred motor vehicles have been burned down. The damage inflicted upon the Kirghiz national economy is estimated at over 40 million roubles. Part of crop has also been ruined.

Tension began to build in relations between Kirghizes and Uzbeks (more than 500,000 Uzbeks account for a quarter of the entire local population) in Kirghizia's south way back in May. At that time the Uzbek informal association Adalat put forward a demand that an Uzbek autonomy be instituted within the framework of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Kirghiz informals from the Osh Aimagi demanded that land be allotted for them to build individual houses. The regional party and local government authorities, who failed to estimate the situation properly, decided to provide the land. This sparked off a clash. Law and order maintenance forces behaved indecisively. Therefore on the very first day, the clash turned bloody.

Absamat Masaliyev, the Kirghizia Communist Party chief and Kirghiz Parliament chairman, believes that the sources of the tragedy are not only in the socio-economic and personnel problems that have not been addressed for years but also in the bureaucratic attitude to the destiny of people and in party and local government bodies' lag behind the processes taking place in society.

A state of emergency and a curfew were imposed in the region on June 4. Units of interior forces and Soviet Army units stationed in Central Asia arrived here to stabilise the situation. A fragile peace set in in the region from July 13. Industrial enterprises are in operation, farm machinery is at work in the fields, and refugees are returning home.

A group of operatives and investigators from the prosecutor's office and the Interior Ministry of the USSR is now at work in Osh region. About a hundred people involved in the unrest have been apprehended and an investigation under way.

Ministry Views Situation

LD0908174290 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 9 TASS—According to the USSR Interior Ministry, the situation in Osh region of Kirghizia has been stable over the past 24 hours.

The curfew was reduced on Wednesday on military commandant order and now remains in effect in the cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Kyzyl Kiya from 23.00 to 05.00 and in Uzgen from 22.00 to 05.00. Activities by the informal public organisations Osh Aimagy, Adalat and Birlik have been suspended, a spokesman at the USSR Interior Ministry's Press Centre told TASS today.

Kirghiz, who are viewed hostilely by Uzbeks in a number of places, continue to return to their homes in Uzgen. Many of the returnees stay indoors, and do not go out to town for work.

Nineteen hunting-guns were confiscated in the region on Wednesday and 149 people were detained for curfew violations.

Authorities Criticized

90US1243A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Aug 90 p 9

[Article by Yuriy Rost: "A Bell Tolling for Those Still Alive"]

[Excerpts] I am not apologizing to either the editors or readers for this article being somewhat "rough." I am recounting what I have learned, what I have seen and heard myself. May God save you from becoming a character in such an article. [passage omitted]

I had no plans to stop in Osh. The newspapers and the television had explained it all. A conflict between the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks. As a result of mutual rudeness and the hot tempers of the young people, 214 people had died. "The situation is tense but is being normalized." The buses had started running, the enterprises had started working. The situation was under control.

I planned to go to the base camp at the 4,200 meters mark right away, at the first opportunity, in order to get a close look at the "pan"—a relatively flat pad where mountain climbers have pitched tents for dozens of years on their way to the top of the Peak of Lenin, and where there is now a collective grave. Finally, I succeeded in getting to the location, and a report from the foot of the Peak of Lenin will be published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA shortly. However, no transportation to the mountains was expected either this day or in the coming days, and I went to Osh, to the building where the

investigative group of the USSR Procuracy worked; this group is headed by my old acquaintance Vladimir Kalinichenko.

The streets were empty and hot. The few pedestrians hurried along, looking around as they went. Next to the hotel "Alay," a party dressed in military uniforms and gym shoes and armed with short automatic rifles was getting into a Volga. Militiamen with the same kind of automatic rifles were at the bus stops and in the midst of passengers on the buses. There were armed soldiers in the doorway of the KGB oblast administration; tanks protected approaches to the oblast committee. The Special Missions Militia Detachment with shields and other gear formed chains—women threatened to gather in the square. In front of the commandant's office there was an armored personnel carrier with soldiers clinging to it. The war was not far away...

The procuracy was the only place with nobody in front of it. Waiting for Kalinichenko, I lay down on a bench in the street and slept for about three hours.

"You must be crazy.... Into the house, hurry!" This was Vladimir Ivanovich in a camouflage uniform without shoulder boards—it is safer that way.

However, the procuracy was not defended any better than the bench on which I slept. One episode of arson will be enough for cases involving 214 murders, hundreds of pogroms, rapes, and other crimes to be "finished" before trial. The investigators themselves are not protected by anyone either, though a good number of threats have been made. Despite promises of help, there is quiet sabotage in the rayons and in the oblast seat. They cannot count on the militia very much, or on the party leadership for that matter.

It looks as though the employees of the Union procuracy are the only ones who care about the investigation. As Aleksandr Vasilyevich Frolov, deputy chief of the Investigations Department, who got the task of coordinating the work of investigative teams under the most difficult conditions, said, the militia is not zealously apprehending criminals despite their making no special effort to hide.

A strange situation gradually came to light in the course of viewing videotapes, pictures, and numerous interviews with representatives of the authorities, servicemen, victims, and eyewitnesses.

The events which we are inclined to ascribe to chance and the awkward behavior of party and soviet organs in reality appear to be a well-planned or precisely provoked action aimed at squeezing the people of nonindigenous ethnicity from the territory of Kirghizia. Moreover, the brazenness and cruelty of the pogroms show that the "higher" purpose relieved the bandits of any human standards at all.

All of us know about the pretext for this conflict—a field in Osh which at one time was farmed mainly by Uzbeks from the kolkhoz [collective farm] imeni Lenin. In July they decided to allocate it for settlement to the Kirghiz.

Supposedly, a clash between groups of Uzbeks and Kirghiz occurred on this field, which resulted in the loss of human life. Six Uzbeks were killed and many wounded. The crowds did not engage each other. The Special Missions Militia Detachment personnel fired into the air but the victims fell with bullets in their chests. The Kirghiz militia fired on the crowd. Kirghiz commandos wearing distinctive red headbands (manufactured at state enterprises), who had two weeks of training, sat quietly in the field and awaited a signal. After the shooting, when the crowd of Uzbeks rushed to the city, the commandos rushed after them.

The following day, mass murders began in Uzgen, Kara-Su, and the rayons. It is hard to believe that these clashes were unpremeditated and spontaneous. It takes more than just the precise organization of operations in order to prepare in advance enough Molotov cocktails sufficient to set fire to entire blocks, and to have pogroms erupt right away in many locations. It takes an idea, a wild and barbaric one, but an idea nonetheless.

These were no "hooligan actions" and no "group of extremists." These were regular people—not to call them normal—in whose minds false ideas about ethnic infringement upon the indigenous population by aliens have been planted, that supposedly it was the people of a different ethnic group living next door for centuries or years rather than the party gentry who made the people poor and frequently homeless. Did one party clan set its people upon the representatives of another in the course of a power struggle in order to become popular? Or is it that another clan—toppled but still influential—provoked the murder of hundreds of people in order to discredit the new authorities? It does not matter. The main point is to understand that the events in Osh are a political putsch.

This putsch is "an offspring" of Sumgait, as was the massacre perpetrated by the Uzbeks in Fergana, the Karabakh war, and Kirovabad. Had the Sumgait pogrom received a legal and political evaluation two years ago we would have avoided hundreds of innocent victims, and tens of thousands of people would not have been left homeless. However, the supreme authorities did not display determination—to comply with the laws in effect in the country and the world, rather than to suppress—being apprehensive about destroying the "infallible stronghold of the friendship of the peoples" proclaimed in the anthem.

Our system does not create prerequisites for nationalism and racism, does it? Maybe it does not. This means that nationalism and racism have sprung up without prerequisites. Or else this abomination has always existed, like a compressed spring which the authorities always kept on safety for as long as a democratic society was far

away, no closer than communism. However, as soon as a threat to the authoritarianism of the party appeared, the safety pin was pulled out.

We have difficulty learning things, and we are hard of hearing—the bell is tolling for us, regardless of the area of the country in which this happens. But we do not hear it, or we do not want to hear it.

In Sumgait a group of hooligans got worked up by rumors about the murder of two Azeris in Karabakh... Was there a need to reinforce the militia on an emergency basis and step up ideological work? No, there was a need to complete the case on the party mafia in the republic in order to hold accountable those who prepared Sumgait rather than to hold the entire Azeri people responsible.

In Fergana a woman with strawberries failed to take something into account, and as a result of a pogrom perpetrated by Uzbek thugs we got more than just one Sumgait.

All of this happened during the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies at which the leader of the Uzbek Republic was elected chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities. Could this be why the congress failed to devote a single day to determining the causes of the tragedy?

The events in Osh Oblast, with a magnitude of dozens of Sumgaits, and exceeding in terms of cruelty everything we know even from literature, happened to occur at the time of a party congress. However, at the congress as well no time could be found to discuss this human catastrophe, and the leader of the hotbed republic (this time, of Kirghizia) became a Politburo member... He visited Uzgen in... an armored personnel carrier, and did not find it in himself to get out to speak to his own people, even with guards at his side. A helicopter ferried him to a place safe for the republic leadership.

A legend about the Osh field of strife, spread by the mass media, has brought to life a myth about the spontaneity of what happened. A legal rally for which the Uzbeks assembled was supposed to discuss 17 points. The issue of an ethnic autonomous unit was among them. According to the official version, this was the fuse. Knowing full well that the claim of the crowd of many thousands was not justified, I will take the liberty to say that the rally was merely a pretext for the pogrom. More precisely, the pogrom was pegged to the rally.

I know that I must spare the sensitivity of the readers, but I believe that they must know the truth.

As far as cruelty is concerned, the events in Osh Oblast are without parallel. Do you understand what is behind this phrase?

I will explain: This means people whose throats were slashed and their blood drained (as they do when they slaughter sheep), subsequently dumping them on the road for desecration or tossing them into the water; this means people killed and then burned to cinders; this means noses and ears cut off and eyes plucked out; this means a human head on a pole; this means women raped by dozens of animals and subsequently killed; this means raped girls, raped and killed. This means children who were killed, many children—from those still in their mothers' wombs and newborns to teenagers... and old people who were killed.

You know, I removed a segment on events at an apiary in the mountains from the article myself, of my own volition, right before the issue was signed to the press. I do not mean the episode when a dozen horsemen, having tied up a bee keeper with iron wire, dragged him behind their horses and then finished him off, but other events so horrible that I considered describing them excessive.

The murderers have been found, or will be found, all the more so because many of them are making no special effort to hide, as if not feeling any particular guilt. However, I would like to wish good luck (damn it, this is not the right word, but the meaning is clear) to the KGB investigators who are looking for the organizers (presumably, not only the pawns) of this terrible carnage. Those who left the already half-dead people to 13- and 15-year-old teenagers for them to complete the atrocities, should also be found. Perhaps, they should be found first of all.

In our previous dramas, these individuals acting behind the backs of the crowd remained anonymous. Or is it that they were not there?

In this case, there were enough of them, and in different places at that. [passage omitted]

More than 80 percent of those killed were Uzbek. The figure of 214 killed is not final, it may even double or triple, because many hundreds of people are unaccounted for. Please, do not try to convince me that all of them have run away and are in hiding. In Uzgen alone more than 80 burial sites have been found which have not been registered so far. In every grave there is at a minimum one person killed. In some, there are more than one. I saw this with my own eyes.

The Uzbeks also know these numbers and who was killed in what manner—they did the burying. What they want is not revenge but the truth. When there is no truth, revenge is taken on the innocent. Here we are, six Kirghiz homes have been set ablaze in Andizhan...

You should know what has happened and, perhaps, is happening in our time and on our land. You should not think that Uzgen is far away, and that you will not end up there. They may come to your house—of a different nationality, wearing different clothes, and with different weapons.

Colonel Valeriy Yevnevich who broke into Uzgen with his paratroopers and combat vehicles and saved thousands of Uzbeks and Kirghiz may not happen to be nearby. There was no anger, only bitterness and pain, in

the heart of this handsome and still young man who has been through Afghanistan but has not witnessed such things even there.

We frequently assail the military for unjustified delays and for excessive actions, but here in Uzgen they should have our gratitude and apologies for being forced to do what is not their job. They came on time. Had they been one day late, even as little as five to six hours late, we would be counting victims in more than mere hundreds. Rescuing the city leadership, the colonel "arrested" them for several days, until the situation settled (and nobody objected). It is interesting that the oblast Internal Affairs Administration chief who preferred not to identify himself to Yevnevich was among those detained. The paratroopers rescued the wounded, buried the corpses, and put out the fires. They lost one soldier: Having seen enough dead children and girls, he took his own life.

Professional federal troops should be provided for in a new Union treaty; they should consist of adults rather than young people. Regional armies which many republic parliaments are now leaning toward may turn a conflict similar to that in Osh into a real war.

Having returned from Uzgen to Osh I once again came to the investigative group of the USSR Procuracy. There was still no guard. There were two investigators "allotted" by the Ukraine in the office of the chief of the group; they complained about rayon authorities not giving them motor vehicles to work in the rayon. They were told: "Pay for them, and use them."

As soon as his temporary coworkers left, Kalinichenko said bitterly: "Here it is. Here! The telephone virtually does not operate. There are continuous disruptions with transportation, and investigative operations are frustrated. After all, they are in another, unfamiliar city. There are no guards, although conflict situations are very likely. Besides, there are no investigators. There are only about 150 specialists for, at a minimum, 214 murders discovered and more than 5,000 other crimes. The republics do not want to provide personnel. Moreover, they recall those who have already done a lot to solve crimes. Who is going to sort all of this out?"

I asked him: "Volodya, is it true that they fired on the crowd from a helicopter?"

"This information is being verified."

"Will it come to trial?"

Kalinichenko said philosophically: "We will wait and see."

Or we will not see?.. After all, all is quiet: A government commission or a Supreme Soviet commission still has not been set up; the Soviet of Nationalities did not meet in an emergency session (apparently, there is more important business); little has been heard from the commission for emergencies... Nobody has offered condolences to the families of the countrymen who died—not the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, not the prime minister, not other ranking leaders. Likewise, the lower leaders who head the two republics did not raise an alarm.

If we fail to hear the alarm today, someone will hear the bells toll.

For others, it will be too late to hear them!

Implementing Firearm Decree in Tajikistan

LD0908194890 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0005 GMT 9 Aug 90

[Text] The time stated in the decree by the president of the USSR for the disbandment of illegal associations, groupings, voluntary squads, and armed divisions, and also for the surrendering of firearms and ammunitions is passing quickly.

A correspondent of the Tajik radio met Navdzhavanov, internal affairs minister of Tajikistan, and questioned him on measures to implement the president's decree, he said:

I can say with a full sense of responsibility that no armed groups exist on the territory of Tajikistan. Officially, 16,776 hunting and sports guns belonging to the inhabitants have been registered. So far, in places where state of emergency is in force, 4,726 firearms have been either confiscated or voluntarily handed over by the inhabitants. [passage indistinct]

Events during the month of February showed that the population still had a lot of firearms. Automatic rifles, carbines, and small firearms have been confiscated. There are a few routes where firearms get into the territory of the republic. During the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, the number of firearms in the republic increased. Other firearms are coming from other regions of the country. Similarly, firearms are also provided by locally made (?methods). [passage indistinct]

In our view, the sale of hunting and sports guns should be banned temporarily. The population should hand over their weapons voluntarily. In this task we hope for the active assistance of local authorities and social organizations. The leaders of those enterprises where the incidents of firearms manufacturing can be seen should be investigated.

Tajik Democratic Party Founded, Large Membership Constituent Conference Opens

LD1008144890 Moscow TASS in English 1433 GMT 10 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Nina Merezhnikova]

[Text] Dushanbe August 10 TASS—A new party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, emerges on the arena of political activity in Tajikistan. The constituent conference of the party which is the first of its kind in Soviet

Central Asia, opened here today. There are similar parties in Russia and some other union republics of the Soviet Union.

The party's leaders say that it already has a membership of some four thousand. Most of them are intellectuals, but there are also workers and peasants in the party.

The native population predominates, but there are quite a number of Russians, Uzbeks and Tatars in the party.

The new party was founded on the basis of a number of informal movements in the republic.

Shodman Yusupov, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, told TASS that the party is supported by many people unsatisfied with the pace of perestroyka in the Soviet Communist Party. The party's programme which is tolerant to religious creeds of its members attracted some Islamic religious leaders.

Leaders of the new party exerted considerable efforts to obtain the permission to hold the constituent conference. The regime of the state of emergency under which large rallies are prohibited, continues to operate in Dushanbe.

The conference hall of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, holding 300, was offered for the conference. It cannot hold all those wishing to attend the conference and so the number of participants had to be restricted.

The constituent conference is attended by guests—representatives of various political movements from Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia, Latvia and other Soviet republics.

Congress Ends 10 Aug

LD1008205290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Aug 90

[Text] The founding congress of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan ended in Dushanbe today. The party has around 4,000 members. Candidate of Philosophical Science Shodman Yusupov was elected chairman of the party in an unopposed election. The party's rules and program were adopted and the editors of newspapers to be published in Russian and Tajik were confirmed. The delegates also adopted an appeal to the people of Tajikistan and the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers.

New Namangan Obkom First Secretary Elected

PM0908135690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[UZTAG-TASS report: "Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] Plenum"]

[Text] Namangan, 7 Aug—An Uzbek Communist Party oblast committee [obkom] plenum was held here today to examine an organizational question. In connection with his election as chairman of the Uzbek Trade Union Council V.A. Alamuradov was relieved of his post of first secretary and bureau member of the CPSU obkom.

B.Zh. Khakimov, acting chairman of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Goskoopkomselkhoz [expansion unknown], was elected first secretary of Namangan Party Obkom.